
mm 
i 



iiiii) 



II I 311} 1 



dill 



m 



ili < 



'ill' 
ill 



in; 














p' 







1 1 IS 






!Mi!» 



i 



ill 'ill 11 



mm 



1 



Si 






Si 



Ill 



HlHiJtHffii 




Class lkz£^^0 
Copyright^? 



CfiEXRIGRT DEPOSIT. 



Employment 



of 



Machine Guns 



By 

Major Walter C. Short, Infantry 




Washington : 

U. S. Infantry Association 

1922 






Copyright 1922, by the 
United States Infantry Association 



©CLA674030 



NATIONAL CAPITAL PRESS, INC., WASHINGTON, 0. C. 



MAY 1 1622 



Preface 

Of all of the developments of the World War none is more striking 
than the remarkable increase in the use of machine guns. Tactically 
nothing is of greater importance to the infantry and cavalry than the 
proper coordination and cooperation of the rifle companies and troops 
with the machine guns that support them. 

In every situation the commander must decide how he can best 
employ the machine guns to support the riflemen, while the machine- 
gun officer must determine the best technical means for rendering this 
support and make the necessary tactical dispositions within his unit. 
This book is intended to be useful to the commanders of units from the 
battalion and squadron to the division and to machine- gun officers of 
all grades. The employment of machine guns in the v arious types of 
action is discussed, and the discussion in each case is followed by a 
map problem showing the application of the principles to a concrete 
example. Technical matters are not included, with the exception of 
an appendix upon the use of the trajectory chart and the chart for 
searching reverse slopes. The correct application of machine-gun 
fire makes it necessary for the commander as well as the machine-gun 
officer to be thoroughly familiar with the use of these graphs. The 
commander first of all must know the organization he has to work 
with and the duties of the members of the various units. What the 
machine guns can accomplish depends largely upon their equipment 
and a full and correct understanding of the possibilities of their equip- 
ment by the commander. For this reason the equi pment of machine- 
gun units is given in detail. 

In the preparation of this book valuable assistance has been re- 
ceived from the instructors of the General Service Schools and of the 
Infantry School. 



Table of Contents 



Chapter Page 

I. Organization and Equipment of the Machine Guns of an Infantry 

Division 1 

II. Duties of the Personnel of Machine-Gun Organizations Preceding 

and During Combat 15 

III. Characteristics of Machine Guns 25 

IV. Employment of Machine Guns in the Offensive 30 

V. Machine-Gun Company with an Infantry Assault Battalion. 

(Terrain Exercise.) 42 

VI. Employment of the Machine Guns of a Regiment in the Later 

Phases of an Attack. (Tactical Ride.) 53 

VII. Machine Guns of a Division in an Attack in a Meeting Engage- 
ment. (Map Problem.) 62 

VIII. Division Machine-Gun Annex in a Prepared Attack. (Map 

Problem.) 77 

IX. Regimental Machine-Gun Annex in a Prepared Attack. (Map 

Problem.) 92 

X. Employment of Machine Guns on the Defensive 106 

XI. Division Machine-Gun Annex in a Defensive Zone. (Map Prob- 
lem.) 120 

XII. Regimental Machine-Gun Annex in a Defensive Zone. (Map 

Problem.) 132 

XIII. Use of Machine Guns in Advance Guards, Rear Guards, Connect- 
ing Groups, Outposts and Combat in Woods. Employment of 
Machine Guns for Anti- Aircraft Defense 138 

XIV. Machine-Gun Company with Advance Guard. (Tactical Ride.) . . 152 
XV. Machine Guns with a Small Rear Guard. (Map Problem.) 157 

XVI. Machine Guns of a Brigade Outpost. (Map Problem.) 165 

XVII. The Division Machine-Gun Officer 171 

XVIII. Organization and Equipment of the Machine Guns of a Cavalry 

Division 185 

XIX. Employment of Cavalry Machine Guns 202 

XX. Machine-Gun Troop with the Cavalry Squadron 209 

Appendix "A." Trajectory Chart and Chart for Searching Reverse Slopes. 219 



Chapter I 

Organization and Equipment of the Machine Guns 
of an Infantry Division 

Table 29-P. — Machine-Gun Company, Infantry Regiment 

(Peace Strength.) November 23, 1920 

(As amended by circular No. 227, W. D. August 30, 1921.) 
(Temporarily modified for the infantry of the Regular Army.) 

Road Space yards. 

Tonnage : 

Animal drawn tons. 

Motor tons. 





1 


2 


3 


4 


5 


6 


7 


8 


9 


10 


11 




Units 


GO 
C 

C8 
u 

•-* m 

ft 
CO 


u 

S 

3 
C 

o 
.a 

a 

>> 

CO 


■8. 

am 
gcr 
O 


One platoon 


CN 
>> 

a 

cS,-s 

5 ° 
82 

_, cj 
O 

H 


13 
•3 

B6 

<u r 
o ft 




1 


11 

CO o* 


c8 

g.a 

en ° 


IN 

J-s 

11 


o f 
SI 


£0 

+■> 

aj 

130 

<u 

U 

Si 


2 








1A 










1 

2 




, 


3 








l/i 






1 


2 


















4 








1 


1 






1 


3 




3 
















5 








Ih 

2 










1 
6 




1 


6 












1 


2 


6 


7 














8 














(1) 










9 








(1) 
dm) 














10 






















11 










1 
(1) 

6 


2 


4 


8 




8 


13 














14 


Privates 1st class and privates, incl 






8 
(1) 

(2/») 
(1) 
(1) 


2 


12 


26 


60a 




60 


14^ 




6th 






15 


















16 




4th 
5th 


















17 


















18 






{«>} 




(2) 
(2) 


(4) 
(4) 






19 


Gunners 














20 








(1) 
(1) 
(26) 








21 






















22 








(2c) 


(5d) 






























73 


Total enlisted 






11 


2 


7 


15 


32 


75 




75 












?4 


AGGREGATE 






12 


3 


7 


15 


33 


78 




78 












75 


Horses, riding 






4 


1 






8 


6 

16 

1 

2 
8 
8 
8 
81 




6 


26 








2 


4 


16 


?7 








1 

2 




1 


?8 
















2 


?9 


Carts, M. G 








1 

1 

1 
7 


2 

2 

2 

15 


4 

4 

4 

34 


8 


30 












8 


31 


Machine guns 










8 


32 


Pistols 






12 


4 


81 













(h) Mounted on horse. (m) Mounted on mule. (a) Includes: 16 Privates 1st Class; 44 Privates. 
Summary of Specialist Ratings: 4th Class, 1; 5th Class, 1; 6th Class, 1. (b) Bicyclists. (c) Agents 
and orderlies, (d) Includes two drivers for gun and ammunition carts. 

1 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Table 29-P. — Machine-Gun Company, Infantry Regiment 

(Peace Strength) November 23, 1920 



Road Space 

Tonnage : 

Animal drawn- 
Motor 



-yards. 



-tons, 
-tons. 



For infantry of national guard and organized re- 
serves. This table is temporarily modified for in- 
fantry of the Regular Army. 





1 


2 


3 

<D 

£ 

fl 
"o 

B 
>■ 

CO 


4 


5 


6 


7 


8 


9 


10 


11 




Units 


"o 
to 
.5 

u 

.Is 

P. 
C/2 


ID 

CU 

d 

C 
t3 

<u 
A 

G 

a 

s 

o 

o 


One platoon 


"a? 

5 

O 

te 
"5. 

>. 
g 

aJ 
ft 
g 

o 

o 

13 
o 

1 

2 

3 


6 
"5 

a, 

•a 

"a 
_o 

'S 

s 

•a 

.G 

a 
1 




1 


xn 

u 

CD 
t- 

a) 
CT 

■d 

<u 
.G 

G 
O 

o 

d 


G 

to 

D 

G 

'Xi 

a 

S 

O* 


-d 
d 

& 

in 

CM 

C 

o 
o 

<D 
en 


w 
G 

.2 

o 

<u 

cs 

C 
o 
o 

*& 
IS 
o 

H 


«3 

d 
to 

to 

< 


2 








1ft 








t 


3 








1ft 






1 
1 


2 


















4 








1 


1 






3 
















5 








2 










1 
8 




1 


6 








1 

(1) 




1 


3 


8 


7 


Platoon sergeants 








8 












(1) 










9 








(1) 

(1«) 

1 

(1) 














10 






















11 










1 


2 


4 


9 




9 


12 










13 










CD 

6 












14 








8 
(2/*) 
(1) 
(1) 


2 


12 


26 


60c 




60 


15 










16 




4th 
5th 
6th 


















17 


















18 






{<»} 




(2) 
(2) 


(4) 
(4) 






19 














20 




6th 

5th 




(1) 
(1) 
{2b) 








21 


















22 




(2c) 


(5d) 






























23 


Total enlisted 






12 


3 


7 


15 


33 


78 




78 












24 


AGGREGATE 






13 


4 


7 


15 


34 


81 




81 












25 








4 


1 






1 

8 


6 

16 

1 

2 
8 
8 




6 


26 








2 


4 


16 


27 








1 
2 






28 
















2 


29 


Carts, M. G 








1 
1 

1 
7 


2 

2 

2 

15 


4 
4 


8 


30 












8 


31 












4 8 
34 1 81 


8 


32 


Pistols 






13 


4 


81 

















(ft) Mounted on horse. (m) Mounted on mule. (a) Includes: 16 Privates 1st Class; 44 Privates. 

Summary of Specialist Ratings: 4th Class, 1; 5th Class, 2; 6th Class, 5. (b) Bicyclists. (c) Agents 
and orderlies. (d) Includes two drivers for gun and ammunition carts. 



Organization and Equipment 



Road Space 

Tonnage ; 
Animal drawn- 
Motor 



Table 29-W. Machine Gun Company, Infantry Regiment 
(War Strength— April 15, 1921) 

Section 45 yards. Platoon 90 yards. Company 190 yards. 



-tons, 
-tons. 





1 


2 


3 


4 


5 


6 


7 


8 


9 


10 




Units 


C 

Pi 

CO 


£ 

3 

"o 

S 

co 


OS 

w 

H 
c « 

IS 

O 


"3 

s 

o 

o 


One platoon 


TO =a 


1 


T3 

o 

<-■ <D 
3 3 

0- 


c 

3 C 
CO o 


CO c-O 


c Is 


TO £_, 

"3 S S 

£J<3 


2 








\hx 

lhc 












1 


3 










1 






1 


3(1*) 


4 












1 






















5 








3(1*) 




1 






1 


5(lx) 
















6 








1A 

4 
(1) 












1 


7 








1 


1 




1 


3 


11 


8 










9 










(1) 










10 








(1) 












11 














(1) 






12 








(1) 












13 


Stable 






(lm) 












14 








(1) 
2 












15 










2 

(1) 


1 


2 


6 


14 


16 


Agents 








17 








(1) 
(1) 












18 




















19 


Squad Leaders 










(1) 








20 












(1) 
7 








21 








17 

(1) 
(2h) 
(1) 
(1) 
(2) 


4 


10 


20 


47 


115c 


22 










23 




















24 


Cobbler 


















25 




4th 
5th 
6th 
















26 
















?7 


Gunners 






{(«} 


{«)} 


H 


(3) 


28 










(5) 


29 


Horseshoer 


4th 
6th 
6th 
5th 






(1) 




30 




(2) 












31 




(1) 
(1) 












32 


















33 


Tailor 




(1) 
(7d) 












34 








(le) 


(7<f) 


(9/) 






















35 








24 


5 


10 


11 


23b 


56 


141 












36 


AGGREGATE. . 






27 


5 


11 


11 


23 


57 


146 












37 








6 




1 






1 
8 


8 


38 








2 


4 


16 


39 










1 




1 






















40 








6 


1 


1 


2 


4 


9 


25 














41 














1 
1 


2 
2 


4 
4 
1 


8 


42 














8 


43 








1 


...... 


1 


3 


44 












1 


45 












1 
11 


2 

23 


4 
57 


8 


46 


Pistols 






27 


5 


11 


146 













Road spaces given are not official but are those used at the Infantry School. 

(h) Mounted on horse. (w) Mounted on mule. (a) Includes: 35 Privates 1st Class; 80 Privates. 

Summary of Specialist Ratings: 4th Class, 2; 5th Class, 3; 6th Class, 6. (b) Section Headquarters 

includes 1 sergeant. (0 Reconnaissance officer. (d) Signalmen, runners, agents and orderlies, 

1 bicyclist. (e) Stable orderly. (/) Includes 2 drivers for gun and ammunition carts. (x) Second 

in command. Not authorized for war strength companies organized in time of peace. 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Organization 

The machine-gun battalion as an organized unit no longer exists 
within the infantry division. However, there will be numerous occa- 
sions demanding the employment of machine guns in units larger 
than a company. When such occasions arise, the machine-gun com- 
panies of reserve infantry battalions will be organized into provisional 
battalions or groups under the command of the regimental machine- 
gun officers. Such temporary organizations rarely will be given ad- 
ministrative functions but will function only as tactical units. 

Each infantry battalion has a machine-gun company as an integral 
part of its organization. 

The company is an administrative and tactical unit and in rare 
cases may be a fire unit. It is a fire unit only in the exceptional case 
where the guns of the company are posted so close together that they 
can readily be controlled by the captain. Such placing of the guns 
usually will lead to excessive losses. 

The platoon is a tactical and a fire unit. It is almost always the 
fire unit for indirect fire and is the fire unit for direct fire whenever 
the guns are placed close enough together to be controlled by the 
platoon leader. 

The section becomes a tactical unit on the offensive when the 
platoon advances by alternate sections. On the defensive the section 
is usually a tactical unit, as machine guns usually are posted by pairs 
rather than by platoons. For direct fire the section is usually the fire 
unit. 

The squad is a fire unit and becomes a tactical unit only in the 
exceptional case where machine guns are used singly. 

The question of the proper organization of machine guns has 
given rise to so much discussion that the reasons advanced for the 
adoption of the present organizations will be given briefly: 

1. A machine gun is one of a number of infantry weapons; it is 
a mechanical device for delivering infantry fire and by means of 
which there is obtained greater concentration of fire, and increase 
in rate, control and direction of fire. 

2. The machine gun must be prepared to attack with infantry and 
to hold the ground the infantry has gained. It must protect the 



Organization and Equipment 5 

flanks of the advancing infantry and be prepared to fill in gaps. It 
must be able to support attacking infantry by direct or indirect over- 
head or flanking fire and to deliver massed fire. 

3. The organization of the infantry must be such as gives the 
greatest efficiency in offensive combat, the defensive being a sec- 
ondary consideration. 

The battalion is the combat unit, and proper organization and 
training of this unit with all its infantry weapons is of the utmost 
importance. In the operation of the battalion today the machine guns 
form a very essential part of the organization, nor can a situation 
be conceived that will not include machine guns. 

4. Organization and training of the battalion must be based on 
combat, and if machine guns are a part of the battalion in combat 
they must be an integral part of its organization. The battalion is 
not a complete unit without the machine-gun weapon. 

5. There is a tendency on the part of some machine-gun officers 
to favor a machine-gun corps. This loses sight of the principle that 
machine guns exist solely to increase the cbmbat efficiency of the 
infantry, and it is the general combat efficiency that must be kept in 
mind constantly rather than the highly technical training of any 
special corps or unit. 

The best results cannot be obtained by separating machine guns 
from battalion organization and training and attaching them in com- 
bat or on special occasions. A battalion commander must be trained, 
and constantly pursue his work under conditions approaching combat 
as nearly as possible. Likewise all officers of rifle companies and 
machine-gun companies must train with the most complete conception 
of the battalion in combat. 

6. The following are lessons taken from the war : 
The battalion is the combat unit. 

Machine guns form an essential part of the unit. 

In offensive action there can be but one command exercised over 
the battalion and this command must be exercised over all its weapons. 

Failures on the part of battalion commanders to give definite and 
complete instructions to machine-gun units attached to their battal- 
ions, or failure of machine-gun officers to function properly with the 
battalion, have been causes of not getting the best support or fire 
effect from machine guns. 

7. If we consider the second role of machine guns as delivering 



6 Employment of Machine Guns 

mass fire, this can be performed by drawing companies from reserve 
battalions. 

8. The assignment of machine-gun companies to infantry bat- 
talions renders necessary a machine-gun officer on the regimental and 
division staffs, to prepare training memoranda for the machine-gun 
units, supervise their technical training, make frequent inspections, 
and during operations to advise and inform his commander on 
machine-gun matters. 

Equipment 

A tabulation of the main articles of organizational equipment of 
machine-gun companies is given in Tables 29-P and 29-W. The 
following extract from circular No. 276, War Department, gives the 
basic allowances of equipment for machine-gun companies. 

WAR DEPARTMENT 

Washington, October 26, 1921. 
Circular \ ■ 

No. 276. J Exiract 

Basic Allowances of Equipment Special for Infantry 

Circular 80, W. D. 1920, is rescinded and Circular 169, W. D. 1921 (Tables of 
Basic Allowances) is supplemented by the following Table IV-A, with notes 
prescribing the basic allowances of individual and organization equipment 
special to the infantry. The allowances prescribed herein will govern^in any 
conflict with other War Department publications. 

Table IV-A 

Section I. Armament and Miscellaneous Equipment. 

Section II. Engineering Equipment. 

Section III. Fire-Control Equipment. 

Section IV. Machine Gun, 37-mm. Gun, and 3-inch Trench Mortar Equipment. 

Section V. Signal and Communication Equipment. 

Section VI. Transportation (Animal Pack and Vehicle). 





Symbols of Supply Branch 




A. G. 


The Adjutant General of the Army. M. 


Medical. 


A. S. 


Air Service. 0. 


Ordnance. 


C. 


Chemical Warfare. Q. 


Quartermaster. 


E. 


Engineer. S. 


Signal. 



Organization and Equipment 



SECTION I 
Armament and Miscellaneous Equipment 



inch 


Articles of Equipment 1 




Q 


Bodies, picket pin, com- 
plete with eyes. 


A 


o 


Bolo, with scabbard .... 


A 


Q 


Case, record 


A 


Q 


Cutters, wire, heavy, with 
carrier. 


A 


o 


Field glasses* 


A 



o 



O Gun, machine, heavy. 



Pistol. 



O Rifle. 



Q Rope, picket, 25 ft. sec- 
tions. 

Q Rope, picket line, 1 J4" or 
cable. 

O Score Book (Soldiers 
Hand Book of the 
Rifle). 

O Watch, wrist, 7-jewel, 
luminous dial, with 
wristlet. 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 

— 2 for every 25-foot section of 
picket rope issued. 

— 1 per squad. 

— 1 per first sergeant. 

— 3 per platoon. Carried in com- 
bat wagon. 

— 3 per company headquarters; 

7 per platoon. 

A B (A) 4 per machine-gun platoon. 

(B) 4 extra spare guns per ma- 
chine-gun platoon. Carried 
in M. O. R. S. 

A — 1 per enlisted man, except 

reconnaissance sergeant, sig- 
nalmen, barber, cobbler, tail- 
or, saddler, mechanic, and 
such messengers as are not 
motorcyclists or bicyclists. 

A — 1 per enlisted man, except those 

armed with automatic rifles 
or pistols; 2 (without bayo- 
nets) per machine-gun com- 
pany carried in combat train. 

A — 1 per ten animals or fraction 

thereof. 

— B As ordered by local command- 

ing officer. 

A — 1 per soldier per year firing 

range rifle practice. 

A — 8 each per machine-gun com- 

pany. * 



(A) War set for field and garrison service. 

(B) Additional for use at posts and camps or stations of a relatively permanent nature. 
* For peace-strength organizations allowance is 6 to machine-gun companies. 



Employment of Machine Guns 

SECTION II 
Engineering Equipment 



Branch Articles of Equipment 1 

E Sketching outfit, — 
complete. 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 
B 1 per machine-gun company. 



SECTION III-A 
Fire Control Equipment for Machine-Gun Company 



1 per gun. 



o 


Box, night, firing, with 
battery, cable and 
lamps complete. 


A 


o 


Clinometer, M. G., com- 
plete. 


A 





Compass, lensatic, com- 
plete. 


A 


o 


Graph, trajectory 


A 


o 


Instrument, angle of site, 
complete. 


A 


o 


Protractor, alidade (len- 
satic compass type). 


A 


o 


Protractor, machine-gun 
(semi-cir.). 


A 





Range finder, complete... 


A 


o 


Rule, zinc 


A 





Sights: 






Luminous, front and 


A 




rear. 






Machine gun, pano- 


A 




ramic, complete with 






tripod. 






Front area, anti-craft.. 


A 



O Squares, zinc A — 

O Stakes, aiming, luminous A — 

A.G. Tables, indirect fire A — 

O Tables, plane, 40 cm., A — 
square, complete. 



1 per gun. 

1 per platoon and 1 additional 

per company. 
4 per gun. 
1 per platoon and k l additional 

per company. 
1 per gun and 1 additional per 

company. 
1 per platoon and ^additional 

per company. 
1 per platoon and 1 additional 

per company. 
1 per platoon and 1 additional 

per company. 

1 per gun. 

1 per gun and ^additional per 
company. 

1 to each 2 guns. 

1 per platoon 'and 1 additional 

per company. 
1 per gun. 
4 per gun. 
1 per platoon and 1 additional 

per company. 



1 (A) War set for field and garrison service. 
(B) Additional for use at posts and camps or stations of a relatively permanent nature. 



Organization and Equipment 



SECTION IV-A 

Machine-Gun Equipment 

Branch Articles of Equipment 1 Remarks and Basis of Issue 

O Attachment (blank am- A — 1 per gun. 
munition for heavy- 
machine gun). 

O Barrel, spare A — 3 per gun (1 with gun and 2 in 

combat train). 

O Belt, filling machine, with A — 1 per platoon and in reserve, 

box (each box contains normally carried in combat 

12 extra needles). train. May be issued to 

platoons when detached. 

O Belt, ammunition, 250 A — 17 per gun, carried on carts; 23 

rounds. per gun, carried in combat 

train. 

O Books, machine gun A — 1 per gun. 

(record). 
O Boxes: 

Ammunition A — 17 per gun, carried on carts. 

23 per gun in combat train. 

O Spare parts A — 1 per section of 2 guns. (See 

note 7.) 

O Water A — 4 per gun. 

O Covers: 

Canvas, mach.-gun .A — 1 per gun. 

O Spare barrel A — 1 per spare barrel. 

O Device, steam con- A — 1 per gun. 
densing. 

O Flash hider A — 1 per gun. 

O Gunner's pouch .... A — 1 per gun. 

A.G. Handbook (Machine Gun A — 1 per gun. 
Service Regulations, 
Section 22). 

O Hatchets, broad A — 1 per gun cart. 

O Mittens, asbestos, pair A — 1 per gun. 

O Outfit, repair, machine- A — 1 per gun, carried on gun and 

gun cart. ammunition cart. (See note 9.) 

O Paulin for cart A — 1 per cart. 

O Pick mattock A — 1 per gun cart. 

O Rod, cleaning A — 1 per gun. 

O Ropes,emergency for cart A — 1 per cart. 

O Shaft, spare for cart .... A — 1 per ammunition cart. 

O Shovel, short handled ... A — 1 per gun cart. 

Sling, ammunition, carry- A — 7 per squad. 

ing web. 

O Tripod A — 1 per gun. 

1 (A) War set for field and garrison service. 

(B) Additional for use at posts and camps or stations of a relatively permanent nature. 



10 



Employment of Machine Guns 



SECTION V 
Single Communication Equipment 



Branch Articles of Equipment 1 
S Signal lamp, Type EE-6. 

Q Tape, friction, pounds. . . 
S Telephone, Type EE-5 . . 
S Wire, outpost, twisted 
pair, miles 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 
2 per machine-gun company. 
(See note 16.) 

1 per machine-gun company. 

2 per machine-gun company. 

1 (on Y2 mile spools) per ma- 
chine-gun company. 



SECTION VI 



Transportation 
Animal: 

Horses, riding A — 



Mules, riding A 

Mules, draft A 

Vehicles: 

Bicycles A 

Carts : 

Machine gun, ammuni- A 
tion with harness, 1 
mule. 
Machine gun, gun with A 
harness, 1 mule. 
Motorcycles with side A 
cars. 

NOTE 7 



— 1 per officer, 1st sergeant and 

bugler. 

— 1 per stable sergeant. 

— 1 per machine-gun cart. 



1 per bicyclist. 

1 per gun. (See note 18.) 

1 per gun. (See note 18.) 
1 per motorcyclist. 



Box, 



Spare Parts, for Browning Machine Gun, Caliber .30. 

{Complete with Contents) 



Number 
1 



Accelerator 

Bolt (assembled) 

Disks, buffer 

Ejector 

Extension, barrel (assembled) . . . 

Extractor (assembled) 

Handle, belt 

Lever, belt feed 

Packing, asbestos, yards (for front 
and rear packing) 3 

Pins: 

Belt holding pawl, split 2 

Breech lock 2 

Ejector 3 

Firing (assembled) 1 

Firing pin spring 2 



Number 

Pin, trigger 1 

Pivot, belt feed lever (assembled) 

Plug, water (assembled) 

Sear 

Slide, belt feed (assembled) 

Springs, barrel locking 2 

Spring : 

Barrel plunger 

Belt-holding pawl 

Cover extractor 

Driving 

Trigger pin 

Breech lock pin 12 

Sear, assembled 3 

Trigger 1 



(A) War set for field and garrison service. 

(B) Additional for use at posts and camps or stations of a relatively permanent nature. 



Organization and Equipment 



11 



Accessories and tools contained in above cases 



Number 
Brush, chamber cleaning, for 
Browning Machine Gun, caliber 

.30 1 

Can, oil 1 

Cup, filling (assembled) 1 

Drift: 

Large 1 

Medium 1 

Small 1 

Envelopes, fabric, spare parts .... 2 



Number 

Extractors, ruptured cartridge. ... 2 

Hider, flash, assembled 1 

Pliers, Bernard, 5-inch, side-cut- 
ting, pair 1 

Fabric : 

Spare parts, roll 1 

Tool, roll 1 

Tin, small parts 1 

Tool, combination 1 



NOTE 9 
Outfit, Repair, Machine-Gun Cart, Complete 



B. 



No. 
Set of field spare parts for carts 
carried in metal tool boxes 
on gun cart and in tool 
chest on ammunition cart, 
consisting of bolts, nuts, 
and washers, assorted set 

washers, assorted set 1 

Pins, cotter, 0.125 by 1 inch. 12 
Pins, linch and rings, lock. ... 4 
Pins, with chains attached, set. 1 

Rivets, for carts, set 1 

Screws, wood, assorted, set . . . 1 

Washers, outer, for axles 4 

Set of miscellaneous repair 
material carried in metal tool 
box on gun cart and in tool 
chest on ammunition cart, 
consisting of grease, axle, 

pound can 1 

Oilstone, for oil or water, 

mounted in box 1 

Sheet iron (30 gauge, 4x48 

inches roll) 1 

Wire, annealed steel, tinned, 

No. 16 lb. spool 1 

Tool kit and tools for machine- 
gun carts consisting of a 



No. 



canvas roll with pockets 
carried in one of the tool 
chests on the ammunition 
cart, consisting of bit, 
reamer 

Awl and tool set 

Bit, screw driver 

Bit, wood, sets 

Brace, bit 

Chisel, cold 

Chisel, framing (0.75 inch) . . . 

File: 

Bastard, flat 

Bastard, round 

Taper, saw, regular 

Handle, file 

Knife, drawing 

Plier 

Punch : 

3/32 by 6 inch 

8/32 by 6 inch 

Leather 

Rasp, wood (flat) 

Saw, 1 8 - i n c h , detachable 
handle 

Vise, hand 

Wrench 



12 Employment of Machine Guns 

NOTE 16 

Signal Lamp, Type EE-6 (14 CM.) 

No. 

Lamp, signal, 14 cm., cord and plug 1 

Case, leather, battery, with strap, containing 4 cells, dry, 4-0 reserve 1 

Cotton, medicated, package, 1 ounce 1 

Cells, dry, 4-0 reserve (spare) 4 

Bulbs (3 clear, 1 ruby) (spare) 4 

NOTE 18 
Harness, Cart, Machine Gun, Complete Set 

No. No. 

Backstrap, with hip straps, har- Headstall, halter, bridle 

ness, cart 1 Reins, check, long, harness, cart. 

Backhand, with shaft tugs, har- Reins, check, short, harness, cart. 

ness, cart 1 Rope, halter, tie 

Bellyband, assembled, harness, Saddle, harness, cart 

cart 1 Straps, breeching, harness, cart. . . 2 

Bit, snaffle, with bit snaps, har- Strap, neck, harness, cart 1 

ness, cart 1 Straps, trace-carrying, harness, 

Breeching, harness, cart 1 cart 2 

Collar, breast, harness, cart 1 Traces, harness 2 

NOTE 19 

Ammunition 1 

(See remarks as to amounts carried in division trains) 

Ball cartridges, cal. .30. In carts, 4,000 per gun; 5,250 per gun will be carried 

in combat train. 
Tracer cartridges, cal. .30. In carts, 50 rounds white per gun. 100 rounds 

white per gun will be carried in combat train. 
Armor-piercing cartridges, cal. .30. In carts, 200 rounds per gun. 400 rounds 

per gun in combat train. 
Pistol-ball cartridge, caliber .45. As per Table II, Tables of Basic Allowances. 

21 rounds per pistol will be carried in combat trains. 

NOTE 24 
Trench Equipment for Infantry Organizations 

(To be issued only during active service in trenches in addition to the prescribed 
mobile equipment, in orders from division, or higher, commanders) 

Quartermaster Property 

Alcohol, solidified, in boxes, one can per man. 
Bags, water, one for each 100 men. 
Basins, metal, one for each 8 men. 



1 The amount of ammunition carried in division train for machine-gun company will be SO per 
cent (one-half) of the quantity carried in combat train, and for the pistol, 21 rounds per pistol. 



Organization and Equipment 13 

Blankets, O. D., wool, quantity to depend upon climate. 

Boots, rubber, hip, one pair per man. 

Brassards, arm, blue, O. D., red, white, yellow, green one for each agent, signal- 
man, runner. 

Braziers, one for each 50 men. 

Containers, food, squad (similar to "Theroz") (in place of marmites), one per 
squad. 

Grease, foot, one can per each eight men. 

Jerkins, leather, one per man. 

Mattress covers or bedsacks, one per man. 

Milk cans (for water storage and supply) 10 gal., one per each 50 men. 

Rations, reserve, two days per man. 

Stoves, trench; with pipe, quantity depends upon condition. 

Batteries, flashlight — one extra per flashlight. 

Bulbs, flashlight — one extra per flashlight. 

Flashlight, complete — one per each 20 men. 

Knife, pocket — one for each man. 

Oil, rifle — one gallon per each 100 men. 

Ordnance Property 
Ammunition, as issued. 
Periscope, simple, one per each 50 men. 
Periscope, magnifying, one per each 50 men. 
Periscope, rifle, one per each 25 men. 
Sniperscope, one per each 25 men. 
Pyrotechnics, as issued. 
Shot guns, 2 per squad. 

Chemical Warfare Service Property 
Alarms, gas, one per each 50 men. 
Canisters, spare, one per each 8 men. 
Chloride of lime, quantity to depend upon conditions. 
Blankets, gas-proof, for dugouts, quantity to depend upon conditions. 
Respirators, S. B., six per Bn. Hq. 
Transmitters, telephone gas mask, six per Bn. Hq. 
Tubes, anti-dim, spare, six per Bn. 
Technical Supplies: 

Bottles. 

Wind vanes. 

Various other supplies, as required. 

Engineer Property 
Axes, one per each 25 men. 
Crowbars, one per each 25 men. 
Cutters, wire, large, twelve per 200 men. 
Nails, 16d, as required. 
Pick, mattocks, same as mobile equipment. 
Pliers, wire cutting, same as mobile equipment. 
Saws, hand, one per each 50 men. 
Shovels, short-handled ; sharp-pointed, one per squad. 



14 Employment of Machine Guns 

Note: The following engineer property will be obtained as needed from the 
Regimental and Divisional Stores: 

Block, 8" (single, double, snatch, triple); burlap; climbers, linesman's; con- 
tainers for saws and edged tools; crowbars; saw files; hacksaw frames ; hack- 
saw blades; hammers, sledge, 6 lb.; hammers, sledge, 12 lb.; knives, gabion; 
machetes, with sheath; rope, %"; saws, crosscut; saw sets; saw tools; shovels, 
long-handled; tapes, steel; wrenches, Stillson; steel drills; corrugated iron; 
lumber and timber mauls; sledges; nails; paint; iron pickets; wood pickets; 
sand bags; spikes; trench flooring; barbed wire; smooth wire; wire netting; 
white tape; trench pumps, etc. 

The following equipment is assigned to the Transportation Platoon of the 
Service Company, Infantry Regiment, for the use of each Machine-Gun Company: 

Carts, ration, 2 mule 1 

Carts, water, 2 mule 1 

Kitchens, rolling, 4 mule 1 

Wagons, combat, 4 mule 2 

Wagons, escort (R. & B.), 4 mule 1 

One pannier pack is issued for each draft animal of combat train. 

The above transportation functions directly under the regimental or battalion 
commander except when it is specifically turned over to the machine-gun com- 
pany commander. 



Chapter II 

Duties of Personnel Preceding and During 

Combat 

General reconnaissance is the function of the infantry, cavalry, 
and aviation. Machine-gun commanders should be kept sufficiently 
well informed of the situation to enable them to use their guns 
effectively. 

The machine-gun commander makes such special reconnaissance 
as is necessary to ensure the proper posting and the employment of 
the guns in the execution of the tasks assigned. For this purpose the 
machine-gun commander is assisted by reconnaissance officers, agents 
and scouts. 

The effectiveness of machine-gun fire is influenced by : 

1. The positions. 

2. The preliminary dispositions, such as securing firing data and 
organizing suitable lines of signal communication. 

3. Concealment and protective cover. 

4. Posting of guns without discovery by the enemy. 

5. Surprise fire. When necessary that guns be brought into 
action quickly everything else must be subordinated to speed. No 
time should be wasted in selecting positions, for in such cases con- 
cealment will be out of the question. The best position immediately 
obtainable should be taken. 

All machine-gun commanders invariably precede their commands 
to the positions to be occupied. All preliminary arrangements for 
action should be made prior to the arrival of the guns when possible. 

The machine-gun commanders should accompany the dommander 
of troops, should be kept constantly informed of the tactical situation 
and the plan of action, and should receive orders as early as possible. 

At the earliest possible moment the machine-gun commander 
selects the positions for his companies, platoons, or sections, and 
informs his subordinates as to where they are to report for instruc- 
tions. 

When the machine-gun commander goes forward for reconnais- 
sance, he instructs the next in command on the following points: 

1. The tactical situation. 

15 



16 Employment of Machine Guns 

2. Whether or not the command is to follow at once. 

3. Any division of the organization and the routes to be followed, 
with the rate of march. 

4. Disposition of the carts. 

Agents or scouts may meet organizations and guide them to their 
positions. 

Reconnaissance officers or agents should accompany advanced 
troops in order to give the machine-gun commanders information as 
to when machine-gun support is required and where the guns can be 
used most effectively. Rocket signals should be arranged to call for 
machine-gun support, but the reconnaissance officer should have not 
less than two agents for sending information to the rear. Scouts may 
be employed to assist in reconnaissance but will not work in advance 
of the front line. 

Reconnaissance Officers 

A reconnaissance officer attached to advance troops, as soon as 
possible after the determination of the enemy's location, should sub- 
mit a report giving all possible information and the most suitable 
positions for machine guns. Where this officer has been issued a 
number of maps for making reports, the following information can 
be given quite quickly: Position of guns; the routes of approach 
showing covered and exposed portions; position for carts; number 
of guns required; location of targets and their relative importance; 
position of belt filling stations and carts. 

Agents 

Agents are used for three general classes of duties : 

As Messengers: Such agents should keep themselves constantly 
informed as to the location of the various elements of the command 
and the routes thereto. The best service is obtained by using one 
agent always for communicating with a particular element of the 
command. All of the duties prescribed for messengers in the Field 
Service Regulations apply to these agents. 

As Information Agents: Such agents are those sent to infantry 
organizations to keep their own organizations constantly informed of 
the situation, location of enemy, friendly infantry, etc. 

As Scouts: Scouts are employed as follows: 



Duties of Personnel 17 

1. To obtain information of the enemy or friendly infantry. 
They do not go in advance of the front line. 

2. For reconnaissance of positions. 

3. To guide troops in positions or to act as markers at road cross- 
ings, etc. 

Division and Regimental Machine-Gun Officer 

The division machine-gun officer and regimental machine-gun 
officer are technical staff officers of the staff of the division and 
regimental commanders, respectively. Their primary duties are those 
of staff officers and not those of commanders of troops. The duties 
of the division machine-gun officer are given in detail in Chapter 
XVII. The duties of the regimental machine-gun officer are similar 
within his respective sphere. In addition thereto his status in respect 
to the howitzer companies is exactly the same as in respect to the 
machine-gun companies of the regiment. In the attack, the regi- 
mental machine-gun officer normally will have command of a provi- 
sional machine-gun battalion. When commanding such a battalion 
his duties will be those described on the following pages for the 
Commander of a Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion. In a prepared 
attack and on the defensive the regimental machine-gun officer ordi- 
narily will have to prepare a regimental machine-gun plan. In an 
attack where the time for preparation is limited a machine-gun plan 
will not be practicable. 

Commander of a Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion 

The following duties enumerated for the battalion commander 
pertain only to the machine-gun companies that are under his direct 
command in any particular engagement and apply more fully to situa- 
tions that permit of using machine guns en masse. 

In Attack: Before the employment of his battalion he remains 
with the commanding officer of the troops he is supporting. 

After receiving his orders to go into action he reconnoiters the 
ground ; orders certain machine-gun companies forward, specifying 
routes and formations if necessary ; assembles company commanders 
for orders. 

His orders should include the following information : 

1. Information of the enemy. Position of friendly troops. 

2. General object to be attained. 



18 Employment of Machine Guns 

3. The number of guns that each company is to place in action 
and the positions, with routes of approach thereto, if necessary. 

The number of guns that each company is to hold in reserve and 
the positions, with routes of approach thereto, if necessary. 
Designation and apportionment of target. 
Time of signal for opening fire. 
Orders for flank protection and reconnaissance. 

4. Arrangements for ammunition supply. 

5. Plan of signal communications. 

Command posts of battalion and next higher commander. 

During the attack he orders such changes in positions, targets, 
etc., as are necessary. 

If the attack succeeds, he designates certain organizations to fire 
on the retreating enemy, others upon probable places for formation 
of counter-attacks, and others to move forward to assist in the con- 
solidation of the position. As soon as possible he should arrange for 
a complete protective barrage. 

In case the attack is unsuccessful, he makes disposition of guns 
to meet counter-attack or to cover retirement. 

In Defense: In defense it seldom will be necessary to organize 
provisional battalions. When so organized the duties of the com- 
mander will be similar to those enumerated for the captain. 

Company Headquarters — The Captain 

In Attack: When his company is supporting an infantry bat- 
talion the captain designates the platoons that are to support the 
assault companies and assigns them to places in the formation. He 
gives directions as to whether the guns will be carried by hand or on 
the carts. When opportunity offers, he uses the fire of his company 
to assist the advance of neighboring battalions by flank fire. 

He takes full advantage of every opportunity to concentrate the 
fire of his platoons, usually without changing their position, on hos- 
tile nests or strong points which are making most trouble. He sees 
that the maximum use is made of the carts. He maintains constant 
supervision over the ammunition supply. The position of the cap- 
tain is normally with the infantry battalion commander. 

When the company is part of a provisional machine-gun battalion 
the position of the captain is where he can best control his company 
and maintain communication with the major. During the approach 



Duties of Personnel 19 

the captain decides when it is necessary to abandon the carts. After 
receiving orders from the major to go into action the captain recon- 
noiters the position. If the company is not going into action as a 
unit, he gives definite tasks to his platoons. If the company is going 
into action as a unit, he designates the targets, allotting to each pla- 
toon its sector ; causes the range to be measured, or taken from the 
map ; decides upon the kind of fire to be used ; designates a reference 
object and announces fire data if indirect fire is to be used. In either 
case his instructions would cover the following points : 

1. Where the guns are to be held under cover. 

2. What positions are to be occupied, and when. 

3. When fire is to be opened. 

4. What cover, if any, is to be constructed. 

5. Lines of communication to be established. 

6. Supply of ammunition from combat train to belt filling stations. 

7. His own position and that of the major. 

During the advance he prescribes routes and formations for 
changes of positions and gives instructions as to the use of carts. 

In Defense: If the position is not occupied deliberately, it will 
be necessary for the captain to make his first dispositions from the 
map. His orders will cover the following : 

1. Information of the enemy; disposition of the friendly infantry. 

2. The general mission of the company. 

3. Assignment of sectors of fire to be covered by the platoons, 
calling attention to objectives of particular importance. Assignment 
of zones or positions in which guns are to be emplaced. Construction 
of cover for crews and guns. Preparation of obstacles. Designation 
and location of reserve guns. 

4. Location of carts and animals; arrangements for supply of 
ammunition ; arrangements for supply of rations. 

5. Plan of signal communications ; location of command posts of 
company and of next higher commander. 

As soon as possible the captain should make a complete inspection 
of the guns of his company and make such changes of positions of 
guns or of their lines of fire as will provide the maximum amount of 
flanking fire. He provides for alternative emplacements. He ar- 
ranges for S. O. S. barrage. His inspection should be so thorough 
as to determine whether the gun squads are properly performing their 
duties and whether they are being properly inspected and supervised 
by platoon commanders. 



20 Employment of Machine Guns 

The Senior Lieutenant 

The Senior Lieutenant is second in command. He has supervi- 
sion of all administrative details. He is the executive officer and 
during the temporary absence of the captain performs the following 
duties : 

1. Commands the company. 

2. Conducts the company to the positions selected. 

3. Makes all necessary preparations previous to taking up the 
position. 

4. Verifies the system of communications and supply. 

5. Supervises the construction of cover, obstacles, etc. 

Reconnaissance Officer 

The second lieutenant assigned to company headquarters is 
Reconnaissance Officer and performs the duties prescribed under the 
previous heading "Reconnaissance Officers." 

Enlisted Personnel 

First Sergeant: He is a general assistant to the captain. He is 
responsible for the recording of all messages and orders. In action 
he performs the following duties : 

1. Selects the position for the carts except when the carts are 
placed at the disposal of platoon commanders. 

2. Conducts the carts to the position selected. 

3. Establishes communication with belt filling stations established 
in rear of gun positions. 

4. Insures continuous supply of ammunition to belt filling sta- 
tions from the cbmbat carts. 

5. Places animals and carts under cover. 

6. Supervises the necessary cover for carts and drivers. 

Mess Sergeant: He commands the rolling kitchen, cooks and 
assistant cook, and is responsible for the preparation and delivery of 
meals to the men. 

Reconnaissance Sergeant: Assists reconnaissance officer in pre- 
paring reports, sketches, range cards, and firing data ; commands 
company agents; is responsible for the cars and adjustment of the 
range finder ; obtains ranges required by the captain and reconnais- 
sance officer. 

Signal Sergeant: Is responsible for all signal property and 



Duties of Personnel 21 

makes repairs as authorized ; commands the company signalmen ; 
carries the two telephones. Assisted by the privates, he establishes 
telephone stations, lays, maintains, and takes up telephone lines, sends 
and receives messages, keeps record of important messages sent. 

Supply Sergeant: Commands the ration and water carts, and 
ration and baggage wagon; is responsible for the care of the com- 
pany property and ammunition; on the march and during engage- 
ments, maintains supply of rations and water ; commands the me- 
chanic, tailor, cobbler and barber. 

Company Clerk: Attends to the routine details of the company 
administration. 

The Buglers: Transmit commands as directed by the captain; 
act as orderlies, messengers, signalmen, agents. 

The Privates: Perform duties appropriate to barber, cobbler, 
cooks, mechanics, tailor and agents. 

Company Train 

Stable Sergeant: Commands the combat train; commands the 
horseshoer, motorcylist, saddler and stable orderly ; is responsible for 
the care of the animals; establishes communication with the combat 
carts ; maintains a service of supply between the combat carts and the 
combat wagons. 

The Privates: Perform the duties appropriate to horseshoer, 
motorcyclist, saddler and stable orderly. 

The Platoon— The Platoon Leader 

In Attack: In the approach the platoon leader marches at the 
head of his platoon. In action he takes a position from which he 
can best control his platoon and receives signals from his captain or 
the infantry commander whom he is supporting; precedes his pla- 
toon for selection of gun positions and preparation of firing data; 
may conduct platoon to its position; assigns positions and tasks to 
his sections; orders and supervises construction of cover; specifies 
kind and rate of fire and gives commands or signal for opening fire ; 
provides for signal communications; arranges for ammunition sup- 
ply; observes the fire effect and controls the fire of his platoon; 
orders changes of position of his platoon. 

In Defense: Reconnoiters the sector to be occupied by his pla- 
toon and selects gun positions; prepares range cards and complete 



22 Employment of Machine Guns 

data for firing, including indirect and night firing; supervises the 
construction of emplacements, cover for men, obstacles, trenches, 
ammunition caches, etc. ; specifies kind, rate and time of opening fire ; 
provides for the posting and relief of sentinels over guns and for 
necessary patrolling in immediate vicinity of guns; provides for 
signal communications; arranges for ammunition supply; controls 
fire of platoon; replaces casualties. 

Enlisted Personnel 

Platoon Sergeant: Should be expert in use of range finder and 
in estimation of range ; prepares range cards ; takes command of pla- 
toon when platoon leader goes forward for selection of positions; 
conducts platoon to the position; makes all details for guard, 
fatigue, etc. 

The Communication Corporal accompanies the rifle company 
which his platoon is to support in action; maintains communication 
between the rifle company and his platoon commander, conveying to 
the latter any information or request from the rifle company com- 
mander ; maintains constant observation to the front in the endeavor 
to locate hostile positions or targets against which his platoon can 
fire; locates machine-gun positions from which his platoon can fire 
on these targets ; signals by prearranged rocket signals or otherwise, 
information necessary to his platoon; controls the agents (normally 
two) under his command. 

The Transport Corporal moves the gun and ammunition 
carts forward in accordance with the movements of the platoon; 
insures replenishment of ammunition when carts are empty; secures 
replacements for killed or disabled mules ; improvises a pack when a 
cart is destroyed or cannot be moved forward. 

Privates of Platoon Headquarters act as agents, signalmen and 
runners in maintaining communication between the platoon head- 
quarters and section headquarters, platoon headquarters and company 
headquarters, platoon headquarters and rifle company it is supporting. 

The Section Leader 

In Attack: The section leader precedes his section and recon- 
noiters his gun positions. In action he takes position where he can 
control his gun squads, observe the target and fire effect and watch 
the leader for signals; arranges for ammunition supply; constructs 



Duties of Personnel 23 

cover ; obtains fire data ; selects aiming marks when targets are indis- 
tinct; announces sight setting and assigns targets to gun squads; 
specifies kind, rate of fire, and commands or signals commence fir- 
ing; checks safety angle if overhead fire is ordered; keeps front under 
constant observation; observes fire effect and control fire; notifies 
platoon leader of casualties ; when platoon is advancing by alternate 
sections, determines upon the time of advance. 

In Defense: Assists platoon leader in preparation of range 
cards ; instructs corporals in the orders for the gun positions ; directs 
the construction of emplacements, cover for men, obstacles, etc. ; 
establishes belt filling stations, or otherwise insures ammunition sup- 
ply; observes the fire effect and controls the fire of his sections; 
replaces casualties. 

The Squad— The Corporal 

In Attack: The corporal is directly responsible for the fire dis- 
cipline of the gun squad and assists in fire control. 

In action he takes position (where he can observe the fire of his 
gun and communicate with the section leader ; he gives to his squad 
all the information he possesses as to situation and plan of action; 
he constructs such cover as time will permit. 

He issues the first order : 

1. Announces range and deflection and verifies sight setting. 

2. Designates the target or aiming point to his gunner, taking 
the target assigned or the portion of the section's target that corre- 
sponds to the position of the squad in the section. 

3. Announces kind of fire, and number of rounds. 

4. Signals section leader when ready and opens fire on signal or 
command commence firing. 

He observes fire effect, makes changes in sight setting, etc., and 
enforces strict fire discipline; takes all possible advantage of cover 
while advancing or in action. 

In Defense: Thoroughly familiarizes himself with his sector and 
the range card ; inspects, when position is occupied and thereafter at 
least twice daily, his machine gun and tripod, tool box, water box, 
belt filling machine, belts, and ammunition ; constructs emplacements, 
cover, obstacles, etc. ; posts number of emplacement outside emplace- 
ment where it can be seen readily; posts the orders for the sentinel 
at the gun inside the emplacement and sees that all men read and 



24 Employment of Machine Guns 

understand them; posts a sentinel over the gun; establishes a belt 
rilling station ; assigns alarm posts to all members of his squad. 

The Privates 

In order that casualties may be efficiently replaced in action, a 
very high all-round standard of efficiency should be attained and all 
numbers should be interchangeable. 

No. 1 carries the tripod into action; personally cleans and looks 
after the gun, insures that the mechanism is working smoothly and 
that water jacket is full; observes his own fire when possible, and 
makes any alteration necessary to secure fire eflect; repeats all 
orders for his gun; keeps his eye on the target; directs his fire in 
accordance with the orders he receives; remedies all stoppages; 
assisted by No. 2, mounts and dismounts the gun. 

No. 2 carries the gun ; generally assists No. 1 to mount and dis- 
mount the gun, feed the gun, remedy stoppages ; carries spare-parts 
case ; keeps his eye on the fire controller and communicates signals to 
No. 1 ; is responsible that condenser is properly attached ; keeps 
water jacket filled. 

No. 3 is responsible for keeping the gun supplied with ammuni- 
tion, water, oil and spare parts ; carries water box and condenser tube 
and one ammunition box ; gets ammunition from No. 4 and carries 
it to the gun position; takes empty ammunition boxes from gun to 
No. 4. 

No. 4 is responsible for keeping No. 3 supplied with ammunition, 
water, oil, and spare parts. 

Carries empty belts and boxes to No. 5. 

Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 establish belt filling station ; supply filled belts 
to No. 4; are responsible for cutting brushwood, filling sandbags, etc., 
as required by gunners. 

No. 9 is responsible for gun mule, cart, and equipment; keeping 
in touch with the guns at all times. 

No. 10 is responsible for the care of the ammunition mule, cart, 
and ammunition ; supplies ammunition to the belt filling station ; 
refills his cart from the combat train. 



Chapter HI 

Characteristics of Machine Guns 

A thorough knowledge of the characteristics of any -weapon is 
essential to its correct tactical use. A confusion of ideas as to the 
characteristics of a weapon will lead to the incorrect use of the 
weapon. Such confusion will cause things to be expected of the gun 
that it cannot perform, or will prevent full advantage being taken 
of it. 

There has been a great tendency throughout the service to con- 
fuse the machine gun and the automatic rifle. The machine gun is a 
gun that fires infantry ammunition on the automatic principle, recoil 
of which is supported by some sort of a fixed mount, and the direc- 
tion of fire is capable of being clamped. The automatic rifle on the 
contrary is fired from the shoulder, and the direction of its fire is not 
capable of being clamped. With our own literature there is at pres- 
ent not much danger of confusing the two terms, but in reading of 
German machine guns there is a very great danger. The Germans 
call both the machine gun and the automatic 1 rifle machine guns, but 
they make two distinct classes — heavy machine guns and light ma- 
chine guns. Their term light machine gun corresponds in a general 
way to our automatic rifle. In reading German machine-gun tactics 
one should be extremely careful to keep clearly in mind whether the 
heavy machine gun or the light machine gun is the type being dis- 
cussed. 

Machine guns considered from the point of view of method of 
operation are of two general types : the direct-recoil type, of which 
the Browning and Vickers are examples ; and the gas-operated type, 
of which the Hotchkiss is an example. 

Considered from the point of view of the method of cooling, 
there are two general types of machine guns: the water cooled, 
which includes the Browning and Vickers, and the air cooled, of 
which the Hotchkiss is an example. 

Our army in France was equipped with three types of guns — the 
Browning, Vickers and Hotchkiss. The difference in these guns, that 
has the greatest tactical effect, is the difference in trajectory. The 
Hotchkiss has an effective range of 3,500 meters, the Vickers 2,900 
meters, and the Browning 2,600 meters. This difference in trajectory 

25 



26 Employment of Machine Guns 

has a very great effect in determining the location of machine guns 
for the accomplishment of certain purposes. In studying machine- 
gun operations in France or Belgium one should be careful to note 
the type with which the organization considered was equipped. 

The stable mount of the madhine gun has a most decided effect 
upon the tactical uses of the gun. The effect of the personal factor 
in holding is largely eliminated. Fatigue and excitement affect the 
accuracy to a very small extent. The shooting of our machine gun- 
ners during the recent campaigns indicates that they can be counted 
upon to fire almost as accurately in a fight as on the target range. 

A stable mount also makes the machine gun suitable for overhead 
fire. Without a stable mount firing over friendly infantry is ex- 
tremely hazardous. It should not be attempted with an automatic 
rifle. Overhead fire with madhine guns is perfectly safe, provided 
the machine gunner is trained. One of the most important things 
for a machine gunner to know is safety angles for overhead fire. If 
he does not know these thoroughly he will either endanger the lives 
of his own troops or stop firing before it is necessary to do so, thus 
failing to support the advance of the infantry by fire at the most 
critical stage. Just before the St. Mihiel operation I inspected the 
machine guns of the 3d and 5th Corps. Part of these guns (were in 
the line and part of them waiting in the rear ready to take their place 
in line. Owing to the location it was impossible to hold maneuvers 
in most places. With the troops not actually in the line two terrain 
exercises were held in each machine-gun battalion to determine 
whether the officers had correct tactical ideas of assisting the infantry 
advance by fire, and this was followed by an inspection of noncom- 
missioned officers and gunners to determine whether they understood 
safety angles for overhead fire. In about 50 per cent of the cases 
the gunners did not understand safety angles and a special effort was 
made to remedy this, and I believe that these organizations did enter 
the fight with a fairly clear idea as to iwhen they could fire over their 
infantry. 

The stable mount causes zone fire to be effective. Certain areas 
can be covered constantly by machine-gun fire so as to prohibit their 
use by the enemy. 

The stable mount has a very direct effect upon the size and shape 
of the shot group. It gives a long and narrow cone of fire. To get 
the maximum effect of this cone of fire requires a narrow and deep 



Characteristics of Machine Guns 27 

target. Such a target can be obtained in two ways : First, by sur- 
prise, by catching a body of troops in column. This will happen very 
rarely. Second, by so placing the guns as to obtain enfilade or oblique 
fire. This should always be sought for. On the defensive it always 
will be possible to obtain enfilade or oblique fire. On the offensive 
frontal fire will be the rule, flank fire the exception, but always much 
more effective when it can be obtained. 

The rapid production of a very large volume of fire makes the 
machine gun a very effective weapon for surprise. The gun can be 
Concealed in a very small space and can produce a volume of fire that 
frequently would be wholly impossible by the infantry owing to the 
limited space available. The fire power of the machine gun may be 
said to vary roughly from the equivalent of 30 rifles at 200 yards to 
the equivalent of 80 rifles at 1,000 yards. If the rates of fire are in- 
creased beyond 200 rounds per minute, these figures would be raised ; 
250 rounds per gun per minute may be taken as the maximum fire 
power that may be expected of any machine-gun organization unless 
the target is so large, dense and close as to almost eliminate aiming. 
In the A. E. F. Machine-Gun Platoon Competition at Le Mans, 
France, in May, 1919, the average rate of fire of the winning platoon 
was 225 rounds per minute. More than 14,000 rounds were fired 
at indirect targets, direct stationary targets and moving targets. No 
allowance was made for stoppages. The highest rate of fire of any 
platoon participating was 237 per minute and the lowest 117. 

The all-round traverse of the machine gun makes it the ideal 
weapon for flanking purposes. It can change the direction of its fire 
by 90 degrees immediately and can be quite as effective in the new 
direction. With infantry the changing of the direction of fire of a 
line is a very delicate operation. 

The machine gunner is at least as mobile as the infantry as long 
as he is able to keep his guns on the carts. When the equipment 
must be carried by hand he loses some of his mobility, and it is diffi- 
cult for machine gunners to keep up with the infantry under such 
conditions for long distances. The following weights indicate the 
loads carried by machine gunners : 

Pounds 

Weight of gun filled with water 37 

Weight of tripod, model 1918 47 

Weight of ammunition box and filled belt. . 15)4 



28 Employment of Machine Guns 

The chief unfavorable characteristic of the machine gun in the 
past has been the stoppage in firing. With the Browning and Hotch- 
kiss guns the question of stoppage is not at all serious. A man does 
not need to be an expert to keep either of the guns functioning prop- 
erly. Under average conditions you should get about one stoppage 
in 3,000 rounds iwith the Browning gun. The Vickers gun, owing to 
the close-fitting breech mechanism, requires much more expert per- 
sonnel to keep it functioning continuously. The second difficulty 
in the use of the machine gun is the peculiar noise of firing which 
tends to disclose its position. Since the infantry, however, has been 
so fully equipped with automatic rifles this is less of an objection. 

General Considerations 

The fact that the machine-gun company forms an integral part 
of the infantry battalion does not mean that it will always operate 
with the infantry battalion to which it belongs. The machine guns of 
a division represent a very great fire power. This fire power should 
be employed to the maximum. There could be no more serious error 
than to hold out of the fight all of the machine guns which belong to 
battalions that are not in the front line. 

The assaulting infantry battalion almost invariably will retain its 
machine-gun company. On the contrary, it will be exceptional for 
machine-gun companies to operate with infantry battalions in regi- 
mental, brigade or division reserve in the attack. Machine-gun com- 
panies should operate with these battalions only when the particular 
mission of the battalion calls for machine-gun support. The machine- 
gun companies of reserve battalions in the attack ordinarily will be 
formed into provisional machine-gun battalions for the purpose of 
supporting the attack by overhead fire, either direct or indirect. Nor- 
mally these battalions will be commanded by regimental machine- 
gun officers. 

On the defensive, the positions and missions of the guns will 
determine whether the machine-gun companies will operate with in- 
fantry battalions or will be formed into provisional machine-gun bat- 
talions. Defensive situations calling for the employment of machine- 
gun battalions will be much more rare than is the case on the of- 
fensive. Coordination of the machine guns of a regiment, brigade, or 
division on the defensive, usually will be provided for by means of 
machine-gun plans which assign the missions in considerable detail 



Characteristics of Machine Guns 29 

but make the infantry battalion commanders responsible for carrying 
out the missions. Such a system permits the concentration of the fire 
of the machine guns at any desired point without any centralization 
of guns or command. 

Direct Fire Should Always Be the Primary Consideration. — This 
does not mean that you should undervalue the tremendous effect that 
you will at times obtain from indirect fire. It does mean that you 
must always sight your guns for an extensive field of fire so that 
good direct fire will be possible. On the contrary, you must always 
make provision for using indirect fire. Failing to do this you will 
frequently not be able to use your guns at all on account of fog or 
darkness. Indirect fire requires a concentration of guns and a cen- 
tralization of command. Accurate maps of not less than 1-21120, 
or accurate angle measuring and range-finding instruments must be 
available. 



Chapter IV 

Employment of Machine Guns in the Offensive 

There are three general types of offensive action: 

1. A meeting engagement. Such an attack is the collision of two 
forces not deployed for action. 

2. An attack against an enemy deployed for defense. In such a 
situation the enemy has surrendered the initiative, selected terrain 
suitable for defense, if possible, and strengthened it artificially as far 
as possible. 

3. An attack against a prepared position. The conditions are 
similar to the preceding situation except as follows: (a) The enemy 
dispositions will be in greater depth; (b) the positions will be greatly 
strengthened by trenches and field works; (c) deep trenches or dug- 
outs will enable the defender to avoid the effects of hostile fire to a 
great extent; (d) the ammunition supply will be perfected. 

In a meeting engagement the following, in general terms, are the 
principal tasks of the machine guns : 

1. To cover the deployment of the infantry and its advance to the 
first firing position. 

2. To support the attack of the infantry. 

3. To support the infantry in continuing the attack or taking up 
the pursuit after the enemy's main position has been captured. 

4. To assist in the consolidation of the position whenever the limit 
of the advance is reached or the infantry is brought to a standstill. 

In an attack against a prepared position, only the last three tasks 
enumerated above devolve upon the machine guns. The deployment 
of the infantry usually will be made at night. The infantry usually 
will be placed in trenches so far forward that the assault can be made 
without any preliminary fire preparation by the infantry itself. The 
artillery and machine guns furnish all of the fire necessary for cover- 
ing the assault. 

In an attack against an enemy deployed for defense, the machine 
guns may have tasks similar to those either in a meeting engagement 
or in an attack against a prepared position. Where preparations for 
the attack are made under cover of darkness, or where there is natural 
cover for deployment in very close proximity to the enemy's position, 
the action will be similar to an attack against a prepared position. 

30 



Employment in the Offensive 31 

Where the attack is launched from a position at some distance from 
the enemy's position, the tasks will be similar to those in a meeting 
engagement. 

While there are certain tasks that will be assigned to machine guns 
in all of these types of offensive action, the methods of carrying out 
these tasks frequently will be quite different. The time element and 
the intensity of the enemy's fire will be large factors in determining 
the methods to be employed. 

The first essential to a successful use of machine guns on the 
offensive is a thorough and comprehensive plan for all of the machine 
guns in a division. The maximum result cannot be expected unless 
there is a plan that contemplates the use and coordination of all the 
guns. In the first phase of a deliberately planned attack this coordi- 
nation will be provided for by a plan which will prescribe a great 
many details. In the later phases of an attack or in a meeting en- 
gagement such elaborate plans are not possible, and in the majority of 
cases machine-gun commanders will receive orders most frequently 
in the form of messages whidh will give them definite tasks at a par- 
ticular time. 

Machine gun as regards their uses may be roughly classed as 
f ollo(ws : 

1. Machine-gun companies operating with infantry battalions. 

2. Provisional machine-gun battalions used for overhead fire. 

3. Reserve guns. 

Machine-Gun Companies Operating with Infantry Battalions. — 
In the approach there is just one object and that is to get the guns 
forward in the least possible time, with the least possible loss. The 
machine guns should not be required to advance by the identical 
route that the infantry uses. They should not be tied down to that 
extent. If good cover can be obtained by taking a slightly different 
route, the route should be taken. On the other hand, the guns must 
not make the mistake of taking such a roundabout course that they 
would not arrive by the time they are needed. In case the route 
selected takes them some distance from the infantry, an infantry 
escort should be detailed for their protection. The machine gunners 
must use their carts whenever it is practicable. Advancing guns by 
hand is very fatiguing and results in the early exhaustion of the 
gunners. In France many organizations made the mistake of aban- 
doning their carts once they had been forced to temporarily leave 



32 Employment of Machine Guns 

them behind. The mere fact that it becomes necessary to advance 
the guns by hand does not justify continuing to advance them by 
hand for the rest of the day. They should be replaced on the xarts 
at the earliest possible moment that conditions justify the procedure. 

In the first phase of an attadk the exact route of advance, organi- 
zation of dumps, etc., may be prescribed in orders when all the inci- 
dents of the action can be foreseen. An attempt to prescribe many 
details in later phases will usually lead to confusion and loss of 
initiative on the part of junior officers. 

There has been a great difference of opinion in our organizations 
in regard to infantry carriers for machine guns. We have tried them 
out in many organizations and most of the time have not been suc- 
cessful. The constant use of infantry carriers is a mistake. They 
should only be used where the advance is so rapid that the infantry 
cannot count on artillery support and it is essential to have every 
machine gun in the division in action. The machine-gun company 
now has sufficient personnel to carry forward necessary ammunition 
for the average situation. 

During the combat the function of the machine guns is to con- 
stantly assist the advance of the infantry by fire power. The use of 
machine guns only at decisive points in the fight is not sufficient. 
They must be so used as to exert a continuous influence from the be- 
ginning to the end of the fight. 

The following examples show the great improvement that was 
made by our division in the use of machine guns during the last two 
or three months of the fighting in the World War. At St. Mihiel the 
90th Division made practically no use of its machine guns. On the 
contrary, on November 1 it fired over 1,000,000 rounds with the 
machine guns, and practically all day the infantry advanced under the 
protection of machine-gun fire. The 2d Division at St. Mihiel used 
only 8 out of 14 companies at the beginning of the fight. On No- 
vember 1 this division not only used all of its own guns but used ten 
companies of the 42d Division. The 5th Division at St. Mihiel used 
only 8 out of 14 companies at the beginning of the fight. In the 
early part of November this same division was using overhead ma- 
chine-gun fire to cover the advance of its exploiting patrols. These 
three divisions are typical examples of the great strides that were 
made in the use of machine guns during the last few months before 
the armistice. 



Employment in the Offensive 33 

Every assaulting infantry battalion habitually retains and em- 
ploys its machine-gun company. 

The folloiwing are suitable tasks for a machine-gun company of 
an assault battalion : 

1. To support the assaulting troops. 

2. To protect the flanks of the attack. 

3. To occupy an interval in the line. 

4. To assist in consolidating the captured ground. 

5. To assist in resuming the attack. 

The orders for use of the machine guns should be clear and con- 
cise and should assign definite tasks to them. The orders should not 
be simply to take a certain place in the formation but should be to 
assist the advance of the infantry by fire. The control of the ma- 
chine guns should be exercised, as far as possible, through the com- 
manding officer of the machine-gun company. He should be in the 
immediate vicinity of the battalion commander, thus facilitating com- 
munication. The infantry battalion commander should retain the 
control of the machine-gun company. The fact that a platoon is 
detailed to support a certain company of infantry does not mean 
that the command of this platoon passes to the infantry company 
commander. In the 1st Division at Soissons on July 18, 1918, the 
machine-gun companies were broken up and three machine guns 
were assigned to each infantry company. These guns were practi- 
cally all placed in the first wave of the company to which attached. 
Almost the only order given to the machine gunners was for them 
to take their places in certain waves. I talked with practically all 
infantry battalion commanders and machine-gun officers of the 1st 
Division after this fight, and I found no case where an order had 
been given for the machine guns to support the advance of the 
infantry with fire. The order has been invariably to take a certain 
place in the formation. The machine gunners had generally inter- 
preted the order literally. They took this position in the formation 
and kept it. They were not interested in finding opportunities for 
shooting their guns nearly so much as they (were in maintaining their 
position. The results were most serious. The machine-gun com- 
panies suffered very heavy casualties and accomplished practically 
nothing except during the consolidation. One company lost 57 men 
without firing a shot. Another company lost 61 men and fired only 
96 rounds. This is typical of what happened to a greater or lesser 
extent throughout the whole division. 



34 Employment of Machine Guns 

Generally the formation of a machine-gun company supporting 
an infantry battalion will be with one platoon on either flank sup- 
porting the two assaulting companies. As to whether or not the 
platoons assigned to support the assaulting companies should be 
placed in rear of the assault companies or in rear of the reserve 
companies depends upon the situation. If the conditions indicate 
the probable early use of machine guns and the ground is favorable 
for their use, they should be placed in rear of assaulting companies. 
On the other hand, if their early use appears improbable, or the 
ground is unfavorable for overhead fire, put them in rear of the 
reserve companies where they can use their transportation as long 
as possible. The formation within the platoon conforms to the 
formation of the infantry with which it is advancing. The usual 
formations will be line of squad columns or line of skirmishers 
when dismounted ; when mounted, column of squads. The purpose 
of the formation taken should be to make it difficult for the enemy 
to distinguish the machine guns from the infantry. 

At times some of our divisions have made the mistake of placing 
machine guns in the first wave of infantry. This has always been 
disastrous. It results in heavy losses among the machine gunners 
with practically no compensation. Machine guns should be placed 
in the first wave of infantry only when it becomes absolutely essen- 
tial to reinforce the firing line and there is no other way of using 
the guns. 

The following quotation from the German instructions issued in 
February, 1918, prior to the spring offensive, shows clearly the 
German polidy on this point: 

"In principle, the heavy machine guns are employed in sections, 
apart from the infantry. Their place is only in the infantry lines 
when the latter require an immediate increase in the intensity of 
their fire and when the cooperation of the heavy machine guns from 
their positions in depth (overhead or through gaps) or from a flank 
is impossible. They then conform to the front line and form part 
of the infantry company." 

During the advance direct fire will be the rule. Indirect fire will 
not be possible to any great extent. The greatest value usually will 
be obtained by the use of direct overhead fire. If machine guns are 
placed in the line or an attempt is made to fire through intervals in 
the line, this fire is necessarily short lived, owing to the fact that the 



Employment in the Offensive 35 

infantry mask the fire just as soon as they advance. Continuous 
fire is seldom possible except by overhead fire. 

"Direct fire by heavy machine guns through the intervals between 
the first line elements has not given good results, because of the fact 
that the infantry changes its position too frequently. The heavy 
machine guns will, therefore, select dominating positions from which 
they can fire over the infantry. From these elevated positions the 
heavy guns will be able, in the absence of artillery, to place a barrage 
in front of the front line, by direct or indirect fire, according to the 
nature of the ground. The exact determination of the first line is 
difficult; when it is not certain the machine-gun barrage will be 
placed well in advance. 

"This fire over the infantry demands thorough individual train- 
ing. The chief of the piece and the gunner must be accustomed 
to estimate difference in altitude by eye. All the gun crew must be 
familiar with the range table and know how to use it. They must 
know how close, on a given terrain, they can bring their fire to the 
infantry without danger. The infantry must, furthermore, become 
accustomed to machine-gun fire over its head. It is therefore abso- 
lutely necessary that there be frequent exercises in which the machine 
guns and infantry take part, and in the course of which ball car- 
tridges are used. 

"When ground is favorable, it is possible, by concentrating all 
the machine guns of one company or even of several companies upon 
the dominating position behind the infantry, to execute actual pre- 
paratory fire. The edges of woods and villages have in this way been 
covered more effectively with machine guns than with artillery fire, 
up to the moment when the infantry attacked and surrounded the 
position." * 

Flanking fire is the most effective but is rare on the offensive. 
Most of the opportunities for flanking fire come about through one 
part of the line advancing much more rapidly than some other part. 
The part of the line so advanced will at times have an opportunity 
to use its machine guns against the flank of the enemy who is holding 
up friendly troops on the right or left. 

Machine guns generally should be advanced alternately by sec- 
tions. Part of the guns always should be in position to assist the 



1 Tactical and Technical Experience with Machine-Gun Units During the 
Spring Offensive of 1918, Headquarters XVIIIth German Army. 



36 Employment of Machine Guns 

advance of the infantry by firing over their heads. Such use of 
machine guns requires a very high degree of intelligence, training, 
and initiative on the part of the platoon and section commanders. It 
takes a very much better trained officer to use machine guns success- 
fully during the advance than for indirect barrages, where everything 
can be deliberately planned. The mistake that is most frequently 
made in advancing machine guns is that they advance by short 
bounds instead of long bounds. Very frequently a short bound does 
not increase the fire power of the machine gun sufficiently to make 
up for the time lost in changing positions. Short bounds also fre- 
quently result in the placing of guns where it is impossible to fire on 
account of friendly infantry. 

The machine-gun company commander should keep in constant 
touch with his platoons. In this manner he will be able to concen- 
trate the fire of all of his guns upon any decisive point and can keep 
himself informed as to the replacements of men, guns, or ammuni- 
tion that are needed by the platoons. Platoons that are supporting 
infantry companies should have a noncommissioned officer and one 
or two agents with the company commander. Rocket signals should 
be arranged which would notify the machine-gun platoon commander 
that his assistance is needed. This often will permit guns to be sent 
forward without the necessity for sending the messengers to the rear. 

The Consolidation. — In the consolidation all guns should be used. 
Even if losses have occurred there should be sufficient personnel to 
operate all guns on the defensive. Whenever the attack is brought 
to a halt and a counter-attack appears probable, machine guns should 
be placed in position to give immediate support to the infantry. The 
placing of these machine guns would follow the principles of em- 
ployment of machine guns on the defensive. 

Use of Provisional Machine-Gun Battalions. — Indirect fire has 
greatly increased the use of machine guns in larger organizations. 
It demands the concentration of guns and of command and renders 
the employment of machine-gun battalions necessary. Direct over- 
head fire can often be made more effective by the employment of 
guns in an organization larger than a company. 

Before the attack machine-gun battalions may be used for harass- 
ing fire. They are more suitable for this purpose than the machine 
guns of companies assigned to infantry battalions, since they are 
usually located farther to the rear. The purpose of this harassing 



Employment in the Offensive 37 

fire is not only to inflict losses upon the enemy but to wear down his 
morale and prohibit him from using important trails, paths, roads, 
etc., for bringing up supplies and to prevent work on defenses. 
Whether or not it is profitable to use harassing fire will depend upon 
the situation. In the days of trench warfare, where the element of 
surprise was eliminated, there was every advantage in using harass- 
ing fire for a considerable period before the attack in order to wear 
out the enemy. Since March 21, 1918, the element of surprise has 
been given important consideration in all attacks. This in most cases 
will eliminate the use of harassing fire. The question of surprise is 
a matter that must always receive proper consideration. Four or five 
days prior to the St. Mihiel attack it was discovered that one division 
of the 1st Corps was preparing to use harassing fire with its machine 
guns. This was stopped by orders from the corps. This attack was 
an example of just when harassing fire should not be used, as the 
purpose was to make the most complete surprise possible. 

During the attack machine-gun battalions will be used most 
largely for overhead fire, which may be either direct or indirect. At 
the beginning of an offensive, or in the resumption of the advance 
after a delay of several hours or several days, indirect barrages will 
be the rule. If the time necessary for the reconnaissance and prepa- 
ration of positions for indirect fire is available, indirect fire is always 
thoroughly practicable under such conditions. Most frequently it is 
the only type of fire that is possible, owing to the fact that the jump- 
off takes place before daybreak. Whenever possible, a detail should 
be sent forward the second night before the attack, to allow plenty 
of time for preparation of the position and of the fire data. Where 
details are not sent forward until the night before the attack, there 
is usually difficulty about accurately locating positions and getting 
fire data. 

Standing barrages will be placed on avenues of approach or re- 
treat, or on positions of special importance. The rolling barrage 
with machine guns is not satisfactory, owing to the fact that there are 
many reverse slopes that machine-gun fire cannot search. 

Indirect barrages frequently are used to place neutralizing fire 
on woods or other difficult terrain that it is not desired to attack at 
the time. On September 26 the 33d Division made excellent use of 
machine-gun fire to neutralize the woods directly in its front near the 
town of Forges. The woods were about 2 kilometers square. The 



38 Employment of Machine Guns 

entire front of the division was 5 kilometers. The division neutral- 
ized the woods, passed by it without entering it, and then sent a 
mopping-up party back through it from the rear. In this manner 
they captured several hundred prisoners with practically no losses. 
Resistance in the woods was so slight that no halts were necessary 
in cleaning up the woods. The front of the woods was strongly 
protected by machine guns, and the prisoners stated that they were 
sure they would have inflicted heavy losses on the division had it 
made a direct frontal attack. 

After the advance is once begun, machine-gun battalions will be 
used for direct overhead fire wherever serious resistance is encoun- 
tered. The companies that are operating with the infantry battalions 
should be able to take care of any slight resistance. One of the best 
examples of the use of direct overhead fire by machine-gun battalions 
was the attack of Colonel Conger's brigade, of the 28th Division, 
near Appremont. Having encountered serious opposition, the ground 
being suitable for direct overhead fire, he brought up the brigade 
battalion and without any artillery support was able to advance with 
practically no losses. 

Machine-gun battalions frequently will be called upon to protect 
the flanks of the infantry. The progress made at different points 
of the line will always vary, thus leaving exposed flanks. No other 
arm can so well take care of this exposed flank as the machine gun. 
At Soissons, General Buck's brigade had its flank exposed for about 
a kilometer and a half, owing to the inability of the French on his 
left to advance. It was an ideal occasion for the use of some of the 
machine guns of the brigade battalion, but all of these had been 
assigned to infantry battalions, some going to the division reserve, 
so that none was available. The result was that it was necessary to 
rush forward the motorized division battalion to protect this flank. 

Owing to the different elements of the line becoming slightly 
confused in direction, gaps in the line frequently will occur. Ma- 
chine-gun battalions, or parts of them, will be called upon to fill 
these gaps. At St. Mihiel such a gap occurred between the 5th and 
90th Divisions, and the 13th Machine-Gun Battalion was sent for- 
ward to fill this gap until touch could be gained with the 90th 
Division and the line rectified. 

The position of provisional machine-gun battalions in the attack 



Employment in the Offensive 39 

formations should be such that they can render prompt support to 
the infantry whenever it is held up. If a provisional battalion has 
been organized in the regiment, it will not exceed two companies in 
strength. A battalion of this size can operate in advance of the 
regimental reserve battalion without being too large a target for the 
enemy artillery. In that position it can render prompt support to 
the assault battalion. It should send forward information agents to 
the assault battalion and should support the infantry by fire upon 
the request of the assault battalion commander in exactly the same 
way that supporting artillery cooperates with the infantry. Bat- 
talions, as large as four companies, may be formed in the brigades 
for use in prepared attacks against a stabilized position. Large bat- 
talions acting under the control of brigade commanders are not as 
flexible as small battalions under the control of regimental command- 
ers, and seldom will be employed in any but a stabilized situation. 
As a Reserve. — Machine guns make a most effective reserve on 
account of the great fire power, but it is a mistake to use too many 
of them for this purpose. Guns placed in reserve should be used for 
long-range fire, where this can be done, without losing control of 
them. If the necessity for the use of the reserve arises, it should be 
used unhesitatingly. However, when such necessity has passed it 
should be withdrawn and again reorganized as a reserve. 

Forms of Orders and Annexes for the Attack 

Paragraph in Division or Regimental Field Order. 
3. (c) MACHINE GUNS. 

(1) Assignment of machine-gun sections or platoons to con- 

necting groups. 

(2) Barrage fire. — Formation of provisional machine-gun 

battalions to support the attack; hour at which com- 
mand of units passes to commanders of the battalions ; 
general assignment of objectives; time of execution of 
fire; placing of division machine-gun officer in com- 
mand of barrage guns or giving control to regimental 
or brigade commanders; return of guns to control of 
brigade, regimental, or battalion commanders after 
completion of barrage mission. 



40 Employment of Machine Guns 

Machine-Gun Annex 

(Attack) 

Annex No to Field Orders No Div. (Brig.) 1920. 

Machine Guns. (Place) 

(Date and hour) 

Map: (Reference map used) 

1. Information of the enemy and of our own troops. (Includes 
zones of action, formation, lines of departure, time and rate of 
advance.) 

2. General plan for use of the machine guns. (Usually to sup- 
port the attack of the command, or of part of the command.) 

3. Instructions for the subdivisions of the command. Instruc- 
tions usually include the following : 

a. Assignment of machine-gun platoons or sections to connecting 
groups. 

b. Formation of provisional machine-gun battalions to support 
the attack. 

Assignment of positions and missions. (Usually by means 
of a fire organization chart and map.) 

Instructions for the occupation of initial positions. (Send- 
ing forward of details for preparation of fire data and em- 
placements. Time of occupation of the position and routes 
of advance.) 

Forward movement of the machine guns. (Usually in the 
form of a Movement Table and a Map, showing old and new 
positions, routes of advance, times of departure and arrival.) 
x. Instructions pertaining to whole command. 

Time at which units assigned to infantry units come under 
infantry commanders. 

Designation of officer to command barrage guns, or plac- 
ing the control of the guns under brigade or regimental com- 
manders. 

Time at which units designated for provisional battalions 
come under command of battalion commanders. 

Hour of the completion of the barrage mission. 

Placing of barrage guns in reserve or return to their 
brigade, regimental or battalion commanders. 

4. (a) Announcement of aid stations. 



Infantry Assault Battalion 41 

b. Establishment of ammunition dumps for barrage fire. 

Instructions for combat wagons and carts. (Places of 
assembly, routes of advance, etc.) 

Detail of ammunition carriers in unusual cases. 

c. Instruction for field train. 

(Separate administrative order seldom necessary.) 
5. (a) Plan of signal communications. 

b. Axes of signal communications. 

c. Command posts. 

By command of Maj. Gen. A. 

X, 
Official : Chief of Staff. 

M. Lieut. Colonel D. M. G. O. 
Distribution. 



Chapter V 

The Machine-Gun Company with an Infantry 
Assault Battalion 

Terrain Exercise 
Part I 

[3-inch Topographical Map of Fort Leavenworth and Vicinity. Leavenworth 
Sheet. (Map No. 1.) General Map of Vicinity of Leavenworth.'] 

General Situation: 

A state of war has existed for several weeks between Kansas 
(Red) and Missouri (Blue). The Blues concentrated a large num- 
ber of troops in Missouri to the east of Leavenworth and Fort 
Leavenworth, and several days ago effected a crossing at those places, 
driving back the Reds and forming a bridgehead covering the 
crossings. 

Special Situation (Blue) : 

In a general attack by the forces forming the bridgehead, the 1st 
Division is attacking with four regiments abreast in the sector 
bounded on the north (right) by Plum Creek, on the south (left) by 
the D. E. F. G. Road and the Atchison Pike. The 2d Brigade is on 
the right and the 1st Brigade on the left. Each regiment has one 
battalion in the assault, one in the regimental reserve, and one in the 
brigade or division reserve. The 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, is the 
left assaulting battalion of the division. On its left is a battalion 
of the 2d Division. The south boundary of the battalion is the 
south boundary of the division. Its north boundary is Wagner 
Point— Hund— Burns— Hill 926— Hill 1047. 

The battalion is deployed with Company A on the right and Com- 
pany B on the left as assault companies; Company C as reserve 
company, Company D, 1st Infantry, two Stokes mortars and two 
1 -pounders are operating with the battalion. 

The division began a general advance at 5.30 this morning. 
At 8.45 a. m., when the scouts of the 1st Battalion reached the 
Frenchman- Kickapoo Road they were stopped by automatic and 
rifle fire from the vicinity of Flint and the railroad cut to the north- 
east of that place. 

As Major A reaches the top of Sentinel Hill he sees the support 

42 



Infantry Assault Battalion 43 

platoons of the assault companies disappearing in the woods just 
east of Salt Creek. A few moments later two messengers appear 
and hand Major A the following messages : 

No. 1. Co. B, 1st Inf., 

400 yards east H, 
27 Oct. '19, 8.45 a. m. 
C. O., 1st Bn., 1st Inf. 
Sentinel Hill. 
Held up by heavy automatic and rifle fire from FLINT and the 
railroad cut to the northeast. Will attack. Will build up firing line 
of 1st and 2d Platoons on the west edge of the FRENCHMAN- 
KICKAPOO ROAD. The 3d Platoon will work up the creek, 
which is 450 yards north of FRENCHMAN, until it crosses the 
wire fence and then attack the woods and railroad cut. Request 
assistance of machine guns and auxiliary weapons. 

Hall, Capt., 
Commanding. 

Co. A, 1st Inf., 
No. 2. SALT CREEK, east of BURNS, 

27 Oct., '19, 8.45 a.m. 
Scouts encountered slight resistance south of BURNS. Am 
continuing to advance. 

Jones, Capt., 
Commanding. 

Major A received these messages at 9.00 a.m. At this time he 
could see the advance elements of Company A approaching Burns. 
He could also see to his rear the machine-gun company which with 
guns on carts was distributed as follows : 
1st Platoon at Hill 855. 

2d Platoon just entering the ravine at 346.87-750.15. 
At the beginning of the engagement the 1st Platoon had been 
given the mission of supporting Company A, the 2d Platoon of sup- 
porting Company B. Captain M, commanding the machine-gun 
company, with first sergeant, and two buglers, was with Major A. 

Required : 

Orders as actually issued by Major A. 

(Order to lieutenant, commanding Stokes mortars and 1 -pound- 
ers, to be omitted.) 



44 Employment of Machine Guns 

Part II 

Major A gave the following verbal order to Captain M, com- 
manding the machine-gun company. 

"Company B has encountered heavy automatic and rifle fire from 
the vicinity of Flint and the railroad cut to the northeast of Flint. 
Company B attacks at 9.25 a. m. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Com- 
pany B will open fire from the west side of the Frenchman-Kickapoo 
Road while the 3d Platoon, Company B, pushes up that creek 450 
yards north of the Frenchman. After the 3d Platoon, Company B, 
passes beyond the wire fence which crosses the creek about 300 yards 
west of the Frenchman-Kickapoo Road, it will execute an attack 
against the woods, railroad cut and Flint. A red rocket from the 
3d Platoon, Company B, will indicate the beginning of the attack. 

"The Stokes mortars will lay down a barrage in front of the 3d 
Platoon, Company B, in the creek valley. The 1 -pounders will be in 
readiness to engage any hostile machine guns that open fire. 

"The machine guns from Sentinel Hill will open fire at 9.25 a.m., 
covering the woods at the railroad cut, Flint and the ridge just south 
of Flint. 

"Combat train 300 yards east of this point at edge of woods. 

"I shall remain at this point." 

Major A sent the following message to Commanding Officer, 
Company B : 

"Begin your attack at 9.25 a.m. The machine guns from SEN- 
TINEL HILL will assist you, opening fire at 9.25 a.m. The Stokes 
mortars will open fire on the creek valley at a point 100 yards east 
of the (wire fence and will lift their fire 100 yards in two minutes 
until the railroad is reached. The 1 -pounders will assist you from 
SENTINEL HILL. 

"A red rocket fired by the 3d Platoon will be the signal that they 
are leaving the creek and beginning their attack. 

"Combat train 300 yards east of this point at edge of woods. 

"I shall be on the top of SENTINEL HILL. 

"A, Major." 

Comments : 

Major A sees that the creek valley up which the 3d Platoon, 
Company B, is to advance will contain dead ground that the machine 
guns cannot search but which the Stokes mortars will be able to reach 



Infantry Assault Battalion 45 

effectively. This valley is narrow enough that the two mortars can 
cover it effectively, thus leaving the machine guns free to sweep all 
of the places from which fire is being received. 

In his orders to Captain M, Major A gives the machine guns a 
definite fire mission but does not tell them hqw to carry out this 
mission or the exact position for firing. He, however, designates 
the time of opening fire and names the rocket signal to be fired by 
the infantry before starting from the creek bottom. He confines 
his orders to the assignment of missions to the various parts of his 
command and the coordination of their efforts. 

Required : 

The orders actually issued by Captain M, commanding the ma- 
chine-gun company. 

Part III 

Captain M, turning to his bugler, gave the following orders: 

"Hill, ride as quickly as possible to the 2d Platoon which you can 
see about 500 yards to the east. Tell the lieutenant and section lead- 
ers to report to me here at once. You will guide the platoon to this 
point." 

Captain M then gave the following instructions to the first ser- 
geant : 

"Examine the Crest for 200 yards to the south and see if you can 
get gun positions with clear fields of fire." 

Captain M, after a few minutes' study of the ground, received 
the report of the sergeant indicating the exact positions selected for 
the platoon. Captain M proceeded to the nearest position, inspected 
it, and scaled the distances from the map from the gun positions to 
the targets indicated by the major. 

At 9.10 a.m. the platoon leader had reported, and Captain M (at 
point 346.3—750.2) gave the following orders: 

"Company B has encountered heavy automatic and rifle fire from 
the vicinity of Flint and the railroad cut to the northeast of Flint. 
Company B attacks at 9.25 a.m. The 1st and 2d Platoons, Company 
B, will fire from the west side of the Frenchman-Kickapoo Road 
while the 3d Platoon, Company B, pushes up the creek about 450 
yards north of Frenchman. After the 3d Platoon, Company B, 
crosses the wire fence about 300 yards from the road it will attack 



46 Employment of Machine Guns 

the woods at the cut. It will fire a red rocket to indicate the begin- 
ning of the attack from the creek. 

"The Stokes mortars will cover the creek valley. The 1 -pounders 
will be in position to fire on hostile machine guns. 

"Firing Position : About 50 yards from the slope along that trail. 

"Target: Woods at the railroad cut, Flint and the ridge to the 
south of Flint. 

"Ranges: Woods 1100 to 1300. Flint and ridge to south 1300. 

"You will be able to see the infantry platoon emerge from the 
creek bottom and will be responsible for shifting the fire so as not to 
endanger the infantry. 

"Signal me when ready to open fire, and open fire on my signal. 

"Combat train and carts 300 yards to the east at edge of woods. 

"I shall be on the right of your platoon.' , 

Comments : 

Captain M has at his disposal two platoons. The major in his 
order said nothing to indicate whether he desired all of the machine 
guns concentrated on the objectives in front of Company B. Captain 
M must therefore decide whether to give the 1st Platoon a temporary 
mission to assist the advance of Company B or to allow it to continue 
to support Company A. If the 1st Platoon Could assist the attack 
of Company B and yet be in a position to render assistance to Com- 
pany A, there would be no question but what it would be used. Its 
natural line of advance, however, will be up the ravine towards Burns 
House, and from a position along this route it could not bring fire 
on any of the objectives without interfering with the advance of the 
infantry. Moreover, it is important that Company A should have 
machine-gun support as the continued advance of Company A will 
place the 1st Platoon in a position to execute flanking fire against 
Flint, which is the most effective of all kinds. Captain M decides, 
therefore, to use only the 2d Platoon. 

The next point to be settled by Captain M is the firing position. 
The top of Sentinel Hill offers most excellent firing positions with 
easy control of the platoon, but it is likely at any time to be swept 
by the enemy's artillery or machine guns. The guns will have to be 
advanced by hand from the edge of the woods about 300 yards down 
the hill. This will render the advance to a new position slow. The 
guns, however, from their present positions dan reach the edge of 



Infantry Assault Battalion 47 

the woods in five minutes, and the buglers could be sent to guide 
them to their positions, which could thus be occupied very quickly. 

The lower slopes to the north possibly iwould offer good firing 
positions, the guns could be brought up close to the firing positions 
on the carts, and the resumption of the advance towards Frenchman 
would be much easier. On the contrary, being on lower ground, the 
machine guns could not support the attack as long and could not so 
nearly enfilade the railroad cut and embankment. There is, too, some 
uncertainty as to firing positions and the time is insufficient for any 
reconnaissance. 

Captain M therefore decides to place the 2d Platoon on the trail 
100 yards to the south and about 50 yards down the slope. He will, 
however, send the reconnaissance officer to see if the route to the 
north of Sentinel Hill is practicable for the carts when the advance 
is resumed. Since the infantrymen can be plainly seen when they 
emerge from the creek, he will place the responsibility for lifting the 
fire on the platoon commander, as the attack can in this iway be 
supported longer. 

Part IV 

Lieutenant B took his section leaders to the position to be occu- 
pied by the platoon, pointed out the exact positions to be occupied 
by them, and gave the following order : 

"You have heard the captain's order. Place your sections in 
position as quickly as possible without disclosing your position. 
Establish one belt filling station for each section. 

"Targets: 4th Section: Woods at the railroad cut, range 1,100 to 
1,300. Combined sights. 

"3d Section: Flint and the ridge to the south. Range 1300. 

"Rate of fire 250 per minute for one minute, and 150 thereafter. 

"Each section will designate one man to watch for the attack 
of the infantry from the creek bottom. Section leaders will shift 
their fire to the ridge south of Flint when the infantry advances 
against the woods. 

"Signal me when ready. Open fire on my signal." 

Required : 

The command of the section leader of the 4th Section for carry- 
ing out the fire ordered. Section assumed to be in position at the 
turn of the trail about 50 yards down the slope. 

Time allowed — 15 minutes. 



48 Employment of Machine Guns 

Sergeant J's Command : 

Combined sights, No. 8 gun 1,100, add 100. 

Target : Woods at railroad cut just north of the pike. 

Distribute 30 mils. Search 6 mils. 

Rate of fire: 250 per minute for first minute; 150 thereafter. 

Signal when ready to fire and open fire on my signal. 

Part V 

At 9.40 a.m. Captain M sees the enemy disappearing over the 
ridge just west of Flint, and the men of Company B approaching 
Flint. 

Required : 

A statement of the detailed plan of action decided upon by Cap- 
tain M. 

Part VI 

When Captain M saw that the enemy was in retreat he ordered 
the platoon leader to have one section of the platoon continue firing 
on the retreating enemy and the other section proceed to the vicinity 
of Flint, guns to be carried and joined en route by carts, which pro- 
ceed to the north of Sentinel Hill. 

Comments : 

To send the guns forward by hand and separate them from their 
Carts is bad as a general principle. In this case, however, it is much 
easier for the gunners to carry the guns and equipment to French- 
man than to carry them down the hill through the woods to the carts. 
It will also enable the carts to start sooner and make more rapid 
progress. 

It is yet too early for Captain M to move all of his guns forward 
as he must have some in position to meet a counter-attack should one 
develop. 

Situation : 

At 10.00 a.m. the last of the enemy disappeared into the woods 
at Mottin, and Company B, which was about 400 yards east of the 
woods, was stopped by fire from the woods. At the same time Major 
A observed that Company A had been stopped at the railroad by fire 
from Hill 926. He also received a message from an aeroplane saying 



Infantry Assault Battalion 49 

that a battalion of the enemy was forming for counter-attack just 
west of the woods at Mottin. 

Major A gave the following order to Captain M : 
"Company B has been stopped 400 yards east of Mottin by fire 
from woods at Mottin. Company A is held up at the railroad by 
fire from Hill 926. Aeroplane observer reports an enemy battalion 
forming for counter-attack west of woods at Mottin. Make your 
disposition to meet counter-attack." 

Required : 

Orders actually issued by Captain M. 

Captain M gave the following verbal order to the section leader 
of the 4th Section (assumed to be the section left on Sentinel Hill 
by the platoon leader ) : 

"Battalion of the enemy is forming for counter-attack west of 
woods at Mottin. Continue firing on east edge of woods but increase 
rate of fire to 200 per minute." 

Captain M sent the following written order by mounted mes- 
sengers to the 1st and 2d Platoons: 

Sentinel Hill, 
27 October, '19, 10.02 a.m. 
C. O., 

1st Plat, Co. D., 1st Inf. 
Enemy battalion forming for counter-attack west of woods at 
MOTTIN. Take position near 344.4-751.7 and be prepared to bring 
flanking fire on attacking troops. 

M, Captain. 

Sentinel Hill, 
27 October, '19, 10.04 a.m. 
CO., 

2d Platoon, Co. D., 1st Inf. 
Enemy battalion forming for counter-attack west of woods at 
MOTTIN. Move your 3d Section at fastest possible rate to vicinity 
of FLINT and take position to repel counter-attack. 

M, Captain. 

Comment : 

It may have been unnecessary for Captain M to send word to 
the platoon leader of the 2d Platoon of the impending counter- 



50 Employment of Machine Guns 

attack. The platoon leader would in all probability have pushed on 
rapidly to Flint, but the message will cause him to precede his 
platoon and make reconnaissance of positions which he otherwise 
might not do. 

The following are the principal errors which were made in the 
solution of the preceding terrain exercise : 

The chief error, and one that was made repeatedly, was in- 
fringing upon the province of subordinates. In a majority of cases 
Major A told Captain M what to do with his platoons, and in many 
cases Captain M told his platoon leaders just how to use their 
sections. 

Many officers failed to grasp the fact that the 1st Platoon, Com- 
pany D, 1st Infantry, having once been given the mission of sup- 
porting Company A, would continue to carry out this mission until 
it received orders to the contrary. 

The enemy having been driven from his position, a considerable 
number assumed that the action was over and took no steps to push 
part of the guns forward to the captured position to hold it in case 
of counter-attack, while the remainder of the guns remained in 
their firing positons until the captured position was occupied and 
continued to fire on the retreating enemy. 

The following numbered errors show in detail the mistakes that 
were made. 

Part I: 

1. No orders were given to the combat trains. 

2. Position of Major A was not given. 

3. Major A gave his orders directly to his platoon leaders who 
were at a distance, when Captain M was with him. 

4. Assumed that platoon leaders were with Major A when they 
had not been ordered to report. 

5. Allowed insufficient time for getting guns into position. 

6. Ordered dispositions that would take too long to carry out. 

7. Failed to notify the captain of Company B when machine- 
gun support would be given him. 

8. Ordered fire from positions from which only indirect fire 
could be used. Indirect fire should not be employed by a machine- 
gun company assigned to an assault battalion when the ground per- 
mits of direct fire. 

9. Directed the employment of the 1st Platoon to support Com- 



Infantry Assault Battalion 51 

pany B when it would have been better to continue it in support of 
Company A. 

10. Chose exposed routes to move guns into position. 

11. Employed a reserve company when the machine guns and 
auxiliary weapons should have been employed. 

12. Employed 1st Platoon to support Company B and made no 
use of 2d Platoon. 

13. Employed only one section to support Company B, which 
was wholly inadequate. 

Part II: 

1. Sent extremely long verbal messages by buglers. 

2. Employed 1st Platoon with Company B when it would have 
been better to continue it in support of Company A. 

3. Did not indicate firing positions of platoon. 

4. Did not designate position of combat train. 

5. Did not direct platoon leader to precede platoon and give him 
his orders where targets could be pointed out. 

6. Did not definitely locate positions assigned to platoon. 

7. Ordered dispositions that would take too long to carry out. 

8. Did not give position of Captain M. 

9. Ordered fire from positions where it was impossible to use 
direct fire. 

10. Chose exposed routes in moving guns forward. 

11. Failed to cover all of the targets designated by Major A. 

12. Ordered guns to continue firing until further orders and ar- 
ranged no signal for lifting the fire so infantry could advance. 

13. Made no allotment of targets to platoons. 

14. Directed 1st Platoon to remain in position instead of per- 
mitting it to continue to support Company A. 

Part V: 

1. Assumed that 1st Platoon had not been moving forward as 
Company A advanced during the attack. 

2. Made no provision for keeping a section in position tempo- 
rarily to guard against counter-attack just after position had been 
captured. 

3. Made no provision for immediately moving a section forward 
to the captured position. I 



52 Employment of Machine Guns 

4. Did not fire on the retreating enemy or on the targets to the 
rear after Flint was captured. 

5. Reported to Major A for orders instead of acting. 

6. Waited for orders instead of adting. 

7. After the capture of Flint gave orders for assembling the 
machine-gun company when the continued support of the battalion 
demanded that the platoons be separated. 

Part VI: 

1. Assumed that 1st Platoon had not advanced with Company A 
during the action. 

2. Sent no orders to 1st Platoon directing it to assist in repelling 
the counter-attack. 

3. Failed to grasp the fact that the first thing for the 2d Platoon 
to do on reaching Flint was to make dispositions that would assist 
in holding the ridge against a determined counter-attack. 

4. Directed fire on the enemy on Hill 926 instead of against the 
enemy making the counter-attack. With such a serious counter- 
attack expected, all energy should have been devoted to repelling it. 

6. Ordered 1st Platoon to change position when it was already 
in a more favorable position to assist in repelling the counter-attack. 

7. Changed orders of 2d Platoon and directed it to go to some 
other position when the position in the vicinity of Flint with its short 
range would have been more valuable in the final stages of a counter- 
attack. 



Ma 




*?-* 





••=■-?- - - - v- 
— Dpmon \ 




Map No. 1, Chapter V 




Chapter VI 

Employment of Machine Guns of a Regiment in 
the Later Phases of an Attack 

Tactical Ride 

[Maps: General Map of Vicinity of Leavenworth. Topographical Map of 
Fort Leavenzvorth and Vicinity, Leavenworth Sheet. (Map No. 2.)] 

Part I 

General Situation: 

A state of war has existed for several weeks between Kansas 
(Red) and Missouri (Blue). The Blues effected a crossing of the 
Missouri at Kansas City with an army corps and advanced north- 
ward. Their advance was stopped by two Red divisions about 10 
miles south of Leavenworth. Yesterday morning the Blue Corps 
made a general attack, pushing the Reds back all along the line. At 
nightfall the Blues had reached Five Mile Creek south of Leaven- 
worth. This morning the General attack was resumed at 11.00 a.m. 

Special Situation (Blue) : 

The 1st Division is attacking on the right of the line in column 
of brigades with the 1st Brigade in front. One regiment of field 
artillery is attached to the 1st Brigade. The 1st Brigade is attacking 
with two regiments abreast in the sector bounded on the east (right) 
by the Missouri River and on the west (left) by Pilot Knob, western 
outskirts of Leavenworth, U. S. Penitentiary, Prison Lane, Blunt 
Hill. Each regiment has one battalion in the assault, one in regi- 
mental reserve and one in brigade reserve. Each regiment has the 
machine-gun companies of the reserve battalions (Companies H and 
M) organized as a provisional machine-gun battalion under the com- 
mand of the regimental machine-gun officer. This machine-gun bat- 
talion is advancing just in front of the regimental reserve battalion. 

The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, is the left assault battalion. It is 
deployed with Company A on the right and Company B on the left 
as assault companies, and Company C as reserve company. Com- 
pany D (the machine-gun company), 2d Infantry, two Stokes mor- 
tars and two 1 -pounders are operating with the battalion. 

53 



54 Employment of Machine Guns 

The west boundary of the battalion is the west boundary of the 
brigade. The east boundary of the battalion is Broadway and Grant 
Avenue. 

In passing through Leavenworth the brigade met with practically 
no resistance. When the assaulting platoons of Company B emerged 
from the orchard east of the penitentiary they met with fire from 
the ridge about 500 yards to the north. At the same time Company 
A received some long-range fire from the ridge to the north of 
Corral Creek. 

At this time the machine guns and all auxiliary weapons (were in 
rear of the reserve companies of the battalion. 

Major A, hearing the firing, rode forward accompanied by Cap- 
tain M, commanding the machine-gun company, and Lieutenant S, 
commanding Stokes mortars and 1 -pounders. When he rode up to 
the east side of the orchard at 1.45 p.m. he saw Company B stopped 
just south and Company A about 100 yards north of the orchard. 
The enemy fire was coming chiefly from the ridge running northeast 
from the penitentiary with an occasional burst of machine-gun fire 
from the high ground north of Corral Creek. 

Required : 

Orders as actually issued by Major A. 
To Captain M, commanding machine-gun company : 
"Bring up your machine guns as quickly as possible to the vicinity 
of this orchard and open fire at once on the enemy along the ridge 
running northeast from the Penitentiary.' [ 

To Lieutenant S, commanding Stokes mortars and 1 -pounders: 
"Bring up the Stokes mortars and 1 -pounders at once. Put the 
Stokes mortars in position south of the orchard. Place the fire of 
the Stokes mortars on Corral Creek from the ravine running up to 
South Merritt Hill inclusive, to a point 200 mils to our left (west) 
of the ravine. Place 1 -pounders in position in that cornfield to the 
east ready to engage any machine guns appearing on high ground 
north of Corral Creek." 

Required : 

Orders as actually issued by Captain M. 



Later Phases of an Attack 55 

Part III 
Situation : 

Captain M gave the following verbal orders : 

To the buglers : 

"Jones, you and Smith gallop back to the company. Tell all 
platoon and section leaders to report to me here at once, and guide 
them to this place. Smith, you will remain with the company and 
guide it here. Tell Lieutenant A to bring it forward as rapidly as 
possible." 

To the 1st sergeant: 

"Sergeant, examine the ground at the west end of the orchard 
and see if it is a suitable firing position for a platoon." 

The 1st sergeant having reported the ground suitable for a pla- 
toon firing position, when the platoon and section leaders reported, 
Captain M issued the following verbal orders (at point 348.8- 
747.25) : 

"You can see our infantry near the wire fence about 300 yards 
to the front. They have been stopped by fire from the ridge running 
northeast from the Penitentiary. This company will go into position 
at once and open fire on that ridge. 

"Firing Positions : 

1st Platoon at the cut 200 yards to the west. 
2d Platoon near the west end of the orchard. 

"Targets : 

1st Platoon the left half of the ridge. 
2d Platoon the right half of the ridge. 

"Occupy positions at once and open fire when ready. 

"Combat wagons will halt on cross street 400 yards south of this 
point. Carts south of the orchard. 

"I shall remain at this point." 

A few minutes after fire was opened by the machine guns and 
Stokes mortars, the Reds along the ridge gave way and the Blue 
infantry advanced and disappeared over the ridge. Two or three 
minutes later shots were heard from the direction of Corral Creek 
just north of the ridge. 

Required : 

Orders as actually issued by Captain M. 
Time allowed — 10 minutes. 



56 Employment of Machine Guns 

Captain M gave the following verbal order to the platoon leader 
of the 1st Platoon: 

"Move forward at once and take up a position on the ridge from 
which the enemy has just retreated. Leave your carts in their 
present position." 

Captain M then sent the following message to the platoon leader 
of the 2d Platoon: 

No. 1. Eastern End of Orchard, 

2 October, '19, 2.15 p.m. 
C. O., 

2d Platoon, Co. D, 2d Inf. 
Replenish your ammunition and be prepared to move forward to 
ridge just evacuated by the enemy. Move forward when you see 
that the 1st Platoon is in position and ready to open fire. Leave carts 
in present position. 

M., Capt. 

Part IV 
Situation : 

Upon hearing the firing, Colonel E, commanding the 2d Infantry, 
went forward. When the enemy was driven from the ridge north- 
east of the U. S. Penitentiary, he established his command post at the 
Penitentiary. At 2.55 p. m. he received the following message: 

Hill 1,000 Yards East of Hill 881, 
No. 2. 2 October, '19, 2.45 p. m. 

CO., 

2d Inf. 
Held up along Corral Creek just west of Grant Avenue and in 
ravine southwest of SOUTH MERRITT HILL by heavy fire from 
SOUTH MERRITT HILL. Am deploying reserve company on 
my left to envelope SOUTH MERRITT HILL. Request artillery 
and machine-gun support. 

A., Major. 

At this time Company D (machine-gun company) was firing 
from the hill 500 yards east of Hill 881, and Company C was being 
worked up the ravine southwest of South Merritt Hill to extend the 
line to the north and envelop South Merritt Hill. The provisional 
machine-gun battalion of the 2d Infantry was along the streets about 



Later Phases of an Attack 57 

400 yards south of the 859-870 road, and the regimental reserve 
battalion was in rear of the machine-gun battalion. Colonel E had 
telephonic communication with the brigade commander whose com- 
mand post was north of Crossroads 859. 

Required : 

Actions of and orders as actually issued by Colonel E, command- 
ing 2d Infantry. 

Part V 
Situation : 

Colonel E called up the brigade commander and requested artil- 
lery fire on South Merritt Hill and the woods to the north thereof 
and on Engineer Hill not later than 3.20 p.m. He informed the 
brigade commander that the attack had been held up but would be 
resumed at 3.30 p.m. 

Colonel E then gave the following verbal order to Major M, 
regimental machine-gun officer, who was with him: 

"The enemy has held up our advance from South Merritt Hill. 

"The 1st Battalion is along Corral Creek just west of Grant 
Avenue and in ravine southwest of Merritt Hill. 

"The 1st Battalion resumes the attack at 3.30 p. m. The reserve 
company is now extending the line to the north so as to envelop 
South Merritt Hill. 

"The 2d Battalion, 1st Field Artillery, supports the attack, par- 
ticular attention being given to South Merritt Hill and the woods 
north thereof and Engineer Hill. The preparation will begin not 
later than 3.20 p. m. 

"The Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion will take up positions 
on the high ground between the Penitentiary and Grant Avenue, to 
support the attack, and will open fire at 3.28 p. m. 

"Command posts of 2d Infantry and of your battalion, U. S. 
Penitentiary." 

Colonel E then sent the following message to Major A: 

U. S. Penitentiary, 
No. 3. 2 Oct., '19, 3.05 p. m. 

CO., 

1st Bn., 2d Inf. 
Resume the attack at 3.30 p. m. 1st Bn. 1st F. A. supports attack, 
paying special attention to SOUTH MERRITT HILL and woods 



58 Employment of Machine Guns 

north thereof, and ENGINEER HILL. Preparation begins not 
later than 3.20 p.m. Provisional M.G. Bn. supports attack, opening 
fire at 3.28 p.m. from high ground between U. S. PENITENTIARY 
and GRANT AVENUE. 

E, Colonel. 

Required : 

Orders as actually issued by Major M, machine-gun officer, 2d 
Infantry. 

Major M gave the following verbal order to the lieutenant who 
was acting as adjutant of the machine-gun battalion: 

"Gallop back to the battalion and direct the company commanders 
to report to me at once at the east end of that orchard. Bring the 
battalion forward and halt it on the road under cover of the orchard. 
Report back to me when you have done that." 

When the company commanders reported, Major M gave the 
following verbal orders : 

"The enemy has held up our advance by strong machine-gun and 
rifle fire from South Merritt Hill. 

"The 1st Battalion is along Corral Creek just west of Grant 
Avenue and in the ravine southwest of Merrritt Hill. Company D 
is in position on the hill 500 yards east of Hill 881. 

"The 1st Battalion resumes the attack at 3.30 p.m., enveloping 
South Merritt Hill from the west. 

"The artillery preparation will begin not later than 3.20 p.m. 

"This battalion will support the attack by direct overhead fire. 

"Firing Positions: 

Company H ; cornfield 300 yards northeast of this point. 
Company M ; ridge running northeast from the Penitentiary. 

"Targets : 

Company H : Grant Avenue, inclusive to the west knoll of 

South Merritt Hill, exclusive. 
Company M : West knoll of South Merritt Hill and ridge to 
northwest. 

"Occupy your firing positions at once, and open fire at the maxi- 
mum rate at 3.28 p.m. 

"Combat wagons at disposal of company commanders. 

"Establish communication with battalion by telephone and 
runners. 

"Battalion command post at U. S. Penitentiary." 



Later Phases of an Attack 59 

Comments 
Part I: 

The enemy that was holding up the infantry and causing it losses 
was on the ridge immediately in front. The machine guns could 
sweep the whole of this ridge from positions which they could occupy 
quickly and with no losses. It was imperative that they should get 
into action at once as the infantry was in a very exposed position. 
The aim then was to get them into action as quickly as possible with- 
out any attempt to have the whole company open a surprise fire. 

Should the enemy retreat to the north over the ridges, the ma- 
chine guns would be able to bring an effective fire on him, but should 
he retreat from Corral Creek Valley to South Merritt Hill by the 
ravine running up to the east of the hill or by the smaller ravine 
about 400 yards to the west, the machine guns would not be very 
effective. This reason, together with the fact that the enemy in all 
probability has supports in Corral Creek Valley, decides Major A 
to place the fire of the Stokes mortars along Corral Creek between 
these points. They could fire very effectively on the ridge occupied 
by the enemy, but Major A considers that the machine guns can take 
care of that. 

The 1 -pounders would not be very effective against the enemy 
on the ridge, but against the machine guns on the high ground north 
of the creek they will prove very effective and will leave our own 
machine guns free to fire on the more important target. 

Part II: 

Captain M wished to look over the ground and select firing posi- 
tions, decide upon the assignment of targets, etc. The buglers could 
return to the company and guide the company to the position as 
well as he. 

Speed was important, so he directed all platoon and section 
leaders to precede the company so there would be no delay whatever 
incident to the occupation of the positions. 

By the way the enemy's line ran he saw that he could almost 
enfilade the right of the line from the position on the left, while his 
right platoon would have an oblique fire on the left of the line. This 
arrangement would greatly increase the fire effect over an assignment 
of targets directly in front of the platoons. 

Getting fire on the enemy as rapidly as possible was more impor- 



60 Employment of Machine Guns 

tant than surprise, so Captain M directed the platoons to open fire 
when ready and did not attempt to have all of the guns open fire 
simultaneously. 

There was plenty of cover at the orchard for both the carts and 
combat wagons, but Captain M preferred to separate them by a short 
distance as there was a possibility of the enemy shelling the orchard. 

Part III: 

As soon as the infantry passed beyond the ridge, Captain M 
wished to occupy it, for his present position afforded him no imme- 
diate opportunity to fire on the enemy. However, he wished to keep 
part of his guns in position for any emergency until one platoon was 
actually in position on the ridge. Should he move all of his guns at 
once and the enemy should make a counter-attack, he would leave 
his infantry without support. 

Part IV: 

Colonel E might have decided to use his reserve battalion to 
drive the enemy from South Merritt Hill. The message of Major A, 
however, indicates that the battalion reserve has not yet been em- 
ployed and the major appears hopeful of being able to dislodge the 
enemy if given artillery and machine-gun support. It would take at 
least an hour longer to deploy the reserve battalion and move it into 
position. It probably could not attack before 4.30 or 5.30 p. m. 

A glance at the ground showed Colonel E that the high ground 
between the Penitentiary and Grant Avenue afforded suitable posi- 
tions for overhead fire of the machine-gun battalion. This position 
could be occupied in thirty minutes. Much valuable time would thus 
be saved. The combined fire power of the artillery and machine 
guns probably would enable the 1st Battalion to advance. This 
would also leave Colonel E with a reserve if more determined resist- 
ance was met with at Engineer Hill after South Merritt Hill was 
captured. 

The colonel should employ always his maximum machine-gun 
fire power when stubborn resistance is encountered. His infantry 
reserves should be pushed into the fight only when the result cannot 
be obtained by fire. His machine guns should be so placed in the 
attack formation that they can be placed in a firing position with a 
minimum loss of time. 



k VI 




Map No. 2. Chapter VI 




Later Phases of an Attack 61 

Part V: 

Major M wished to continue in observation of the situation and 
also wished to issue his orders to the company commanders where 
he could point out the positions and targets to them. For these rea- 
sons, he sent for the captains to come forward instead of himself 
returning to the battalion. He did not wish to lose any time, how- 
ever, so he directed the adjutant to bring the battalion as far forward 
as it could come advantageously as a unit before being separated for 
its different missions. 

In assigning firing positions Major M was influenced by the 
ground offering favorable positions and giving the maximum amount 
of enfilade fire and at suitable ranges. He placed the greater part of 
his fire on the enemy's right as it was at this point that the principal 
attack was to be made and he wished to have a decided fire supe- 
riority. 

There was ample time to connect up the companies to battalion 
headquarters by telephone, and he directed that this be done. At a 
later stage quick communication might prove important in the move- 
ments of the companies. 

The companies can plug in at the regimental switchboard since 
battalion and regimental command posts are at the same point. The 
provisional machine-gun battalion, having no telephone equipment, 
often will be able to utilize the regimental switchboard. There is 
another advantage in the battalion command post being with the 
regimental command post, and that is easy communication with the 
assaulting battalion which is being supported. Control of the fire, 
however, is the first consideration in locating the command post. 



Chapter VII 

Machine Guns of a Division in an Attack in a 
Meeting Engagement 

[Maps: General Map Gettysburg -Antietam, 1 inch to 10 miles. Getty sburg- 
Antietam 1-21120, Sabillasville, Fairfield, Knoxlyn, and Emmittsburg 
Sheets. (Map No. 3.)] 

General Situation: 

The Potomac River is the boundary between a Red (northern 
state) and a Blue (southern state). These states are at war. 

Red forces are concentrating in the vicinity of Baltimore, with 
several small detachments to the westward and along the north bank 
of the Potomac. 

A Blue army is being mobilized in the valley of the Shenandoah. 
Several Blue detachments are along the south bank of the Potomac 
and in Washington. Blue troops have crossed the river at Harper's 
Ferry and are advancing towards Chambersburg. 

Neither side has any air service at the present time. 

Special Situation (Blue) : 

On September 1, 1919, the 1st Corps (1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Di- 
visions) has reached the vicinity of Greencastle, with the 1st Division 
at Waynesboro. On the evening of September 1 the corps com- 
mander receives a message from the army commander to the effect 
that the Reds are advancing from Baltimore. The army commander 
further states that he intends to meet the Reds east of the mountains 
and that it is imperative that the passes east of Waynesboro and at 
Cashtown be seized at once to allow the debouching of the 1st Army. 
The 1st Division is ordered to move on the 2d instant and secure 
the heights northeast of Emmittsburg. 

This division reached the vicinity of Blue Ridge Summit on the 
evening of September 2. Here it halted for the night, disposed as 
follows : 

Its Brigade in the vicinity of Monterey and Charmain. Com- 
mand post — Monterey. 
2d Brigade in the vicinity of the State Sanatorium and 
Sabillasville. 
62 




'-^!SS&JSS3BB»S" 



Attack in a Meeting Engagement 63 

Command post at State Sanatorium. 

Remainder of division, and trains, in and near Blue Ridge 

Summit. 
Division command post at Blue Ridge Summit. 
Outposts along the general line Fountain Dale — Hill 1567. 

At 6.00 a. m., September 3, 1919, the 1st Division advanced to 
secure the heights along Middle Creek from a point 2 miles north- 
west of Rhodes Mill to the Taneytown-Emmittsburg Road and 
establish a bridgehead covering the Waynesboro pass. The division 
moved in two main columns. The northern column consisted of 1st 
Brigade, 1st Light Tank Co., 1st Field Artillery, Company A, 1st 
Engineers, and one-half 4th Ambulance Company. It started from 
Charmain at 6.00 a.m. and advanced via the Waynesboro Turnpike 
to the line Rhodes Mill — point on Middle Creek 2 miles to the north- 
west of Rhodes Mill. The southern column consisted of 2d Brigade, 
2d Field Artillery, Company B, 1st Engineers, and one-half 4th 
Ambulance Company. It started from Sabillasville at 6.00 a.m. and 
advanced via Friend's Creek to the line Emmittsburg — Taneytown 
Road — Rhodes Mill. The Signal Company followed the northern 
column without distance. The 1st Field Artillery Brigade (less 1st 
and 2d Field Artillery), 1st Engineers (less Companies A and B) 
followed the northern column at 1 mile. 

The cavalry crossed the outpost line at 6.00 a. m. with Troops 
A, B and C on the Waynesboro Turnpike, and Troop D via Friend's 
Creek. 

At 6.30 a. m. the cavalry on Waynesboro Turnpike came in con- 
tact with Red cavalry estimated at one squadron, about 2 miles 
west of Zora. 

At 7.00 a. m. a message received indicated that the Red cavalry 
had established a firing line in the western edge of the woods just 
north of the word "Waynesboro" and that the Blue cavalry was 
working to the north. 

At 6.55 a.m. a message arrived from an officer's patrol on Hill 
802 (335.1—740.3) stating that a number of Red cavalry patrols 
were west of Tom's Creek, south of Hill 802, and that the ridge 
south of McKee Knob, east of Tom's Creek, seemed to be occupied 
by infantry. 

At 7.05 a. m. a message was received from the cavalry on 
Friend's Creek that cavalry patrols had been encountered about 1 



64 Employment of Machine Guns 

mile southwest of Zora, and that a patrol on Hill 985 reported a long 
column of infantry, estimated at a reinforced brigade, on the Em- 
mittsburg— Taneytown Road, the head at 6.30 a.m. being at Oren- 
dorf Farm, but that there were no signs of any other enemy troops 
to the northeast, nor to the east. 

At 7.00 a. m. the heads of the advance guards had reached Foun- 
tain Dale and the stream one-half mile east of cross roads 819 
(331.8—735.6). Each brigade was similarly disposed and was 
marching in the following order, with distances as noted : 

Yards 

Point, 1 platoon 30 

Distance 100 

Advance Party, 1 Co. (less 1 platoon) 65 

Distance 300 

Support, 1 Co 95 

Distance 500 

Reserve, 1 Bn. (less 2 Companies) 675 

1 Platoon, Howitzer Company 40 

1 Battery F. A 535 

Distance 800 

Main Body, Brigade Headquarters 50 

1 Regiment Infantry (less 1 Bn. and Field Tn.) . . 2,025 

Regiment F. A. (less 1 Battery, Field and C. Tn.) . 1,690 

1 Regiment Infantry (less F. Tn.) 2,920 

Company Engineers 225 

Com. Tn. Rgt. F. A. (less C. Tn. 1 Battery) .... 1,430 



Ambulance Company 130 



At 7.10 a. m. a message from the officer's patrol sent to Hill 
1263, dated 6.45 a. m., stated that the Reds, estimated at one brigade 
of infantry and a battalion of artillery, were apparently taking up a 
position from Hill 722 to Hill 564. 

At 7.15 a. m. it therefore became apparent to the division com- 
mander that he was going to meet considerable opposition in form- 
ing a bridgehead covering the Waynesboro Pass. It was plain that 
he must attack the enemy, who evidently intended to oppose his 
advance by holding the heights east of Tom's Creek. He decides to 
attack, and issues the following attack order : 



Attack in a Meeting Engagement 65 

1ST DIVISION 

Blue Ridge Summit, Md. 

3 Sept., '19, 8.00 a.m. 
Field Orders) 
No. 5 / 
[Map: Gettysburg, 3 inch.] 

1. The enemy, estimated at one brigade, one battalion of artillery, 
and one squadron of cavalry, is holding a position east of TOM'S 
CREEK, from Hill 722 to Hill 564. 

2. This division will attack at 11.30 a.m. and drive the enemy 
east of MIDDLE CREEK. 

Line of Departure : The general line Hill 802— Hill 771— LA W- 
LER FARM. 

March conditions cease. 

3. (a) The advance guards will seize at once the line from Hill 
771 to LAWLER FARM. 

b. The 1st Brigade with 1st L Tank Co. attached will attack the 
front Hill 722 (inclusive) — ZORA (exclusive). Southern bound- 
ary: ZORA— RHODES MILL (both exclusive). 

c. The 2d Brigade (less 4th Infantry) will attack the front 
ZORA (inclusive) — Hill 564 (inclusive). Northern boundary: 
Southern boundary of 1st Brigade. 

d. The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (less Troop C) will seize Mc- 
KEE KNOB at once and support the attack of the 1st Brigade. 
Troop C will reconnoiter towards EM MITTS BURG and to the 
south. 

e. The 1st F. A. Brigade will support the attack. Regiments are 
attached one to each infantry brigade, except that during the prepa- 
ration and the attack all guns will be controlled by the division 
commander. 

A concentration of not less than 45 minutes will precede the at- 
tack, with field guns well advanced and in positions covering both 
sub-sectors. 

Not less than one battalion will open fire at once to neutralize 
enemy artillery and enemy observation from ridge south of Mc- 
KEE KNOB. 

/. The machine-gun companies of reserve battalions will be em- 
ployed for overhead fire. 



66 Employment of Machine Guns 

g. The 4th Infantry will constitute the division reserve and will 
assemble at Road Fork 586 on FRIEND'S CREEK and await fur- 
ther orders. The C. O., 4th Infantry, will employ his machine guns 
from the high ground west and southwest of LAWLER to support 
the attack of the 2d Brigade. 

h. The 1st Engineers (less Cos. A and B) will move to FOUN- 
TAIN DALE and await further orders. 

x. Brigade commanders are charged with the maintenance of 
suitable connecting groups. 

4. Supply, Engineer, and Field Trains will await further orders 
in their present locations. 

Ammunition Distributing Stations : FOUNTAIN DALE and 
Crossroads 819. 

5. a. Plan of Signal Communications : No change. 

b. Axes of Signal Communications : No change. 

c. Command Posts : 

Division: FOUNTAIN DALE. 
1st Brigade: Hill 815. 
2d Brigade : Farm at 355.6-736.9. 
F. C. C. : Church 1,500 yards west of TOLL GATE. 

F., Major General, 

Commanding. 
Copies to : 

Staff 1st Brig., 2nd Brig., 1st F. A. Brig., C. O. Tns., 1st F. S. 
Co., 1st Sq., 1st Cav., 1st Engineers, 1st Corps. 

Required : 

A discussion of the employment of the machine gun of the 
division and the orders of the regimental machine-gun officers. 

The Mission of Machine Guns. — In an attack in a meeting en- 
gagement the following are the principal tasks of the machine guns : 

1. To cover the deployment of the infantry and its advance to 
the first firing position. 

The range of the machine guns is not sufficient to make them of 
much value in covering the approach march of the infantry. This 
task will, as a rule, devolve wholly upon the artillery. The deploy- 
ment of the infantry, however, usually will be made at such a dis- 
tance from the enemy's position that the machine guns can be useful 
in keeping down the enemy's long range machine-gun and rifle fire. 
Whether it will be necessary to employ the machine guns for this 



Attack in a Meeting Engagement 67 

purpose depends entirely on whether there is cover available for the 
deployment of the infantry. Where suitable cover is available the 
infantry will need no other protection than that of the artillery. 

After the infantry has deployed it frequently will have to 
advance for some distance to the first firing position either without 
cover or with imperfect cover. Under such conditions the machine 
guns should cover the advance of the infantry from the place of 
deployment to a first firing position. 

2. To support the attack of the infantry. 

At the moment that the infantry begins its advance from the first 
firing position every machine gun should be firing at the maximum 
rate of fire. Owing to the limited amount of ammunition carried 
and the heating of the barrels, it is seldom advisable for the machine 
guns to take part in an extended artillery preparation, but for one 
or two minutes prior to the launching of the attack they should fire 
at the maximum rate and should give continuous support to the 
infantry from then until the enemy's position is reached. Such sup- 
port of the machine guns may permit the infantry to advance con- 
tinuously without resort to its own fire power. This continuous sup- 
port will be possible only where there are suitable positions for 
overhead fire, or where machine-gun support can be given from 
positions on the flank. Flank positions seldom will be available. 
Every effort should be made to use overhead fire. 

3. To support the infantry in continuing the attack or taking up 
the pursuit after the enemy's main position has been captured. 

In a meeting engagement very little usually will be known of 
the enemy's dispositions in rear of his main position. Definite plans 
for the use of the machine guns, therefore, usually cannot be made. 
The best that can be done is to move the machine guns forward by 
echelon from one suitable position to another, keeping part of them 
constantly in readiness to support the infantry whenever such 
assistance is needed. 

4. To assist in the consolidation of the position whenever the 
limit of the advance is reached or the infantry is brought to a stand- 
still. 

At this stage of the game the machine guns should be pushed 
well forward so as to be able to place flanking fire in front of the 
position while the infantry is digging itself in and strengthening the 
position. Later it may be advisable to withdraw the machine guns 
somewhat farther to the rear. 



68 Employment of Machine Guns 

Method of Employment. — The division order directed the 
machine guns of the reserve to support the attack of the 2d Brigade. 
This general type of order will be the rule in a meeting engagement. 
There is no time to issue a machine-gun plan carefully coordinating 
the work of all the machine guns of a division, and there is usually 
not sufficient information of the enemy upon which to prepare such 
a plan. The division commander, however, will always provide a 
definite plan with a main attack to be delivered against a certain part 
of the line. It will be highly desirable always to have a decided 
superiority of fire at that point. Augmenting the fire at that point 
very frequently will be the mission assigned to the machine guns of 
the division reserve. In this situation such action was not advisable 
on account of the location of the reserve. The machine guns of the 
4th Infantry could not be assigned the mission of supporting the 
1st Brigade without separating them from their regiment by such 
distance that probably they would not be able to join it should it 
become necessary to employ the 4th Infantry without delay. Since 
it is not practicable to employ the machine guns of the 4th Infantry 
to support the main attack, it is employed to support the secondary 
attack and is placed in such a position that it would protect the right 
flank of the division, which is the most exposed since enemy 
reinforcements probably will come from the southeast. The position 
in which the machine-gun companies are placed is such that they 
could join their regiment promptly if it should be moved forward by 
either the 586 — 468 road or the 586 — 832 road. These two roads are 
the only probable lines of advance of the regiment. The machine 
guns continue under the command of the regimental commander so 
there would be no difficulty about their rejoining the regiment 
promptly in case of necessity. 

Whether or not these machine-gun companies would be withdrawn 
from the support of the 2d Brigade after the capture of the enemy's 
main position would depend entirely on the situation at that time. 

The machine guns have all been directed to support the brigades. 
It is therefore necessary to take up their employment from the stand- 
point of the brigades. 

1st Brigade. — The commanding general, 1st Brigade, gave a 
verbal order to his regimental commanders and staff which included 
the following instructions : 

"The 1st Brigade will attack with the 1st Infantry on the right 
with two battalions in the front line, and the 2d Infantry on the left 



Attack in a Meeting Engagement 69 

with one battalion in the front line. Boundary between regiments : 
House 1,000 yards north of Road Junction 487 — Road Junctions 
493-576-520, all to the 2d Infantry. 

"The commanding officers 1st and 2d Infantry will employ the 
machine-gun companies of reserve battalions to cover the deployment 
of and the advance of the infantry to the first firing positions just 
west of the Toll Gate — Fairfield Road and to support the attack 
against the enemy's position." 

In a meeting engagement, the machine-gun companies of reserve 
battalions ordinarily will be employed by regiment under the com- 
mand of regimental machine-gun officers and not by brigade. Only 
in an attack against a prepared position the machine-gun companies 
of reserve battalions exceptionally may be employed by brigade. In 
a situation like the present one, machine-gun support will be rendered 
to assaulting battalions much more promptly by employing the 
machine guns by regiment. Employing them by brigade will make 
communication more difficult and also will present a larger target to 
the enemy's artillery. 

1st Infantry. — The 1st Battalion was the advance guard of the 
brigade. Acting as such it had secured the east edge of the woods 
on the southern slopes of Hill 771 before the regimental attack order 
was received. 

The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, was at the head of the main body 
of the brigade. It was followed by the 3d Battalion with Company 
M in the lead. Company M had been placed in this position in the 
column to facilitate its entrance into action. The probability of the 
infantry of the 3d Battalion being used in the opening stages of the 
attack was extremely small. With the machine-gun company of the 
battalion, however, the situation was very different as the colonel 
habitually counted upon employing all of the machine guns of his 
regiment to support the attack. 

Upon the receipt of the brigade order, Colonel D, commanding 
the 1st Infantry, gave the following verbal order to his staff, the 
commanding officers of the 2d and 3d Battalions, of the Howitzer 
Company, and of Company M, and had his adjutant give the same 
order to the commanding officer, 1st Battalion. 

"The information of the enemy and the dispositions of the 
brigade and division, including the boundaries, the time of attack and 
the first firing positions of infantry, were given, and the following 
was added : 



70 Employment of Machine Guns 

"This regiment attacks with two assault battalions, 1st Battalion 
on the right and 2d Battalion on the left. Each assault battalion will 
be reinforced by one platoon of the Howitzer Company. 

"Boundary between battalions : Hill 789 — Road Junction 474 — 
Road Junction 524 — Road Junction 542, all to the 1st Battalion. 

"Company M will cover the deployment and advance of the 2d 
Battalion to the first firing position from the ridge 500 yards north- 
west of Hill 815 and will support the attack of the 2d Battalion from 
the eastern slopes of Hill 771." 

(Remainder of order omitted.) 

Without orders from the colonel, the commanding officers of the 
1st and 2d Battalions would employ their machine-gun companies to 
cover the deployment and advance to the first firing position, and to 
support the attack of their respective battalions. The colonel decided 
to employ Company M to support the attack of the 2d Battalion 
rather than of both battalions because the prospects of success are 
greatest on the front of the 2d Battalion. As a rule, an attempt 
should be made to have the greatest fire superiority at the point 
where progress appears most probable. 

2d Infantry. — The 2d Infantry was formed in column with the 
1st Battalion in the lead and followed by Companies H and M 
(machine-gun companies of 2d and 3d Battalions). This formation 
made it possible to employ all of the machine guns of the regiment 
without loss of time. 

Upon the receipt of the brigade order, Colonel E, commanding 
2d Infantry, gave the following verbal orders to his battalion com- 
manders, the regimental machine-gun officer, and commanding 
officer of the Howitzer Company : 

"The information of the enemy and the dispositions of the 
brigade and division, including the boundaries, time of attack and the 
first firing position of the infantry were given and the following 
was added : 

"This regiments attacks. 

"1st Battalion, with one platoon of Howitzer Company attached, 
is the assault battalion. 

"The 2d Battalion, less Company H, in regimental reserve, will 
take position along the creek 300 yards east of Hill 881. 

"The 3d Battalion, less Company M, in brigade reserve, will 
take position along the creek 400 yards west of Hill 881. 

"Companies H and M, under the command of the regimental 



Attack in a Meeting Engagement 71 

machine-gun officer, from the cornfield 600 yards southwest of Hill 
802, will cover the deployment and support the attack of the 1st 
Battalion. 

"The Howitzer Company, less one platoon, will support the 
attack from the woods southeast of Hill 802. 

"Ammunition distributing station : Fountain Dale. 

"Command post of regiment : Farmhouse 300 yards east of 
hill 881." 

Major X, machine-gun officer, 2d Infantry, upon receiving the 
order of the colonel, rode back to the machine-gun companies, 
assembled the captains of Companies H and M, and gave them the 
following verbal order as they rode along : 

"The enemy, estimated at one brigade of infantry, one battalion 
of artillery, and one squadron of cavalry, is holding a position east 
of Tom's Creek, from Hill 722 to Hill 564. 

"The 1st Division attacks at 11.30 a. m., our brigade attacking on 
the front Hill 722 (inclusive) to Zora (exclusive). 

"The 1st Infantry attacks on the right with two battalions in front 
line and the 2d Infantry on the left with 1st Battalion in the front 
line. The first fire position of the infantry will be just west of the 
Toll Gate — Fairfield Road. 

"Boundary between 1st and 2d Infantry: House 1,000 yards 
north of Road Junction 487 — Road Junction 493 — Road Junction 
576 — Road Junction 520, all to the 2d Infantry. 

"Companies H and M, under my command, will cover the de- 
ployment and support the attack of the 1st Battalion. 

"Firing Positions : 

"Eastern edge of cornfield 600 yards southwest of Hill 802. 
Company H on the right. 

"Targets : 

"From the northern edge of Hill 722 to the southern bound- 
ary of the regiment. The subdivision of the target will 
be made at the firing position. 

"During the advance of the infantry to the first firing position, 
support will be given to the infantry as it is needed. At 11.28 a. m., 
all guns will open fire at the maximum rate. 

"Nearest battalion aid station will be announced later. 

"Combat wagons at disposal of company commanders. 

"I shall be on the left of Company H." 



72 Employment of Machine Guns 

When Company H reached the unimproved road just west of 
Road Junction 607, at 8.45 a.m., Major X turned his command to 
the north and led it by the country road and across country to its 
position. The major and captains would precede the battalion to 
make their reconnaissance and select the exact firing positions. The 
battalion should go into position about 9.30 a.m., which is early 
enough to cover the advance of the infantry to the first firing posi- 
tion. Major X has learned from the commander of the 1st Battalion 
that the assaulting companies will use the woods and cornfield south- 
east of Hill 802 to infiltrate to the first firing position. The 1st 
Battalion will not reach the woods earlier than 9.30 a.m. so there 
should be no difficulty about covering their advance to the firing 
position. The range from the machine guns to the enemy's position 
is about 1,500 yards. The machine guns will be effective enough at 
this range that there will be no necessity for a move until after the 
enemy's position has been captured. 

The target to be covered by these two companies and the machine^ 
gun company of the assault battalion is only 600 yards. This will 
give a very dense fire which is highly desirable since the main effort 
is being made at this point and a decided superiority of fire is im- 
portant. 

2d Brigade. — The commanding general, 2d Brigade, assembled 
his regimental commanders, read the division order to them, and 
added : 

"The 3d Infantry will attack on the front of the 2d Brigade with 
two battalions in the front line and one in reserve. The machine-gun 
company of the reserve battalion will be employed to support the 
deployment and attack. 

"The machine-gun companies of the 4th Infantry, under com- 
mand of the regimental machine-gun and howitzer officer, from the 
high ground west and southwest of Lawler, will support the attack 
of the 3d Infantry as requested by the commanding officer, 3d In- 
fantry. 

"The first firing position of the infantry will be along the corn- 
fields and woods just west of the Zora — 468 road, and along Tom's 
Creek south of the 468-567 road. 

"Command posts of 2d Brigade and of 3d Infantry at farm- 
house 800 yards west of Lawler." 

3d Infantry. — The 1st Battalion, 3d Infantry, was the advance 



Attack in a Meeting Engagement 73 

guard of the brigade. Acting as such it had secured the eastern edge 
of the woods just west of Zora before any attack order was received 
from the regiment. 

The 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, was at the head of the main body 
of the brigade. It was followed by the 3d Battalion with Company 
M in the lead. 

Upon the receipt of the brigade order, Colonel F, commanding 
3d Infantry, gave the following verbal order to the commanding offi- 
cers of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the Howitzer Company, and of 
Company M, and to the machine-gun officer, 4th Infantry, who had 
reported to him, and had his adjutant give the same order to the 
commanding officer, 1st Battalion: 

"The information of the enemy and the dispositions of the 
brigade and division, the time of the attack, the boundaries of brig- 
ades, and the first firing position of the infantry, were given and the 
following added : 

"This regiment attacks with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 
2d Battalion on the right. Each battalion will be reinforced by one 
platoon of the Howitzer Company. 

"The 1st Battalion will attack from Zora inclusive to the orchard 
1,000 yards to the southeast, exclusive. 

"The 2d Battalion will attack from the orchard 1,000 yards south- 
east of Zora, exclusive, to Hill 564, inclusive. 

"Company M, from Hill 607, will cover the deployment and 
advance to the first firing position of the 2d Battalion and will sup- 
port the attack of the 1st Battalion. 

"The howitzer company, from the woods west of Zora, will sup- 
port the attack of the 1st Battalion. 

"The Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion, 4th Infantry, from the 
high ground west and southwest of Lawler, will neutralize the 
orchard 1,000 yards southeast of Zora and will support the attack 
of the 2d Battalion. 

"Ammunition Distributing Station : Crossroads 819. 

"Nearest battalion aid station will be announced later. 

"Command post of regiment: Farmhouse 800 yards west of 
Lawler." 

The front of the regiment is so great that the whole of it could 
be attacked by two battalions only by very great extension. The 
orchard 1,000 yards southeast of Zora, on account of the cover it 



74 Employment of Machine Guns 

affords the enemy, probably would prove to be a very difficult posi- 
tion to take by frontal attack. Owing to the fact that the orchard 
comes right down to Tom's Creek, it would be impossible to infil- 
trate forward to Tom's Creek as a first firing position at this point. 
The result would be that a frontal attack would have to cross a per- 
fectly level open space of about 600 yards from a first firing position 
in the woods to the west. This no doubt would be extremely costly. 
There appears to be every advantage in neutralizing this orchard, 
thus avoiding the losses incident to a frontal attack and permitting 
the battalions to attack with appropriate frontages. Fortunately the 
machine guns of the 4th Infantry, which have been assigned to sup- 
port the attack of the regiment, give the colonel a suitable force for 
this purpose. In addition, these machine guns will be sufficient in 
number to support the attack of the 2d Battalion. These guns, how- 
ever, will not be in position in time to cover the deployment of the 
2d Battalion since their position in the column of march is too far to 
the rear. Company M, on the contrary, will reach its position suffi- 
ciently early to cover the deployment of the 2d Battalion. After the 
2d Battalion has reached its first firing position, Company M can be 
switched to the support of the attack of the 1st Battalion. 

Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion, 4th Infantry. — After receiv- 
ing the order of the colonel of the 3d Infantry, the machine-gun 
officer, 4th Infantry, returned to the machine-gun organizations of 
the 4th Infantry which were marching in rear of the 1st Battalion, 
4th Infantry, in the order Companies D, H, M. Major Y informed 
the captains that their companies would form a provisional machine- 
gun battalion under his command to support the attack of the 3d 
Infantry. The battalion continued on the road until it reached road 
junction 586 at 8.50 a.m. At that point it was turned south on the 
586 — 832 road. It continued on this road until opposite Hill 985, 
when it turned northeast through the woods to a point on the east 
edge of the woods 500 yards southwest of Lawler. It reached this 
point at 9.20 a.m. Major Y and the company commanders had pre- 
ceded the battalion, and at this point Major Y gave the following 
verbal order : 

"The enemy, estimated at one brigade of infantry, one battalion 
of artillery, and one squadron of cavalry, is holding the position east 
of Tom's Creek from Hill 722 (inclusive) to Hill 564 (inclusive). 



Attack in a Meeting Engagement 75 

"The 1st Division attacks at 11.30 a. m., our brigade attacking on 
the front Zora to Hill 564, both inclusive. 

"The 3d Infantry makes the attack with two battalions in the front 
line and one in reserve. The first firing position of the infantry is 
the cornfields and woods just west of the Zora — 468 road and Tom's 
Creek east of the 468 — 443 road and south of the 468 — 567 road. 

"The 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, attacks on the front, orchard 
1,000 yards southeast of Zora, exclusive, to Hill 564, inclusive. 

"This battalion will neutralize the orchard 1,000 yards southeast 
of Zora and support the attack of the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry. 
"Firing Positions : 

Company D, the woods 500 yards south of Lawler. 
Company H, the cornfield south of Lawler. 
Company M, the orchard at Lawler. 
"Firing Missions: 

Company D will support the attack of the 2d Battalion, 3d 
Infantry. Special attention to roads leading east of Oren- 
dorf and Road Junction 505. 
Company H will neutralize the southern half of the orchard 

1,000 yards southeast of Zora. 
Company M will neutralize the northern half of the orchard 
1,000 yards southeast of Zora. 
"At 11.28 a. m. all guns will open fire at their maximum rate. 
"Combat wagons at disposal of company commanders. 
"Station for Slightly Wounded : Road Junction 655 on Friend's 
Creek. 

"I shall be on the left of Company D." 

The number of guns to be assigned to the neutralization of the 
orchard and the number to the support of the 2d Battalion, 3d In- 
fantry were entirely at the discretion of Major Y. Since no attack 
is to be made against the orchard, the immunity of troops on the right 
and left from fire from this orchard depends entirely on how thor- 
oughly it is neutralized. Sixteen guns employed against the orchard 
will give a frontage of about 40 yards per gun. At ranges of about 
1,500 yards such fire will be effective. If it were a dense woods 
instead of an orchard, the machine guns would be effective only 
against the edges. The orchard, however, is so open that the whole 
area can be covered effectively. 

Owing to the fact that the 4th Infantry is in reserve and that the 



76 Employment of Machine Guns 

machine-gun companies may be called upon at any time for service 
at some other point, Major Y would have preferred to hold the 
combat wagons under his own command where he could regulate 
the supply. However, sending the combat carts through the woods 
to refill would be difficult, so he decides it is safer to place the combat 
wagons at the disposal of the company commanders. 



Map No. 3, Chapter VII 




Chapter VIII 

Division Machine-Gun Annex in a Prepared 

Attack 

[General Map: Gettysburg- Antietam. Map: Gettysburg- Antietam 1-21120, 
Kingsdale and Taneytown Sheets. (Map No. 4.)~\ 

General Situation: 

A Blue nation has declared war on the allied states of Maryland 
and Pennsylvania (Red), and, having landed an invading army at 
Baltimore, has driven elements of the 1st Red Army, superior in 
strength but poorly trained, back towards the Monocacy River. 

The Red defense has been stubborn and the troops are every- 
where in contact. 

Special Situation (Blue) : 

The 1st Blue Army, at 2.00 p. m., June 2, 1920, has reached the 
following line and halted : Allaway Creek north of Oakgrove S. H. — 
Kingsdale— Piney Creek— Point 357.3-731.5— Point 356.0-731.0— 
Point 354.0—731.4 — Boyd — Crabster. The 8th Division was holding 
the line from Kingsdale, exclusive, to Point 357.6—731.8. It was 
holding the west bank of the east branch of Piney Creek. 

At 3.00 p.m., June 2, 1920, G3 of the 8th Division outlined to the 
division machine-gun officer the general plan of the attack of the 
8th Division on June 3d as follows : 

"The 8th Division with its brigades abreast, 15th Brigade on the 
right, attacks at 4.15 a. m., June 3, as the left division of the 2d Corps. 
Order of regiments from right to left: 29th, 30th, 31st, 32d Infantry. 
The 9th Division attacks on the right of the 8th Division and the 1st 
Division on the left. 

"Right boundary of the division : Road Junction 387 — Hill 564 at 
Point 356.0—738.5 — Kingsdale — Road Junction 743, all points ex- 
clusive. 

"Left boundary of division : Arters Mill — Big Pipe Creek Mill — 
Point 357.6-731.8— Longville— Point 351.8-733.0, all points inclu- 
sive. 

"Center boundary between brigades : Junction of Marsh Creek 
with the Monocacy River — Crossroads 435 — Hill 567, exclusive, 



78 Employment of Machine Guns 

Piney Creek (village)— Hill 709— Hill 727, all points to 16th 
Brigade. 

"Line of departure : Trench along east branch of Piney Creek. 

"The 15th Brigade attacks with its two regiments abreast, with 

two assault battalions in each regiment. It will capture the Ridge 

587, 572, 567, and will cooperate with the 16th Brigade in reducing 

the Harney Ridge. 

"The 16th Brigade makes the main attack. It attacks with regi- 
ments abreast in column of battalions. After taking Hill 574 it will 
capture the Harney Ridge by turning it from the south under cover 
of Allaway Creek. The 8th Light Tank Company is attached to the 
16th Brigade. 

"An artillery preparation of thirty minutes precedes the attack. 
A rolling barrage will precede the infantry by 150 yards to the ridge 
of Hills 587 — 572 — 567 — 574. The further advance will be covered 
by successive concentrations arranged by infantry commanders with 
supporting artillery. 

"The infantry advances from line of departure to Ridge 587 — 
572 — 567 — 574, 100 yards in four minutes: thereafter as arranged 
between commanders of infantry and supporting artillery. 

"Each brigade will furnish connecting groups of one platoon of 
infantry to maintain contact with adjacent divisions and groups of 
one section for contact between brigades. 

"Station for Slightly Wounded : Green Valley S. H. 
"Ammunition Distributing Station: Road Junction 665. 
"Axes of Signal Communications : 

8th Division : Silver Run — Green Valley S. H. — Gait. 

15th Brigade: Point 365.5-725.5 — Crossroads 669 — Black 

S. H. 
16th Brigade: Point 361.5-732.3— Gait— Road Junction 535 
— Lambert. 
"Command Posts : 

8th Division: Silver Run. 
15th Brigade: Point 365.5-735.5. 
16th Brigade: Point 361.5-732.3." 
G-3 directed the division machine-gun officer to prepare and 
submit a draft for paragraph 3 (d) of the division order, which 
would be the order pertaining to machine guns. 

In the preparation of the division order, the division machine- 



Division in Prepared Attack 79 

gun officer will usually be called on to prepare the draft of the 
paragraph pertaining to machine guns. He is the adviser of the 
division commander and of the general staff on matters pertaining 
to machine guns. In general the best results will be obtained where 
the machine-gun officer prepares the paragraph and the general staff 
amends his draft to whatever extent it is necessary to make the 
machine guns fit in with the general plan. The G-3 may prefer to 
draft the paragraph himself and then have the machine-gun officer 
look it over. It is not believed that this will get as good results on 
the average since the G3 may not as readily make corrections in his 
own order as in the order of the machine-gun officer. Whatever 
system is used the final paragraph should be a result of the combined 
work of G3 and the division machine-gun officer. This paragraph 
is the ground work of the machine-gun plan. If the paragraph is 
bad, the machine-gun plan cannot be good. 

In the preparation of this paragraph, the following points will 
always have to be covered : 

1. The employment of machine guns with infantry units: 

The commander must indicate clearly the general policy that he 
wishes to be carried out in regard to the employment of machine- 
guns with infantry units. In an attack with an extremely limited 
objective, it may perhaps be profitable to employ with assault bat- 
talions of infantry only a very small number of guns for use in the 
consolidation. In any other form of attack, a machine-gun company 
almost invariably will be employed with each assault battalion of 
infantry. On the contrary it will be exceptional to employ machine- 
gun companies with battalions in regimental, brigade, or division re- 
serves. They should be employed with these battalions only when 
the particular mission of the battalion calls for machine-gun support. 
It usually will be necessary to assign machine guns to connecting 
groups in the proportion of a platoon of machine guns to a company 
of infantry, or a section of machine guns to a platoon of infantry. 

In this case there are no special reasons demanding the employ- 
ment of machine guns with reserve battalions at the beginning of the 
attack. The right flank of the left brigade will be exposed to fire from 
Hill 567 (point 357.6-735.0) as it advances on Hill 574, but the 
barrage guns can cover Hill 567 until the right brigade reaches it. 
After the artillery barrage ceases, the left brigade may advance more 
rapidly than the right. At that time it may be desirable to return a 



80 Employment of Machine Guns 

machine-gun company to the regimental reserve battalion of the right 
regiment of the left brigade for the protection of its flank. The 
barrage guns will have completed their mission at that time and can 
be used for this assignment. 

The only guns to be employed with infantry units at the outset, 
therefore, should be those of assault battalions and those assigned to 
connecting groups between brigades and with divisions on the flanks. 

2. The time at which the machine guns will be placed under the 
command of the infantry unit commanders: 

The machine guns must come under the command of the com- 
manders of connecting groups and similar detachments or of an 
assault battalion, from which the machine-gun company has pre- 
viously been detached, early enough to permit them to receive instruc- 
tions and to move into the jumping off positions without undue 
haste. Nothing could be more unsatisfactory to the infantry than to 
be uncertain as to whether its machine guns will reach it in time 
for the attack. If the guns reach the infantry too late to thoroughly 
assimilate the orders of the infantry commander, cooperation be- 
tween the infantry and machine guns cannot be expected. On the 
contrary, if the guns are part of the defensive scheme of the sector, 
they should not be moved from their positions sooner than is neces- 
sary. 

In this situation it is essential that the guns remain in their posi- 
tions until after dark in order that the enemy may not become aware 
of the preparations being made for the attack. 

3. The designation of guns for barrage fire: 

In a meeting engagement where conditions force the commander 
to make a piecemeal attack, feeding in his troops as they arrive, 
some machine guns frequently will be held out of action in the begin- 
ning of the attack. However, where time is available to prepare a 
concerted attack, every machine gun should be employed in the initial 
stages of the attack. All guns not required with infantry units 
should be used for barrage fire. It is entirely unnecessary to hold 
out a reserve which takes no part in the barrage, or to leave machine- 
gun companies with battalions which are in reserve. The position of 
the barrage guns will always be far enough to the rear and the control 
over the guns such that the commander can interrupt their barrage 
mission and assign them a new mission. Where a command had an 
exposed flank that was being threatened by the enemy, the machine- 



Division in Prepared Attack 81 

gun company would be left with the reserve battalion employed to 
prevent the advance of the enemy at that point. Such employment 
would, however, be no exception to the rule since these guns would 
have a definite mission and would be in no sense a reserve. 

In this situation there is no reason why every gun not assigned 
to connecting groups or belonging to assault battalions should not be 
employed for barrage fire. 

4. The command of the barrage guns: 

The command of the barrage guns may be provided for in one 
of three ways : 

a. The machine-gun companies of battalions in the division re- 
serve may be assigned to the support of one brigade and the brigade 
commanders left free to work out the barrage in their zones of action. 
In a meeting engagement where there is little or no time for the 
preparation of a machine-gun plan, carefully coordinating the work 
of all of the guns, this will be the rule. Where time is available, 
however, the best results will not be obtained by this method. There 
are always positions in one brigade zone of action that can best be 
covered with fire from the other brigade zone of action. The possi- 
bilities of oblique and enfilade fire seldom will be fully realized where 
the brigades employ their machine guns independently of each other. 

b. The machine-gun companies designated for barrage fire may 
be formed into provisional battalions placed under the direct com- 
mand of the division machine-gun officer. 

Such a method of employing the machine guns is suitable only 
for an attack against a highly prepared position, on a narrow front, 
and with plenty of time available for preparation. Such command 
requires the installation of an extensive system of communications 
that is not necessary when the command is exercised through brigade 
commanders. If the front is wide, the difficulty of such command 
is greatly increased. Lateral communications will be more difficult 
to maintain than those leading to the rear through brigades. 

c. The division machine-gun officer may coordinate the work of 
the machine guns by preparing a division machine-gun plan and 
supervising the preparations for the attack, the actual command of 
the barrage guns being exercised by regimental machine-gun 
officers controlled through the regular channels of command. 
This will be the usual method of employment of machine guns when- 
ever there is time for a concerted attack. This method possesses all 



82 Employment of Machine Guns 

of the advantages of cooperation without the difficulties incident to 
too great a centralization of command. 

Where a provisional machine-gun battalion is organized in a regi- 
ment it seldom will exceed two companies in strength. A battalion 
of this size can operate in advance of the regimental reserve battalion 
without being too large a target for the enemy artillery. In that 
position it can render prompt support to the assault battalion of the 
regiment, supporting it by fire upon the request of the battalion com- 
mander in exactly the same way that supporting artillery cooperates 
with the infantry. 

Battalions as large as four companies may be formed in the 
brigades for use in prepared attacks against a stabilized position. 
Large battalions are not as flexible as small battalions under the 
command of regimental machine-gun officers and seldom will be 
employed in anything but a stabilized situation. 

In the present situation provisional battalions commanded by regi- 
mental machine-gun officers and coordinated by the division machine- 
gun officers should be the method employed. 

5. The time that the barrage guns will be placed under the com- 
mand of the regimental machine-gun officers or of the division ma- 
chine-gun officer: 

Frequently the guns to be employed for barrage fire will be guns 
that are a part of the defense scheme and are under the command of 
commanding officers of centers of resistance or sub-sectors. It is 
essential that the plan of defense should not be disturbed sooner than 
necessary, but it is also important that these guns make proper recon- 
naissance of their barrage positions and move into them in time to 
make all preparations. The reconnaissance and preparation of fire 
data should, when practicable, be carried out on the night of D minus 
2 days — D minus 1 day. The occupation of the position should be 
completed four or five hours previous to the attack. The best way 
to fulfill all of the conditions is to place the barrage guns under the 
command of the provisional machine-gun battalion commanders early 
on D minus 2 days, but to direct that the guns shall not be moved 
from the positions then occupied before a specified hour on D minus 
1 day. This permits battalion commanders to order forward recon- 
naissance parties and to establish ammunition dumps. 

6. Assignment of targets to the machine guns: 

The assignment of targets by the division order will be in very 



Division in Prepared Attack 83 

general terms. It is necessary that the infantry should know where 
machine-gun support may be expected. In a stabilized situation the 
assignment of targets will be made on very definite information. In 
such a situation as is presented in this problem an estimate is made 
of the points affording the best opportunities to the enemy to hold 
up our advance. Artillery and machine-gun fire will be placed on 
these points. Some of these positions can be covered best by artillery 
while the machine guns may more effectively cover others. It should 
always be determined whether machine guns can effectively fire on 
certain targets if the shape of the ground makes it doubtful. Very 
often the artillery and machine guns will fire on the same targets. 

In this situation the ridge running from Hill 587 to Hill 574 
offers the best opportunity for the enemy to stop the attack. For 
this reason all prominent points along the ridge and all woods in the 
vicinity of the ridge which afford concealment for the enemy are 
designated as targets. The roads and ravines leading to the west 
from this position will be used by the enemy in withdrawing or in 
reinforcing his line and should be covered. 

7. The time during which the barrage guns zvill fire: 

In an attack where there is no attempt to surprise the enemy, it 
frequently will be profitable to employ harassing fire by machine 
guns. Where surprise as to the time of the attack is hoped for, 
the machine barrage should not begin until H hour. Machine guns 
are not suitable for firing a long preparation like the artillery. The 
guns become hot and the barrels are worn out by long-continued fir- 
ing. The effect on the enemy would also be comparatively small 
since he can avoid the effects of the fire by remaining under cover. 

The barrage as such can be employed only as long as the infantry 
is advancing on a time schedule. When the infantry is advancing 
irregularly, the machine guns can furnish support to local attacks 
only by means of direct fire. Owing to the number of moves neces- 
sary it is much more difficult for machine guns than for artillery to 
lay down a barrage for a great distance in front of the line of depart- 
ure. It usually will not be advisable to prescribe a machine-gun 
barrage for more than 3,500 meters in front of the line of departure. 

In the present situation it appears that no general enemy line will 
be found for some distance beyond the line of Hill 587 — Hill 572 — 
Hill 574. Therefore the barrage mission should cease when the 
infantry reaches that line. 



84 Employment of Machine Guns 

8. The disposition of the barrage guns upon the completion of 
the barrage mission: Upon the completion of the barrage mission, 
the guns usually will be placed at the disposal of the regimental or 
brigade commanders. 

Paragraph 3 (d), prepared by the division machine-gun officer 
and amended by G3, was included in the field order in the following 
form: 

3 (d) Machine Guns : 

(1) One machine-gun section will be assigned to connecting 
groups on north boundary and on south boundary of the division, 
and one section to the connecting group between 15th and 16th 
Brigades. These guns will come under the command of commanders 
of connecting groups at 9.00 p.m., June 2, '20. 

(2) All guns not assigned to connecting groups or belonging to 
assault battalions will be employed for barrage fire. Provisional bat- 
talions will be formed under the command of regimental machine-gun 
officers. 

The D. M. G. O. will coordinate the work of the battalions. 

Barrage guns will come under the command of the Regimental 
machine-gun officers at once but will not move from their present 
positions before 9.00 p.m., June 2, 1920. 

Standing barrages will be placed on the following positions : Hills 
587, 584, 586, 572, 567 (at point 357.6-735.0), 574 and 567 (1,000 
meters northeast of LONGVILLE) : Woods in the vicinity of the 
general line of above hills : Road leading west from Road Junction 
573, 535 — 540 road. Unimproved road leading north from Hill 574, 
528-525 Road: Ravine at point 357.1-735.0. 

The barrage guns will open fire at 4.15 a. m., June 3, 1920. 
The barrage mission will cease when the infantry reaches the line: 
Hill 587— Hill 572— Hill 574. 

Upon the completion of the barrage mission the machine guns 
will be at the disposal of brigade commanders. 

(3) For details see Annex No. 2. 

Paragraph 3 (d) having been amended and approved by G-3, the 
division machine-gun officer is ready to start work on the machine- 
gun annex. 

Paragraph 1 should show the following: Information of the 
enemy ; a general statement of the mission of the division ; the attack 
formation of the division: the boundaries of the division and the 



Division in Prepared Attack 85 

boundary between brigades; the objective of the division; the line of 
departure of the infantry ; the time of attack ; the rate of advance of 
the infantry. 

All of this information is essential to the machine guns if they 
are to cooperate with the infantry. Regimental machine-gun officers 
could obtain this information from the regimental orders after they 
had been issued. However, much time will be saved to the provi- 
sional battalion commanders if this information is given in the ma- 
chine-gun annex. 

Paragraph 2 will be simply a statement that the machine guns 
will support the attack of the division. Situations might arise where 
all of the guns of the division would be used to support the attack 
of one brigade. In such a situation paragraph 2 would be a statement 
to that effect. 

Paragraph 3 (a) covers the assignment of machine guns to in- 
fantry units. This matter is covered in the machine-gun annex in 
practically the same way as in the division order. 

Paragraph 3 (b) covers the employment of barrage guns ; it desig- 
nates the guns for barrage fire; it definitely assigns targets to ma- 
chine-gun battalions; it assigns machine-gun battalions to initial fir- 
ing positions and provides for reconnaissance and occupation of these 
positions, including routes to be used ; it provides for the forward 
movement of the guns, designating successive barrage positions and 
routes thereto. 

The designation of barrage guns has been previously discussed. 
The targets to be fired upon are given in a general way in the field 
order, but there is no assignment of targets to machine-gun battalions. 
The 16th Brigade is expected to make the main attack, advancing 
more rapidly and turning the Harney Ridge from the south. For 
this reason it is to be strongly supported by machine-gun fire. Sup- 
porting the advance of the 16th Brigade does not necessarily mean 
firing on targets in its zone of action. A study of the map shows 
that Hill 567 (at point 357.6-735.00) and the woods 1,000 yards to 
the west afford excellent opportunities to the enemy to enfilade the 
attacking line of this brigade, since the other brigade jumps off 
farther to the rear. The road and ravine leading to the northwest 
between Hill 567 and the woods to the west are natural lines of re- 
treat for the enemy and should be covered with fire. These then are 
suitable targets for the Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion, 31st 
Infantry. 



86 Employment of Machine Guns 

The targets to be covered by a battalion have a great deal to do 
with the firing positions that will be assigned to it. The initial posi- 
tion should be such that the ranges to the first targets will not be too 
great and that the guns will not be called upon to make an early 
move. Commanding ground is extremely important. If positions 
are available which give oblique or enfilade fire they should be used. 
With the machine-gun companies of battalions in reserve there is also 
an additional consideration. The position should be such that the 
companies can join readily the infantry battalions to which they be- 
long. In other words, the machine-gun companies must not lose 
their functions as a part of the reserve battalions while they are par- 
ticipating in barrage fire. Both cover and concealment are always de- 
sirable and should be secured to the greatest extent possible. The 
cornfield north and west of Crossroads 538 possesses most of the 
requisites of a good firing position for a battalion with the mission 
to be assigned to this one. 

In the zone of the 16th Brigade, Hill 567 and Hill 574, with the 
woods in the vicinity of it and the roads leading to the north and 
northwest in rear of the hill, are suitable targets for machine guns. 
These targets should be assigned to the Provisional Machine-Gun 
Battalion, 32d Infantry. The cornfield west of the 481—538 Road 
is a suitable firing position for the battalion. It is sufficiently high 
so that the guns can fire safely over the infantry at the line of de- 
parture. There will be 14 guns in action in this battalion. The guns 
should not be less than 20 yards apart if sufficient suitable ground is 
available. The position has a frontage of over 800 yards and will 
fulfill this requirement. 

A study of the map shows that a considerable number of good 
enemy positions in the zone of the 15th Brigade can be covered best 
from firing positions in the zone of the 16th Brigade. Guns posted 
in the zone of the 16th Brigade will be able to bring enfilade fire 
against these positions. This may be taken care of in one of two 
ways : Guns of the 16th Brigade may be called upon to cover these 
targets; guns of the 15th Brigade may be posted in the zone of the 
16th Brigade. 

The number of barrage guns in the 15th Brigade will be only 
12, owing to the fact that the brigade employs four assault battalions. 
It might appear advantageous to have guns of the 16th Brigade assist 
the 15th Brigade by taking over more of the targets in the zone of 



Division in Prepared Attack 87 

the 15th Brigade. However, the plan of the division commander calls 
for a decided fire superiority in the zone of the 16th Brigade, so this 
action will not be admissible. The machine-gun company of the 30th 
Infantry should therefore be posted in the vicinity of 358.75—733.9. 
The machine-gun company of the 29th Infantry should be posted 
in rear of the right of the brigade and on commanding ground. 
Point 361.8-735.7 is a suitable location. The disposition of the 
guns of this brigade is an excellent example of the necessity for 
the coordination of the employment of the guns of the division. 

The reconnaissance of the positions will be made at once and the 
positions will be occupied at the earliest practicable moment after the 
time that the situation will permit the guns to be moved from their 
present positions. This hour has been fixed at 9.00 p. m. 

Frequently so many troops will be moving into position the night 
before the attack that it will be necessary to assign definite routes 
to the battalions for advancing to the initial barrage positions. In 
this situation such conditions do not exist, and the choice of routes 
will be left to battalion commanders. 

In this situation the guns will be able to carry out their complete 
barrage mission from one firing position. This is very unusual. 
Where it is necessary to use a number of positions they should be 
chosen with the same care as the initial positions. Routes to be fol- 
lowed in moving into them should be prescribed. The battalions 
should move forward by echelon, the company being the usual unit 
to form an echelon. The movement should be so arranged that there 
always will be machine-gun fire on positions just previous to the in- 
fantry assault. 

Paragraph 3 (,r) covers matters of interest to all of the machine 
guns. It includes : 

a. Time at which machine-gun organizations come under the 
command of infantry unit commanders. 

b. Designation of the commander of the barrage guns or provi- 
sion for the coordination of provisional machine-gun battalions, and 
the time at which the barrage guns will come under the command of 
these battalion commanders. 

c. The provisions for anti-aircraft defense. 

d. The duration of the barrage. 

e. The disposition of the barrage guns upon the completion of the 
barrage mission. 



88 Employment of Machine Guns 

All of these matters have been discussed except the provisions 
for anti-aircraft defense. This practically always will be the direc- 
tion that a section in each platoon be designated for anti-aircraft de- 
fense. In a well instructed division this would be a matter of routine 
and could be omitted from the annex. 

Paragraph 4 covers the administrative details. The station for 
slightly wounded should be given. The division administrative order 
will not cover the details affecting the ammunition supply of the 
machine guns and these should be given in Paragraph 4 to avoid the 
necessity for the issue of an administrative order as a supplement to 
the machine-gun annex. The size and general location of ammuni- 
tion dumps to be established and the location of the ammunition dis- 
tributing station will be given. Instructions relative to the use of 
tracer and armor piercing bullets will be given. With an assured 
supply of these kinds of ammunition this would soon become a rou- 
tine matter and be omitted from the order. If it becomes necessary 
to detail infantry ammunition carriers, they would be covered in this 
paragraph. They should be detailed only where the machine-gun 
companies have been greatly depleted, or where the conditions are 
such as to render the use of carts impossible and where it is impera- 
tive that all of the guns in the division be kept in action at all times. 

Paragraph 5 gives any necessary instructions as to the plan of 
signal communications, announces the axes of signal communication 
for the division and designates the division and machine-gun bat- 
talion command posts. 

The Machine-Gun Annex, prepared by the division machine-gun 
officer and checked up and amended by G3, was issued as an annex to 
the field order in the following form : 

8th Div., 
SILVER RUN, 
Annex No. 2 to 2 June, '20, 4.00 p. m. 

Field Orders No. 7, 8th Div. 
[Map: Gettysburg 3-inch Map.] 

Machine Guns 

1. Enemy situation is unchanged. 

The 8th Division attacks as part of a general attack with the 9th 
Division on its right and the 1st Division on its left. 

The 8th Division attacks with the two brigades abreast, the 15th 



Division in Prepared Attack 89 

Brigade on the right. The 15th Brigade employs four assault bat- 
talions, the 16th Brigade two assault battalions. Order of regiments 
from right to left, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32d Infantry. The 8th L Tank 
Company is attached to the 16th Brigade. 

Boundaries of the 8th Division: 

Right boundary : Road Junction 387— Hill 564 at Point 356.0- 
738.5— KINGSDALE— Road Junction 743, all points exclusive. 

Left boundary: ARTER'S MILL— BIG PIPE CREEK MILL 
—Point 357.6-731.8— LONGVILLE— Point 351.8-P-33.0, all points 
inclusive. 

Center boundary between brigades: Junction of MARSH 
CREEK with MONOCACY RIVER— Crossroads 435— Hill 567, 
exclusive— PINEY CREEK (village)— Hill 709— Hill 727 (all 
to 16th Brigade). 

Objective : MONOCACY RIVER. 

Line of departure of infantry: Trench along east branch of 
PINEY CREEK. 

Time of attack : 3 June 20, 4.15 a. m. 

The infantry advances from line of departure to Ridge 587 — 572 
— 567 — 574, 100 yards in four minutes. Thereafter as arranged by 
commanders of infantry and supporting artillery. 

2. The machine guns will support the attack of the division. 

3. (a) Machine-gun sections of the 29th and 32d Infantry will 
be assigned to connecting groups on the north and south boundaries 
of the division, and a machine-gun section of the 30th Infantry to 
the connecting group between the 15th and 16th brigades. 

b. ( 1 ) All guns not assigned to connecting groups nor belonging 
to assault battalions are designated as barrage guns. The machine- 
gun companies of the 31st and 32d Infantry will be formed into pro- 
visional battalions under command of the machine-gun officers. 
(2) Standing barrages will be placed on the following points : 
Company M, 29th Infantry — 

Hills 587 — 584 — 586, woods in the vicinity of points 359.9- 
735.9, 359.0-736.5, road leading west from RJ 573. 
Company M, 30th Infantry — 

Hill 572, woods in the vicinity of points 359.4-736.1, 359.0- 
735.6, 358.4-735.4. 
Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion, 31st Infantry — 

Hill 567 (at point 357.6-735.0), Woods in the vicinity of 



90 Employment of Machine Guns 

point 356.5-735.0, 535-540 Road, Ravine at point 357.1- 
735.0. 

Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion, 32d Infantry — 

Hills 574, 567 (1,000 yards northeast of LONGVILLE), 
Woods at points 356.9-734.1, 356.0-733.0, 355.5-734.2, 
355.8-733.8, Unimproved Road leading north from Hill 
574, 528-525 Road. 

Times of firing on various targets will be designated by regi- 
mental machine-gun officers. 

(3) Units designated as barrage guns will take initial positions 
as follows : 

Company M, 29th Infantry — In the vicinity of point 361.8— 

735.7. 
Company M, 30th Infantry — In the vicinity of point 358.75- 

733.9. 
Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion, 31st Infantry — In corn- 
field north and west of Cr. 538. 
Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion, 32d Infantry — In corn- 
field west of 481-538 road. 
Company and platoon commanders will make a reconnaissance of 
their positions and prepare fire data at once. Positions will be occu- 
pied as soon after 9.00 p. m. as practicable. Emplacements will be 
constructed at all positions and will be carefully camouflaged. 
Routes to positions at discretion of regimental machine-gun officers. 

(4) There will be no forward movement of barrage guns until 
the completion of the barrage mission. 

x. ( 1 ) Machine-gun organizations assigned to infantry units will 
come under the command of infantry unit commanders at 9.00 p. m. 

(2) The division machine-gun officer will coordinate the work of 
the machine guns. All barrage guns will come under the command 
of the regimental machine-gun officers at once but will not move from 
their present positions before 9.00 p. m. 

(3) One section in each platoon will be designated for anti-air- 
craft work. 

(4) Barrage guns will open fire at H hour (3 June, '20, 4.15 
a. m.). The barrage mission will cease when the infantry reaches 
the Ridge 587—572—567—574. Upon the completion of the bar- 
rage mission all barrage guns will be at the disposal of brigade com- 
manders. 



\. Chapter YIII 




largefsofCa "M"39 *Jnf '{jjfl 

Targets of Co. ~M"30">/nf- gg 

Targets of Provisional M.G.Bn. 31 s * Jnf H 
Targets of Provisional M.G£n.32 nd Jnf. ':•!:. 



Map Xo. 4. Chapter VIII 




Division in Prepared Attack 91 

4. a. Station for slightly wounded : GREEN VALLEY, S. H. 
b. Ammunition distributing station: RJ 665. Companies will 

establish ammunition dumps of 48,000 rounds in the vicinity of their 
barrage positions. One gun in each section of guns assigned to in- 
fantry units and one gun in each platoon of barrage guns will be 
provided with tracer bullets. Sections designated for anti-aircraft 
defense will be provided with tracer and armor piercing bullets. See 
Administrative Order. 

5. a. Plan of Signal Communications : Provisional machine-gun 
battalions will connect by telephone with respective regiments. 

b. Axes of Signal Communications : 

8th Division: SILVER RUN— GREEN VALLEY S. H.— 
GALT. 15th Brigade: Point 365.5-735.5 — Crossroads 
669— BLACKS S. H. 

16th Brigade: Point 351.5-732.3— GALT— Road Junction 
535— LAMBERT. 

c. Command Posts : 

8th Division: SILVER RUN. 

Provisional Machine-Gun Battalions to be designated by 
Brigade Commanders. 

By command of Major General A : 

B, Chief of Staff. 
Official : 

M. D. M. G. O. 
Distribution : 

Same as F.O. No. 7, 8th Division, and in addition all regimental 
machine-gun officers. 



Chapter IX 

Regimental Machine-Gun Annex in a Prepared 

Attack 

[General Map, Gettysburg- Antietam. Topographical Map, Gettysburg- Antie- 
tam, Kingsdale Sheet. (Map No. 5 J] 

Part I 

General Situation: 

Two hostile armies (Red — north and Blue — south) have been in 
a stabilized situation for two months on the general east and west 
line through Silver Run. 

On the front between Silver Run and Big Pipe Creek the oppos- 
ing lines are located as follows: 

Reds: The Red front line runs from west to east along the line 
Hill 586— 363.2-731.3— Hill 581— Hill 582— Hill 621—364.6-732.7 
—364.8-733.0— Hill 722— Hill 744. 

His main line of resistance is on the general line Hill 566 — Hill 
621— Hill 742— Hill 726— Hill 744— Hill 767— Hill 742. 

Blues: The Blues are holding the ridge from Green Valley School 
House to the town of Silver Run, with outposts along Silver Run 
Creek. 

Special Situation (Blue) : 

October 20, 1919, a general Blue advance was order for D day 
at H hour which will be within the next four days. 

The 1st Division holds the front from Silver Run to 496 Road 
Junction, both inclusive, as follows : 

1st Brigade from Silver Run, inclusive, to 365.4—722.1. 

2d Brigade from 365.4-732.1 to 496 Road Junction, inclusive. 

Company D, 3d Infantry, is occupying emplacements along the 
ridge to the west of Crossroads 655. 

Company M, 3d Infantry, is occupying emplacements in the vicin- 
ity of Hill 647 and in the woods east of Green Valley S. H. 

Company H, 3d Infantry, is in rest billets at farmhouse 800 yards 
east of Arter's Mill. Company H suffered heavy casualties the night 
of October 17 from artillery fire and had to be pulled out of the 
front line for recuperation. Its present strength is only 125 enlisted 
men. 

92 



Regiment in Prepared Attack 93 

1st Field Artillery Brigade is in the woods in the vicinity of the 
following points: 367.3-731.3, 366.85-730.2, 366.7-729.2, 363.4- 
730.2, 366.0-728.1, 364.6-728.2. 

Division Summary of Intelligence for October 20, 1919, con- 
tained the following important information : 

Headquarters, 1st Division, 

ARTER'S MILL. 

Summary of Intelligence 

From 12.00 o'clock noon, 19 October, '19. 
To 12.00 o'clock noon, 20 October, '19. 

1. Enemy order of battle: No new identifications. 

2. Location and movements of enemy's troops : 

Airplane reports that a company of machine guns was observed 
moving up the north slope of Hill 742 at 7.00 p. m., October 19. 

3. Enemy infantry, artillery, and aerial activity: 

Prisoners captured near Hills 581 and 709 about 10.00 p. m., 
October 19, state that the enemy has one battalion in the wood west 
of Hill 709 and one battalion south of Hill 706 in the woods. These 
battalions furnish the garrisons for the strong points on Hills 581, 
582, 622, 621. They state also that there is a battalion on Hill 742 
and one battalion holding the woods in the vicinity of 364.4—734.4, 
and Hill 727 and woods to west, two companies being in each posi- 
tion. That the rest of the brigade is in rest billets in KINGSDALE 
and GEORGETOWN. 

Deserters who came in and surrendered the night of October 19 
corroborate the above statements. 

4. Enemy works : Airplane photographs taken the morning of 
the 20th show new wire on Hills 621 and 622, and in the vicinity of 
364.85-733.05. 

5. Enemy morale : Enemy's morale is bad, all indications are that 
he will not offer serious resistance to a determined attack. 

F. F. Jones, 
Distribution A. A. C. of S., G-2. 

On October 20, 1919, Major M, machine-gun officer, 3d Infantry, 
is handed the following advanced copy of the regimental Field Order 
for the attack with instructions to submit recommendations for the 



94 Employment of Machine Guns 

employment of all of the machine-gun companies of the regiment, 
recommendations to be in the form of a sub-paragraph of paragraph 
3 of the field order. 

3d Infantry, 
ARTER'S MILLS, 
20th October, '19, 2.00 p. m. 
Field Order } 
No. 40 f 
[Map: 3-inch Topographical Map, Gettysburg- Antietam, Kingsdale Sheet."] 
1. a. For the past week the enemy has been strengthening his de- 
fenses along the whole of his line. The last three nights prisoners 
have come in and surrendered to our outposts. They all state that 
the morale of the Red forces is bad and that they are nervous over a 
possible attack. 

(b) The 1st Corps will attack at D day, H hour, with the 3d 
Division on the right, 1st Division in the center, 2d Division on the 
left. 

The 1st Division will attack with 1st Brigade on the right and 
2d Brigade on the left. 

The 2d Brigade attacks with the 3d Infantry on the right and 
4th Infantry on left. 

Boundaries of 2d Brigade: 

Right (east) : Creek east of Hills 621 and 709 (center branch) 
— Creek west of Hill 744 — Road Crossing 557 (west of 
GEORGETOWN) Hill 664, 361.65-740.15, 361.7-740.7, 
all inclusive. 
Left (west) : 496—698 Road, 361.6-736.6, 360.9-738.3, 567- 
557-526-527 Road, all inclusive. 
Objective of 1st Division: BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. 
The 1st Division will be supported by the 10th Field Artillery 
Brigade. 

The artillery preparation will commence at H minus 15 minutes 
and will consist of heaviest possible concentrations on the enemy's 
front line, and on all sensitive points. 

Two battalions of light artillery will support the advance of the 
3d Infantry. One 75 -mm. gun will be assigned to the assaulting 
battalion as an accompanying gun. 

A rolling barrage by all available light guns will commence at H 
minus 5 minutes and precede the infantry as far as the 665-669 road. 



Regiment in Prepared Attack 95 

A smoke screen will be placed in front of the woods south of 
Hills 709 from H minus 15 minutes to H plus 24 minutes, and in 
front of Hill 742 from H minus 15 minutes to H plus 81 minutes. 

2. This regiment will attack at D day, H hour. 
Boundaries : 

Right (east) : Same as right boundary of 2d Brigade. 
Left (west) : Creek west of Hill 621, 679-704-669-602-528 
road, 361.5-739.0, 361.1-740.8. The 3d Infantry will be 
responsible for creek and road. 
Objective: Same as the objective of 1st Division. 
Line of departure of infantry : SILVER RUN CREEK. 
Rate of advance : 100 yards in 5 minutes to the 665-669 road. 

3. a. The 1st Battalion, with one platoon of the Howitzer Com- 
pany attached, will attack as the assault battalion. It will be in posi- 
tion not later than H minus 2 hours. 

b. The 2d Battalion (less Company H), in regimental reserve, 
will take position in the woods northeast of Hill 651 and await orders. 

c. The 3d Battalion (less Company M), in brigade reserve, will 
take position along BIG PIPE CREEK south of ARTER'S MILL 

and await orders. One platoon with of machine guns will act 

as a connecting group with the 2d Infantry. 

d. Machine guns : (less one platoon). 

e. Howitzer Company (less one platoon), from the woods east 
of Green Valley S. H., will support the attack of the 1st Battalion, 
paying special attention to the woods southwest of Hill 709. 

4. Regimental aid station: ARTER'S MILL. 

See Administrative Order No. 56. 

5. a. Plan of signal communications unchanged. 

b. Axis of signal communications : 

Point 200 yards southwest of Crossroads 655 — Hill 621, 679- 
720-704-669-528 Road. 

c. Command Posts : 

2d Brigade, farmhouse at point 365.0-730.7. 

3d Infantry, 200 yards southwest of Roadcrossing 655. 

Barrage guns : 

C, Colonel. 
Distribution A. 



96 Employment of Machine Guns 

The division machine-gun annex had not yet been received by the 
regiment, but the following information had been telephoned by the 
division machine-gun officer : 

"The 3d Infantry will furnish the machine guns for the connect- 
ing group between the 1st and 2d Brigades. 

"All guns not assigned to connecting groups nor belonging to 
assault battalions will be employed for barrage fire. Barrage will 
cease when the infantry reaches the 665-669 road. Machine guns at 
disposal of regiments upon completion of barrage. 

"Guns will not be moved from present position before 7.00 a. m., 
D minus 1 day. 

"3d Infantry machine guns will cover sensitive points within its 
zone of action and in addition the whole of Hill 727." 

Required : 

The sub-paragraph submitted by Major M. 

Part II 

Special Situation (Blue) : 

Colonel C, after looking over the paragraph prepared by Major 
M, amended it to read as follows, and directed Major M to prepare 
the machine-gun annex for the regimental field order. 

3. d. Company H will report one section of machine guns to the 
commanding officer of the connecting group between 1st and 2d 
Brigades, at 7.00 a. m., D minus 1 day. Companies H (less one sec- 
tion) and M are designated for barrage fire. These companies will 
come under the command of the machine-gun officer at 7.00 a. m., D 
minus 2 days, but will not move from their present positions before 
7.00 a. m., D minus 1 day. 

Standing barrages will be placed on: Hills 621 and 709, woods 
southwest of Hill 709, 718-704 road, Hill 726 (at 364.6-734.2), Hill 
727, road and woods 300 yards north of Crossroads 669, ravine 400 
yards northeast of Crossroads 669, ravine and unimproved road 700 
yards northeast of Crossroads 669. 

Upon the completion of the barrage mission, the guns will remain 
in their final barrage positions until further orders. 

For details see Annex No. 1. 

Major M prepared the following machine-gun plan as an annex to 
paragraph 3 (d), Field Order No. 40. 



Regiment in Prepared Attack 97 

Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion, 3d Infantry, 

ARTER'S MILL, 
20 October, '19, 2.00 p. m. 
Field Orders ^ 
No. 1 ) 

Annex No. 1, 

To Field Order No. 40, 3d Infantry. 
[Map: Gettysburg 3-inch Map.] 

Machine Guns 

1. Enemy situation unchanged. 

Our corps attacks at D day, H hour, with 3d Division on the 
right, 1st Division in the center, 2d Division on the left. 

1st Division attacks with brigades abreast, 2d Brigade on the left. 
The 2d Brigade attacks with 3d Infantry on the right and 4th In- 
fantry on the left. 

Boundaries of 3d Infantry : 

Right (east) : Creek east of Hills 621 and 709 (center 
branch) — Creek west of Hill 744 — Road Crossing 557 
(west of GEORGETOWN)— Hill 664— Point 361.65 — 
740.15, Point 361.7-740.7, all inclusive. 
Left (west) : Creek west of Hill 621, 679-704-669-602-528 
Road, Point 361.5-739.0— Point 361.1-740.8, all inclusive. 
Objective : BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. 

Line of departure of infantry : SILVER RUN. 
The infantry advances at the rate of 100 yards in 5 minutes, 
and will be preceded by an artillery barrage as far as the 
665-669 Road. 

2. Companies H (less one section) and M will support the attack 
of the regiment by barrage fire. 

3. a. For details of positions and missions see Table 1 and Dia- 
gram No. 1. 

Times of fire given in Table 1 are general guides for the firing 
of the platoon or company. Company and platoon leaders will check 
the clearances of friendly troops by each gun. 

b. Companies will take initial positions as follows : 

Company H in the vicinity of 365.45-731.7. 

Company M in the vicinity of 364.55-731.2. 

Company and platoon commanders and 8 men per platoon will 



98 Employment of Machine Guns 

reach the vicinity of their positions at 6.00 p. m., D minus 2 days, for 
reconnaissance of positions, preparation of fire data, and construction 
of emplacements. Excavations will be made after dusk and work 
carefully camouflaged. Companies will occupy their positions at 
8.00 p. m., D minus 1 day. 

Company H will march to its position by the ARTER'S MILL — 
655 Road. 

Company M will proceed to its position by a route selected by its 
captain. 

For forward movement of machine guns see Table 2. 

x. 1. Barrage guns will come under the command of Major M 
at 7.00 a. m., D minus 2 days, but will not move from their present 
positions until 7.00 p. m., D minus 1 day. 

x. 2. The barrage mission ceases at H plus 2 hours and 50 min- 
utes, but all guns will continue under the orders of the machine-gun 
officer, and will remain in the position they occupy at that time until 
further orders. 

4. a. Regimental aid station: ARTER'S MILL. 

b. Ammunition. 

Companies will establish dumps in the vicinity of initial positions 
as follows: 8,000 rounds of ordinary 30 cal. ammunition; 3,000 
rounds in belts with 1 tracer bullet, and 1 armor-piercing bullet in 
each ten rounds. 

One gun in each section will carry two boxes of tracer ammuni- 
tion on carts for ranging. Sections designated for anti-aircraft work 
will carry on the carts six boxes of ammunition loaded with tracer 
and armor piercing bullets as noted above. 

The 3d Infantry has detailed 16 men to act as ammunition car- 
riers for Company H. 

c. Field trains will not advance north of SILVER RUN. 

5. a. Plan of Signal Communications : 

Communication by visual, rockets and runners as provided in Gen- 
eral Plan of Division. 

Companies will connect their initial positions by telephone with 
initial command post of the Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion and 
their second position with second command post. 
b. Command Posts: 

3d Infantry: In ravine 200 yards southwest of Crossroads 
655. 



Regiment in Prepared Attack 



99 



Provisional Machine-Gun Battalion: From H to H plus 95, in 
ravine 200 yards southwest of Crossroads 655. After H 
plus 95 in woods north of Crossroads 718. 
By command of Colonel C : 

B, Adjutant. 
Official : 

M, Major, M. G. O. 
Distribution : 
Same as F. O. No. 40 and in addition Cos. D. H. M. 

Required : 

a. Preparation of an "Organization Chart" and a diagram showing 
details of positions and missions of companies as Table 1 to para- 
graph 3 (a) of Machine-Gun Annex. This chart will show assignment 
of targets at the initial position and at successive positions, and the 
times of fire and rates of fire for all targets. 

b. Preparation of a "Movement Table" as Table 2 to paragraph 
3 (b) of the Machine-Gun Annex. This table will show all move- 
ments of platoons or companies, giving the location of the organiza- 
tions both before and after the movement, time of movements, and 
routes followed. 



Requirement (a) Part II PART II 

Organization Chart 

Table 1 to Annex No. 1 of F. O. No. 40 

Reference: Diagram No. 1. Date: Oct. 20, 1919 



Platoon or 
company 



A Plat. . . 

B Plat. . . 

Co. H . . . 
C Plat. . . 

DPlat... 
Co. M... 



Composition 



Plat, of Co. H. 
Plat, of Co. H. 



Plat, of Co. M. 
Plat, of Co. M. 



Guns 


Approxi- 
mate 
location 


Target 


Time 


Rate of 
fire 


From 


To 


2 
2 


HI 
HI 


Tl 

T5 


H 
H+ 42 


H-f 40 
H-f 72 


125 

75 


4 
4 


HI 
HI 


Tl 
T6 


H 
H+ 42 


H-f 40 
H+ 76 


125 

75 


6 


H2 


T10 


H+140 


H+170 


125 


4 
4 


Ml 
Ml 


T2 
T3 


H 
H-f- 24 


H-f- 22 
H-f 30 


125 
125 


4 


Ml 


T3 


H 


H+ 30 


125 


8 
8 
8 


Ml 
M2 
M2 


T4 

T7 

T8&T9 


H+ 32 
H4- 96 
H+137 


H-f 52 
H+135 
H + 165 


75 
75 
75 



Remarks 



100 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Requirement (b) Part II PART II 

Movement Table 

Table 2 to Annex No. 1 of F. O. No. 40 

Reference: Diagram No. 1 Date: Oct. 20, 1919 



Platoon or 


From 


Time 


Route 




company 


rom 


To 


To 


Company H . . . . 
Company M 


HI 

Ml 


H+78 
H+54 


H+138 
H+ 94 


655-697 Road and un- 
improved road over 
Hill 726. 

Creek west of Hill 621 
and 679-718 Road. 


H2 

M2 



Comments 

Part I. — It should be noted that Colonel C provides a definite 
mission for all of his guns. In the initial stages of such an action 
every machine gun should be employed. It is entirely unnecessary to 
hold out a reserve which takes no part in the barrage. The position 
of the barrage guns will always be far enough to the rear and the 
control over the guns such that Colonel C can interrupt their barrage 
mission and assign them a new mission. It would be a mistake to 
hold out reserve guns which would take no part in the firing. 

Colonel C is making a surprise attack, as is indicated by the short 
artillery preparation. For this reason he provides that the machine 
guns will not open fire until H hour. 

Colonel C does not assign a rolling barrage mission to the machine 
guns as they are not suited for such work. He directs that they place 
standing barrages on known strong points and on the woods where 
the enemy is known to have troops. 

Colonel C places the barrage guns under the command of the 
machine-gun officer on D minus 2 days as he wishes him to have time 
for the reconnaissance and preparation of the positions. He states 
specifically, however, that they shall not be moved from their present 
positions until D minus 1 day, as he wishes to continue his present 
scheme of machine-gun defense until it is absolutely necessary to 
place the guns in position for the attack. 

The division commander has decided that the machine-gun bar- 
rage cannot be planned beyond the 665-669 Road and provides that 



Regiment in Prepared Attack 101 

the barrage mission ceases at that time. Colonel C, however, con- 
tinues all companies under the command of the machine-gun officer, 
which means that they will become a regimental reserve. He directs 
that they shall not move until further orders. It would be a mistake 
to concentrate them upon the completion of their mission when their 
future mission cannot be foreseen. At the end of the barrage mission 
they will be in excellent positions for repelling counter-attacks, and it 
is better to leave them in these positions until Colonel C knows what 
the situation is. 

Part II. — In making the selection of initial positions for the com- 
panies Major M was guided by the positions that the companies now 
occupy. Company H has a road leading directly from its defensive 
position to its initial barrage position so that it can be moved readily 
without interfering with other troops. Company M is so close to its 
position that it can reconnoiter the position and move to it with mini- 
mum of exposure. 

In designating the times of fire for different targets, it is Major 
M's aim to always have a heavy fire on the target that is most likely 
to hold up the infantry at a particular time. He intends to open fire 
on the target as soon as possible and to continue firing on it until the 
safety angle forces him to cease firing or until the infantry is 1,800 
meters in advance of his guns, when it is necessary to cease firing. 
He also wishes to have a part of his guns that are firing on any target, 
at medium range, whenever it is practicable. 

In providing for the forward movement of the organizations, 
Major M directs them to use the roads. At this stage of the game 
there is no danger of the roads designated being congested with traf- 
fic. The only thing that would be going forward so early possibly 
would be a few trucks with engineer material for road construction. 
The roads may be heavily shelled, but it is unlikely. The enemy will 
be busy moving his divisional artillery to the rear, and the artillery 
farther to the rear will be neutralized to a great extent. The smoke 
screen on Hill 742 will deprive the enemy of his best observation sta- 
tion, so direct fire on the carts is improbable. To send the carts 
across country will greatly delay their advance. It is better to take 
a chance on the shelling and trust to subordinate commanders to use 
their judgment and get off the roads if they are heavily shelled. There 
will be some difficulty in advancing over the roads, and Major M 
has taken this into consideration. The first organization to advance 
over any road will not be able to advance as rapidly as the later ones, 



102 Employment of Machine Guns 

as they will have to cut wire and possibly fill in or bridge some 
trenches. 

In assigning times of fire on any target Major M makes the state- 
ment that these times are to be taken only as guides. He has made 
only one calculation for a platoon or company, and that with the posi- 
tion known only approximately. If his figures were followed rigidly, 
the infantry might be endangered by some one gun in an organiza- 
tion. For this reason platoon and company commanders are always 
responsible for looking out for the safety of the infantry regardless 
of the time shown in the table. 

Major M does not tell his command what kind of fire they will 
use. He considers it unnecessary for they have been trained always 
to use direct fire when possible, including barrage work, but always 
to be prepared to use indirect methods. 

The targets to be covered were given as lines instead of areas in 
order to make the calculation of times less difficult. Many of the 
targets would have been areas rather than lines. 

In providing for ammunition dumps Major M does not indicate 
what part of the ammunition will be in original packing boxes and 
what part in belts. He does not know what is available and must 
leave it to his supply officer to get the greatest quantity in belts that 
is possible. The supply of oil and water would be provided auto- 
matically. 

Major M directs that reconnaissance be made and emplacements 
prepared on D minus 2 nights. This is always much better when time 
is available. It insures that the position can be occupied deliberately 
and the fire data accurately calculated. When machine gunners have 
to locate their positions and lay out their lines of fire after dark, 
errors usually will creep in. 

It may not have been necessary for Major M to state that excava- 
tions would be made only after dark and all work carefully camou- 
flaged, but he is on the safe side in so ordering. 

Ammunition carriers are provided for Company M on account of 
the shortage in personnel. Where companies are not depleted they 
should furnish their own ammunition carriers. The personnel of a 
machine-gun company is now sufficient for this purpose. 

It is unnecessary for Major M to go into detail as to the various 
methods of communication, as that is provided for in the General 
Plan of the Division which is a matter of drill in the organizations. 
He does consider it necessary to give some instructions about the 



Regiment in Prepared Attack 103 

telephones, however, as he does not want the first organizations that 
move forward to try to connect back to the first command post. 

The following are the principal errors made in the solution of the 
preceding problem. 

Part I. — 1. Form given for "Par. 3 (d) Machine Guns" was 
not followed. 

2. Machine-gun organizations assigned to infantry units were 
not placed under the command of the infantry commander early 
enough to permit them to receive instructions and move into the 
jumping-off positions without undue haste. 

3. Machine guns assigned to barrage fire were not placed under 
barrage commander early enough to permit them to make proper 
reconnaissance of positions. 

4. Distribution of targets to companies was made in the field 
order. That should be done in the machine-gun annex. 

5. Fire was lifted when infantry was 500 yards from the target 
instead of on a time schedule. Irregularities of the ground make 
this method uncertain. 

6. Did not use all guns. All guns not belonging to assault bat- 
talions nor assigned to connecting groups should be used for barrage 
fire. 

7. A rolling barrage was employed. This is not practicable with 
machine guns. 

8. Targets were designated too generally. 

9. Time when barrage mission ceased was not shown. 

10. Too many guns were assigned to the connecting group. 

1 1 . All of the organizations were not accounted for. 

12. Passage of lines was provided for when it had not been or- 
dered. 

13. Objectives well to the rear frequently were not covered. 

14. Machine guns belonging to assault battalions were given mis- 
sions after H hour by commander of barrage guns. Such use will 
be exceptional. The infantry battalion commander ordinarily will 
designate the targets for these guns. 

15. No machine guns were assigned to connecting group. 

16. No guns were designated as barrage guns. 

17. Information not necessary to the command was placed in 
field order. 

18. Known strong points were not fired on. 

19. Firing was ordered that would endanger the infantry. 



104 Employment of Machine Guns 

20. Machine-gun annex was submitted instead of a paragraph 
for the field order. 

21. Reasons for action were put in the order. 

22. All of the barrage guns were assembled at one place. 

23. Machine-gun companies were employed with reserve bat- 
talions without any special reason. 

24. Successive positions for machine-gun organizations were 
shown in the field order. 

25. Harassing fire was provided for when the attack was planned 
as a surprise. 

26. Other objectives than the Baltimore Turnpike were assumed. 

27. Provision was made for the adjustment of the barrage fire 
under conditions where adjustment was impossible. 

28. Matters that were a question of training were placed in the 
order. 

29. A barrage was placed on the line of departure. 

30. Sufficient information in regard to the barrage guns was not 
placed in the order. 

31. Machine-gun companies belonging to assault battalions were 
relieved from such assignment during the action. They will always 
be needed during the consolidation. 

32. Forward movement of the guns was shown in the field order. 

33. The machine-gun barrage was begun before the artillery 
preparation. 

Part II. — 34. More guns were assigned to certain targets than 
were necessary to cover the target effectively. 

35. The machine guns did not continue to support the infantry 
as long as possible before lifting their fire from a target. 

36. No time interval was allowed for in switching from one target 
to another. 

37. Firing was carried out over friendly troops at a greater dis- 
tance than 1,800 meters. 

38. Provision was not made for supporting the infantry up to H 
plus 2 hours and 50 minutes, which was the time at which the infan- 
try would reach the 665-669 road. 

39. Movements were made across the country when roads could 
probably have been used and they would have been much faster. 

40. Rates of fire were too rapid. 

41. Rear targets were not covered. 

42. Bounds in moving the barrage guns forward were too short. 



Map No. 5, Chapter IX 












M 


AP No. 


. Ch. 


iPTEK IX 












118 


$WM 


Sr 


illtl 


^^ 




$g| 




^l/ylK!NG 


sun 


Jcprgetowti Ca 




^ 








;i£fi_i] 




M 


? 


ill 


ill 


\T\li^ 








SSll 


W^PineyCi 




Vk-i^^^^^- 


i^sssls 


^'^v^wv 


^||p| 






• : : i ;* 'It A 5 


^1 • "M 


«»5 




ffiill 


111111 


*w®Si0^ 




111 




ill 


5K 




ylllll3$t§i 




liliili 




ipf 


lli 

IIP 


111 










g 


-ifclY \¥l$£. 




lypll 


ISHili 






m r :^#?z 


r i 


oo 


2000 Meters S^Tft^wS 


^iipisi 




fll 


l ^ 


■ "jr^ m 




;rpi^ 




I 




- ' 'lfeU r, " r,rf = ! ' 


%te« 


i t-xl^ 



Regiment in Prepared Attack 105 

43. The commander of the barrage guns assumed control over 
guns which belonged to the assault battalion. 

44. Fire was continued so long on certain targets that the friendly 
infantry was endangered. 

45. Times of advance were not shown. 

46. All of the guns assigned to the barrage fire were not em- 
ployed. 

47. Times for lifting the fire were not given but a general state- 
ment made that guns would lift their fire when the infantry masked 
them. 

48. Firing was carried out at ranges greater than 2,600 meters, 
which is the limit of effective fire with the Browning machine gun. 

49. Order to open fire at H hour was violated. 

50. A rolling barrage was provided for, although standing bar- 
rages had been ordered. 

51. Movement table showed movement to initial positions instead 
of movement from initial positions to successive positions. 

52. All of the prescribed targets were not covered. 

53. Changes of position were shown for only part of the organiza- 
tions. 

54. Failed to prescribe rate of fire. 

55. Rate of fire was too slow. 

56. Exact time of movement was not shown. 

57. Fire of the companies was split up more than necessary. 

58. An attempt was made to cover all targets from the initial 
positions. 

59. Positions were occupied before the infantry had advanced to 
that point. 

60. Fire was made unnecessarily complicated by having a platoon 
from both organizations fire on a target when one organization could 
have delivered all of the fire on the target. 

61. The time was incorrectly expressed. 

62. Emergency missions were assigned to barrage guns. These 
can usually be handled better by guns with assault battalions. 

63. Positions shown in the movement table did not agree with 
ones shown on the organization chart. 

64. Targets were not fired upon just before the infantry assault. 

65. Barrage guns were moved forward practically together in- 
stead of by echelon. 

66. Fire was ordered from certain positions before the machine 
guns reached the positions. 



Chapter X 

Employment of Machine Guns on the Defensive 

Troops with a defensive mission may hold a position in the fol- 
lowing ways : 

1. Deployed for Defense. 

In such a situation there are no intrenchments. The boundaries 
of strong points are known only approximately. The command for 
the purpose of occupying the position develops, takes up the approach 
march, and deploys so as to cover the front. 

Machine guns cannot be located accurately nor their lines of fire 
definitely prescribed. The order probably would indicate the number 
of machine-gun companies to be employed on each line and the num- 
ber to be held in reserve. There will be little time for adjustments 
between the infantry and machine guns. Time is an all-important 
factor. These conditions will often be met the best by employing 
all machine-gun companies with infantry battalions. 

2. By Taking up a Defensive Position. 

In this situation, lines of defense have been located accurately, 
trenches and field works have been partially or wholly constructed, 
and observation posts provided. The infantry units will have been 
assigned definite missions and definite zones of action. The artillery 
has prepared normal and emergency barrages. 

In this situation the machine-gun annex would go into great de- 
tail. Tables and maps would be prepared showing the exact locations 
of guns and the exact lines of fire, both for their battle missions and 
S. O. S. missions. The question of the command of the machine- 
gun units would be determined by the missions assigned to particu- 
lar machine-gun organizations. The situation described herein would 
be a gradual development, more details being prescribed the longer 
the command remained in the sector. 

3. By Occupying a Defensive Zone. 

The defensive zone is usually the development of a defensive 
position. A defensive zone includes two or more defensive positions. 

As regards the machine guns, great distribution in depth is the 
chief characteristic which distinguishes it from the defensive posi- 
tion. Since two or more positions are to be held, it no longer will 

106 



Employment on the Defensive 107 

be possible to place the great bulk of the machine guns so that they 
can lay down a barrage in front of the main line of resistance of the 
first position. 

Whatever type of defense is employed, the general principles of 
the employment of machine guns are the same. The chief differences 
that will appear will be the extent to which the situation permits the 
coordinating of all of the guns, and the additional distribution 
in depth that will be necessary where the command defends a 
zone instead of a position. In the following discussion the distribu- 
tion in depth considered applies to a defensive position and not to a 
defensive zone. 

At medium and short ranges, the zone swept by machine-gun fire 
is narrow and deep. The use of machine guns from flanking or 
oblique positions increases their effectiveness many times. While, 
in the offensive, frontal fire from necessity will be the rule, on the 
defensive flanking or oblique fire almost always will be possible and 
should be considered the normal use of machine guns. Frontal fire 
should be used only against exits or narrow passages of special im- 
portance (bridges, roads, trails, streets, forest paths, communicating 
trenches, etc.), or to concentrate upon one objective the fire of every 
weapon capable of firing on it. 

Machine guns should be so placed as to bring oblique or enfilade 
fire against: 

(1) The enemy lines. 

(2) Positions where the enemy would form for the attack. 

(3) The ground over which the enemy must pass should he 
attack. 

(4) Our own front lines should the enemy penetrate them. 
To achieve these objects, machine guns may be placed: 

a. In a salient or reentrant in the line. 

b. In concealed positions in front of the line. 

c. In dominating positions in rear of the line. 

Surprise action gives machine guns the opportunity to cause tre- 
mendous losses in a very short time, completely destroying the morale 
of the enemy. On the defensive machine guns must make the great- 
est use of this characteristic. They must not reveal their location by 
firing on unimportant targets. Often the element of surprise is of 
greater importance than long range. This was one of the most 
marked features of the German method of machine-gun defense. 



108 Employment of Machine Guns 

On the defensive, even more than on the offensive, the effective- 
ness of machine guns depends upon cooperation. The perfection of 
this cooperation will depend upon the length of time available. When 
it is necessary to take up a position hastily, the best that can be hoped 
for is the proper distribution of machine-gun companies to different 
sections of a front. As an organization settles down in one position, 
cooperation of the machine guns should be worked out in more detail. 
Sectors of fire should be assigned to all guns and the maximum use 
should be made of enfilade and oblique fire. The longer the organi- 
zation remains in a position the more centralized should the control 
of machine guns become. Such centralization of control gives a 
greater opportunity for the coordination of machine-gun fire where 
time is available for working out the detail. This is a matter that 
infantry commanders frequently have overlooked. Where machine 
guns have been assigned directly to them upon first taking a position, 
they frequently have resented it when they have been withdrawn from 
their control at a later time. 

The development of the sectors of the 2d Division in Belleau 
Woods and of the 3d Division at Chateau Thierry illustrate how 
differently systems of defense are developed under different condi- 
tions. These organizations had gone into the line on May 31 and 
June 1, 1918. An inspection of these organizations about June 22 
to June 24 found the 2d Division with emplacements for all guns 
and cover trenches near at hand for the gun squads. A sufficient 
supply of ammunition was on hand at the guns. There was, how- 
ever, very little coordination of the guns. In some places more guns 
were being used than necessary to hold a given piece of ground, while 
in other places there was a shortage of guns. In the 3d Division, on 
the contrary, there was a very complete plan for the employment of 
the guns, but very little had been done toward carrying out this plan. 
Very few emplacements had been constructed. There were extremely 
few cover trenches. Many of the guns did not have an adequate 
supply of ammunition. The machine-gun situations were the logical 
results of the conditions in the sectors. The 2d Division had met 
with severe fighting from the moment it entered the sector, and its 
lines of defense had changed constantly. Such conditions made it 
imperative that machine guns should be pushed well forward to give 
protection to the infantry, which had very little in the way of ma- 
terial defenses. There had been no time for a plan coordinating the 



Employment on the Defensive 109 

use of all of the guns at the time that the position was taken up, and 
the situation had changed so constantly that no thorough plan of 
defense had been worked out. Necessity, however, had compelled 
the machine gunners to provide emplacements and cover trenches and 
a plentiful supply of ammunition. The 3d Division, on the contrary, 
had had practically no fighting and had been permitted to occupy the 
position more or less leisurely. The result was that a comprehensive 
plan had been drawn up before any construction of emplacements 
and cover trenches had been started. The sector was so quiet that 
the troops did not feel the same need for protection that the 2d 
Division did. They had not dug very much and in many cases had 
not brought up sufficient ammunition. The preparation of emplace- 
ments, cover trenches and ammunition dumps was actually completed 
only two days before the attack of the Germans on July 15. 

Where time is available to plan the occupation of a position and 
carry it out deliberately, the disposition of the machine guns should 
be the first step in the occupation of the position. The machine guns 
are the backbone of the defense, and in general the disposition of the 
infantry should conform to the machine-gun positions. If the in- 
fantry is first placed in position and then the machine guns sited so 
as not to interfere with the infantry, the maximum use of the ma- 
chine guns will not be attained. The purpose of the defense is to 
hold the position with the greatest economy of men, leaving the 
greatest number possible for counter-attack. This will be possible 
only where the maximum use is made of the automatic weapons. 
There will, however, always have to be slight adjustments of posi- 
tions between the infantry and machine guns, and frequently infantry 
dispositions may properly prevent the machine guns from taking the 
most ideal positions. The general formation of the infantry in hold- 
ing the position always will have to be taken into consideration in 
posting the machine guns. 

Machine-gun fire should be carefully coordinated with that of the 
automatic rifles. It is impossible in most cases to place a continuous 
belt of machine-gun fire across the front of a position. For this 
reason only the important avenues of approach should be covered by 
machine guns and the less important places should be taken care of 
by automatic rifles or rifle fire. 

There should be cooperation with the artillery and trench mortars 
for the following reasons : 

1. In planning the S. O. S. barrage it will be impossible for any 



110 Employment of Machine Guns 

one of the arms to completely cover the front. Without cooperation 
it will usually happen that more fire than is necessary will be placed 
upon certain sections of the front, while other portions of the front 
will be neglected. There will be certain pieces of ground that it will 
be impossible to sweep by machine-gun fire. This must be covered 
by artillery and trench mortars. On the other hand, where machine 
guns enfilade roads or important avenues of approach they will pro- 
hibit the use of these roads much more effectively than can the 
artillery or mortars. 

2. In planning a harassing fire a combined schedule of firing 
should be prepared which would include all three arms. This avoids 
duplication of work and renders more effective the harassing fire. 

3. The artillery has important means of information that the 
machine guns have not. Through cooperating with the artillery, they 
will have access to this information, which will be most valuable to 
them. 

The following are suitable missions for machine guns on the 
defensive : 

1. Counter preparation. If the enemy indicates that he is going 
to attack, it sometimes will be possible to break up the attack through 
counter preparation before it is ever launched. Machine-gun fire 
should be placed upon the important avenues of approach and the 
areas that are favorable for forming up the attack. 

2. Barrages when the enemy actually launches his attack. At the 
time that the enemy actually attacks in force all machine guns should 
be used to their maximum capacity. 

3. The support of counter-attacks. Preparation should be made 
for placing machine-gun fire on points in our own line which are 
most valuable to the enemy. In such cases the machine guns can 
render immediate assistance to our infantry in the counter-attacks if 
the enemy penetrates at these points. 

4. Harassing fire. On the defensive the element of surprise has 
not the same importance, and harassing fire almost always can be 
used to advantage. It is excellent training for the machine gunners 
in the use of indirect fire. Naturally in harassing fire the machine 
guns should not be used from the same emplacements that they ex- 
pect to occupy in case of serious attack. 

The distribution of machine guns depends upon the missions as- 
signed to them and upon the distribution of the troops which the 



Employment on the Defensive 111 

machine guns support. When the main defensive position is pre- 
ceded by an outpost zone, very few machine guns, as a rule, will be 
placed in front of the outpost line of resistance. It usually will not 
be wise to have many guns flanking the first line unless they can do 
so from commanding positions in rear. Where the enemy has had 
time to bring up all of his artillery and trench mortars, machine guns 
seldom should be placed in front-line trenches unless they are pro- 
tected by concrete emplacements. The trench-mortar barrage will 
extend to a depth of not less than 800 yards. Machine guns not in 
concrete emplacements in all probability will be destroyed when 
placed in this zone if the enemy precedes his attack by a long artillery 
preparation. 

When a position is first taken up a greater percentage of machine 
guns can be pushed forward for the following reasons : 

1. There will be less artillery and trench mortar fire. 

2. The fire will be less accurate since there has not been the same 
chance to register, and the shooting will be largely map shooting. 

3. For the first few days the information as to the exact location 
of the troops will not be sufficiently accurate to justify the enemy in 
putting down an intense barrage in extremely close proximity to his 
own line. 

The number of guns assigned to the outpost zone also will depend 
upon the strength of the infantry assigned to the outposts and the 
amount of resistance it is intended to offer in this zone. Where one 
battalion from each infantry regiment of a division is used to garri- 
son the outpost zone, four companies of machine guns usually will 
be placed in this zone. The ratio of machine guns to infantry in the 
outpost zone or position will seldom be less than a machine-gun 
company for each battalion of infantry and frequently will be con- 
siderably greater. 

The greater part of the guns assigned to the outposts participate 
in the defense of the outpost zone by delivering flanking fire through 
intervals between supporting points or overhead fire from command- 
ing positions in rear. 

The greater part of the machine guns are employed in the defense 
of the battle zone and are distributed throughout the battle zone and 
over a limited zone of depth in its rear. When employed in the de- 
fense of a zone, machine guns are echeloned in checkerboard forma- 
tion in such manner that each element flanks the front or covers the 



112 Employment of Machine Guns 

flanks of adjacent elements and, when practicable, is capable of de- 
livering overhead fire over the defensive elements in its front. 

Machine guns must be echeloned in depth for the following 
reasons : 

1. It must be possible to place a barrage in front of the front line 
of infantry. 

2. Some guns must be far enough to the rear to stop the enemy 
if he should succeed in breaking through the front line. 

3. Some guns must be so placed as to give support for counter- 
attacks against the most important points of the position. 

In the placing of the guns there are two conflicting elements. 
There must be sufficient fire power to stop the attack, yet there must 
be sufficient depth to provide against a break through. The trajectory 
of the guns is going to have an important bearing upon the positions 
to be occupied. Where the division is occupying only one position, 
the bulk of the guns should be so placed that it will be possible for 
them to lay down a barrage in front of the main line of resistance. 
Guns held in reserve farther to the rear normally would prepare 
positions some of which would be occupied in case of emergency. 
The positions usually would enable the guns to barrage in front of 
the main line of resistance. Where the division occupies more than 
one position, naturally a very considerable number of guns will be 
posted too far to the rear to barrage in front of the main line of 
resistance of the first position. It may be assumed, then, that, gen- 
erally speaking, the Hotchkiss gun should not be placed farther to 
the rear than 3,100 meters from the front line, the Vickers gun 2,500 
meters, and the Browning gun 2,200 meters. If the position is a 
highly organized one, the bulk of the guns then should be in the zone 
from 800 to 3,100 meters in rear of the front-line trench. Greater 
distribution in depth becomes simply dispersion and is a source of 
weakness, since the guns can be overcome a few at a time without 
ever being able to bring the full effect of their combined fire power 
against the enemy. 

The distribution in depth of machine guns decreases with the 
improvement of the material defenses of the position. As an organ- 
ization of the defenses approaches the linear, a larger number of 
machine guns may be placed in or near the line of resistance. 

The positions of machine guns and the missions assigned to them 
will determine whether or not they should remain under the control 



Employment on the Defensive 113 

of infantry battalions or be placed under the more direct control of 
the regimental commander and commanded by the regimental ma- 
chine-gun officer. As a rule the machine guns should be under the 
command of the lowest infantry commander who exercises authority 
over both the positions where they are posted and the ground that 
they cover with their fire. Thus, if guns posted in the sector of an 
infantry battalion are employed almost wholly to cover the front of 
the battalion and not to place flanking fire in front of adjacent bat- 
talions, they should be placed under the command of the infantry 
battalion commander. On the contrary, where the guns posted in the 
sector of one battalion or regiment are employed to a considerable 
extent to flank adjacent battalions or regiments, then the control of 
these guns should be retained by the regimental or brigade com- 
mander and the guns should be commanded by the machine-gun 
officer. 

Reserve Guns. — Where two forces have been facing each other 
for several days or weeks, the situation usually is so thoroughly 
known that the defender has a very definite idea as to the probable 
place of the enemy's attack. Under such conditions dispositions can 
be made to meet his attack, and it will not be necessary to keep a 
great number of guns in reserve. When a defensive position is first 
occupied or in a meeting engagement the intentions of the enemy 
cannot be so well foreseen, and it will be necessary to hold a greater 
number of guns in reserve. At the beginning of a defensive action 
both the division and brigade usually will hold some machine guns in 
reserve. 

The function of the reserve guns is to assist in checking the 
enemy where he is making most progress and to cooperate with the 
counter-attacks. The enemy will penetrate the line at the weak points, 
while the strong points will hold on, thus creating a series of salients. 
These local penetrations are not serious as long as the enemy is pre- 
vented from widening them. The infantry reserves are therefore 
used to reinforce the flanks of these salients since they are the most 
dangerous points, and it also places the infantry in the logical position 
for a counter-attack. The machine guns, on the contrary, should 
reinforce the point of the salient, as they will be able to bring flank- 
ing fire on any enemy troops attempting to widen the salient and also 
will be in a position to support the counter-attack with direct flanking 
fire. 



114 Employment of Machine Guns 

The machine guns held in reserve, therefore, should be opposite 
the weak parts of the line. Possible positions and routes thereto 
should be reconnoitered and prepared so that it would be possible to 
occupy them rapidly as soon as the enemy discloses his intentions. 
For such purposes the platoon is the correct tactical unit. It is the 
smallest unit commanded by an officer, and the task is too important 
to be intrusted to a noncommissioned officer. The company usually 
will be too large a unit for the task, as eight guns would be required 
only where the penetration was on a considerable front, and in such 
cases it seldom would be practicable for all the guns to advance by 
the same route. 

Siting of Guns 

1. The most effective type of machine-gun fire is direct fire with 
the guns so placed as to create successive belts of fire. All guns 
should therefore be sited with the longest possible field of fire that 
will enable them to carry out their mission and place their fire at the 
important points or on the avenues of approach. Although direct 
fire is always the first consideration, indirect fire must not be neg- 
lected. Provision must be made for covering the normal lines of 
fire by indirect methods at night, during fog, in smoke, etc. As far 
as possible, all guns that cannot fire in front of the first line by direct 
fire should be given an indirect fire mission in front of the front line 
or of the outpost line of resistance. 

2. Guns usually should be sited in pairs. The two guns should 
be close enough together to be controlled readily by the section ser- 
geant. This can be done effectively if the guns are from 10 to 40 
yards apart. Where practicable, the two sections of a platoon should 
be close enough to facilitate inspection by the platoon leader. Unless 
excellent cover is available, however, four guns placed in a battery 
formation usually will disclose their location and be shelled out of 
position. Guns sited singly are not so reliable, owing to the danger 
of stoppage and lack of efficient control. 

3. Gun positions must be suitable for all-round defense. If this 
is not the case, the dead space must be covered by automatic rifles, 
rifles or grenades. 

4. Machine guns should be removed from visible defenses that 
would cause them to receive a great amount of artillery fire. Posi- 
tions 100 to 200 yards in front of the edge of a woods usually are 
safer than the woods itself. The commanding officer, 9th Machine- 



Employment on the Defensive 115 

Gun Battalion, says in his report on the attack of the Germans at 
Chateau Thierry, July 15, 1918: 

"Woods afford only a false protection in artillery bombardments 
and should be avoided due to the great length of time that gas con- 
centrations remain in them." 

5. Guns may be sited in trenches if the terrain is such as to lend 
itself readily to the concealment of the emplacement, otherwise they 
are sure to be destroyed. With bombardment lasting several days 
all guns are likely to be destroyed, but with the more recent bombard- 
ment of only a few hours well-concealed guns have an excellent 
chance to escape destruction. 

6. They must be most carefully concealed and every possible step 
taken to avoid disclosing their location. 

7. Shelter must be provided for the gun crews. It is essential 
that shelter be provided for at least two members of the gun crew 
in the immediate vicinity of the gun. If all of the men are placed in 
deep dugouts, very frequently the guns will never be brought into 
action before the enemy is upon them. 

The S. O. S. Barrage. — Every gun should be given an S. O. S. 
mission, and all guns should be constantly laid on their barrage lines 
except when actually carrying out harassing fire, etc. Upon the 
completion of such missions they should immediately relay on their 
barrage lines. The S. O. S. barrage should be carefully coordinated 
with the artillery. The S. O. S. barrage should be fired only when 
the ammunition supply is ample and the hostile infantry attack is 
imminent. 

Obstacles. — Wire should be placed so as to hold the enemy under 
enfilade fire. A careful location of the entanglement often will make 
it possible to get the enemy where a cross fire can be brought on him 
by two machine guns. The arrangement should not be too obvious 
or the enemy will avoid the trap. 

Emplacements. — Emplacements always must be constructed, as it 
is absolutely essential to protect both the gun and crew from obser- 
vation and fire. Emplacements which render guns conspicuous are 
more dangerous than leaving the guns unprotected. Machine-gun 
units ordinarily will be called upon to construct only the simple types 
of earth emplacements. Concrete emplacements ordinarily will be 
constructed under the supervision of engineers. The shell-hole type 
emplacements can be constructed by a squad in two hours. It is sim- 
ple, inconspicuous and efficient. 



116 Employment of Machine Guns 

All emplacements must be carefully camouflaged, not only after 
completion but during construction. Unless the work is protected 
from observation of the enemy, the construction should be carried 
out at night. 

Every gun should have one or more alternative emplacements. 
The battle emplacement should be used only in case of an enemy 
attack, otherwise it probably will be spotted and destroyed during 
the preliminary bombardment. 

Withdrawal. — If it becomes necessary to withdraw, the machine 
guns must cover the withdrawal of the infantry. The withdrawal 
should be made by echelon. Agents should precede the withdrawing 
detachments for the purpose of selecting fire positions and the prepa- 
ration of fire data. As far as practicable, sectors of fire, ranges, etc., 
should be determined before the arrival of the guns. 

The greatest possible use should be made of the gun carts and 
packs, as speed in retiring, once the movement has begun, always 
will be one of the greatest factors of safety. 

Communication. — It is essential that good communication be 
maintained not only within machine-gun organizations but between 
the machine guns and infantry. The fullest use should be made of 
the telephonic communications of the infantry, as the telephone 
equipment of the machine-gun organizations is insufficient to main- 
tain communication where organizations are widely distributed. 
Regimental machine-gun officers in command of machine-gun com- 
panies ordinarily establish their headquarters in the immediate vicin- 
ity of regimental headquarters and company commanders their head- 
quarters at the headquarters of the infantry battalions which they 
are supporting. This arrangement greatly facilitates communication. 

Telephones alone cannot be depended upon. Provision must al- 
ways be made for the use of rockets and runners. 

Orders for Gun Positions. — The squad commander is responsible 
for the following : 

1. That the number of the emplacement is placed outside of the 
emplacement where it can readily be seen. 

2. That machine guns are not fired from their battle emplace- 
ments except in case of emergency. 

3. That, unless emplacements are well concealed, guns are not 
mounted except between evening and morning "posts," and when 
visibility is poor. 



Employment on the Defensive 117 

4. That two men by night and one man by day per squad are 
always on duty at the gun. 

5. That written orders for the emplacement are posted where 
they can be read by all members of the squad. 

6. That a range card is prepared and posted near the gun. That 
in addition to the range to each objective the range card shows the 
clinometer reading for indirect laying on each objective. 

7. That there is a minimum of 4,250 rounds of ammunition in 
belts and sufficient other ammunition to bring the total up to 10,000 
rounds. 

8. That each man has 35 rounds of pistol ammunition. 

9. That there is a box of grenades (48). 

10. That all machine guns, pistols, ammunition and grenades are 
inspected and cleaned at morning and evening posts. 

11. That there is a bolo or hatchet convenient for opening boxes 
of ammunition or grenades. 

12. That there is sufficient quantity of water at hand for cooling 
the gun and not less than a pint of oil. 

13. That there is a spare barrel and spare parts case in the em- 
placement. 

14. That there are 1 pick, 1 shovel and 12 sandbags in the em- 
placement. 

15. That traversing stops are used to limit the movement of 
the gun. 

16. That aiming stakes are placed to indicate to the gunner his 
normal direction of fire : Night firing boxes or luminous discs to be 
used at night. 

17. That the gun is inspected for all the points covered in pages 
12 and 14, section 12, Machine Gun Service Regulations. 

18. That the camouflage is kept in good condition and that there 
is no movement to disclose the position to the enemy. 

19. That in addition to the flash hider wet sandbags are used to 
hide the flash of the gun when firing at night. 

20. That during the day the gun is kept covered unless it is very 
close to the enemy. That at night it is always loaded. That all mem- 
bers of the squad know the location of and routes to any alternative 
emplacements assigned to the squad. 

21. That sentries know their orders thoroughly and are relieved 
at regular intervals. 



118 Employment of Machine Guns 

The sentry at the gun will know : 

1. What to do if he see the enemy. 

2. The sector of fire assigned to the gun. 

3. All objectives shown on the range card. 

4. What the S. O. S. signal is and what to do when it is given. 

5. What the S. O. S. barrage line is and how to lay the gun on it 
by either direct or indirect methods. 

6. The line of fire if the enemy penetrates our front line. 

7. When relieving another sentry the following facts will always 
be ascertained : 

a. Whether the gun has been fired during the relief. 

b. If fired, what the target was. 

c. If fired, the emplacement from which fired. 

d. Whether any instructions have been received as to friendly 
patrols or working parties. 

8. The sentry always will inspect the gun when taking over the 
position. 

9. In case of alarm, or a gas attack, the sentry will wake the 
gun team. 

Officers inspecting machine-gun organization in position should 
cover the following points in their inspections : 

1. That all orders prescribed for the commander of gun squad 
and for the sentry of the gun are carried out. 

2. That there is an officer on duty with each platoon. 

3. That the four guns of the platoon are close enough together 
to be inspected readily and controlled by the platoon commander if 
the tactical situation permits. 

4. That platoon and company headquarters are centrally located 
with reference to the guns of the platoon and company. 

5. That communication by telephone, rockets, visual signals and 
runner is provided for. 

6. The following points should be noted with reference to em- 
placements : Siting ; field of fire ; type ; cover ; state of camouflage ; 
are there tracks leading to emplacement which will give away posi- 
tion? 

7. Is there a deep trench, shrapnel proof or dugout for the mem- 
bers of the gun squad? If so, distance from gun; type; capacity; 
are there gas curtains and anti-gas apparatus? 

8. Are riflemen, auto-riflemen, or bombers employed to cover 
dead ground that cannot be covered by machine-gun fire? 



Employment on the Defensive 119 

MACHINE-GUN ANNEX 
(Defense) 

Annex No 

To Field Order No Div. (Regt.) , 1920. 

Machine Guns. (Place) 

(Date and hour) 
[Map: (Reference to Map used.)] 

1. Information of the enemy. 

Information of our own troops. Should include : Line to be 
held ; boundary of division, brigade and regimental sec- 
tors ; positions to be organized with lines of each. 

2. General plan for use of machine guns. (Usually to assist in 
the defense of certain positions.) 

3. (a), (b), (c), etc. Instructions for the subdivisions of the 
command. 

Positions and missions may be shown by tables or maps. 
(Missions should include both battle and S. O. S. or normal 
mission.) 

x. Instructions pertaining to whole command : 

(1) Cooperation with the infantry. 

(2) Maps or reports of exact locations called for. 

(3) Any general instructions as to S. O. S. barrage. 

(4) Instructions for anti-aircraft defense. 

(5) Instructions for anti-tank defense. 

(6) Construction of emplacements, cover trenches, dugouts, etc. 

(7) Action in case of attack. 

(8) Instructions for withdrawal. 

(9) Preparation of barrage for counter-attack. 

4. a. Announcement of aid stations. 

b. Establishment of ammunition dumps. 

Instructions for combat wagons and carts. 

c. Instructions for field train. 

(Separate administrative order seldom necessary.) 

5. a. Plan of Signal Communications. 

b. Axes of Signal Communications. (Only in exceptional cases 
will machine guns have an axis of communication, but will use in- 
fantry axes.) 

c. Command Posts. 

By order of Maj. Gen. A: 
Official : X, 

M. D. M. G. O. Distribution. Chief of Staff. 



Chapter XI 

Division Machine-Gun Annex in a Defensive Zone 

[Map: Gettysburg- Antietam 1-21120, Emmittsburg, Taneytown, Kingsdale 
Sheets. (Map No. 6.) Gettysburg- Antietam General Map."] 

General Situation: 

A Blue nation has declared war on the allied states of Maryland 
and Pennsylvania (Red) and, having landed an invading army at 
Baltimore, has driven elements of the 1st Red Army, superior in 
strength but poorly trained, back towards the Monocacy River. 

The Red defense of the Monocacy River has been stubborn, and 
troops are everywhere in contact on that line. The bridges over the 
Monocacy were left intact. 

Special Situation (Blue) : 

The 1st Blue Army on June 2, 1920, is holding the line of the 
Monocacy from Gettysburg to Woodsboro. The 2d, 1st and 3d 
Corps are holding the line from right to left. Each corps has two 
divisions in line and one in reserve. The army has the 4th Corps in 
reserve. The 8th Division is on the left of the 2d Corps. The 1st 
Corps is holding the line from Allaway Creek on the north to a point 
5 miles to the southwest on the Monocacy. The 1st Division is hold- 
ing the line from Allaway Creek to Stull and the 2d Division from 
Stull to the south. 

At 4.00 p.m., June 2, 1920, General A, commanding the 1st Di- 
vision, received a corps field order directing the organization of a 
defensive zone. He issued the following field order : 

1st Division, 
STUMPTOWN, PA., 
2 June, 1920, 6.00 p. m. 
Field Order V 
No. 7 / 
[Map: Gettysburg 3-inch Map.] 

1. The enemy has been forced across the MONOCACY RIVER. 
Our advance elements are in contact with the enemy at the river 
crossings. Our army halts on the general line of the MONOCACY 
RIVER. 

120 



Defensive Zone 121 

Our corps, holding the line of the MONOCACY, defends the 
general line— LONGVILLE (inch)— Hill 526— Hill 532— Hill 524 
—Hill 483— Hill 524— Ridge one-half mile west of MOUNT ZION 
CHURCH. 

No change in corps boundaries. 

2. (a) This division will organize and defend the TANEY- 
TOWN Sector. 

Northern boundary: BIG PIPE CREEK MILL— LONG- 
VILLE— ALLAWAY CREEK, all inclusive. 

Southern boundary: Point 362.0-725.0— CRAB STER—R J 
49&— RJ 489— STULL, all inclusive. 

Eastern boundary : BIG PIPE CREEK. 

b. Positions: 

An Outpost Position with the line of resistance: Point 351.8— 
733.0— Point 351.4-732.4— MOUNTAIN VIEW FARM— Hill 
503— Hill 483— Road Junction 433— Hill 427— Hill at Point 347.8- 
727.5. 

A Battle Position with the main line of resistance on the line: 
LONGVILLE (incl.)— Hill 526— Hill 532— Hill 524— Point 350.5- 
729.7— Hill 483— Point 348.6-728.5— Road Junction 489— Hill 524; 
with the battalion reserve line along Road Junction 545 — Hill 531 — 
BOYD— Hill 476— Point 349.8-728.5— Hill 506; with the regi- 
mental reserve line along: Point 355.8-732.4 — Point 354.4-731.1 — 
Point 353.6-730.1— Point 352.3-728.2— CLEAR VIEW S. H. 

An Intermediate Position with the main line resistance: Hill 
588— Hill 587— TANEYTOWN— Hill 561— Hill 540. 

c. Sabsectors: North Subsector ; South Subsector. 

Boundary lines between sub-sectors: MAYBERRY— STUMP- 
TOWN— Hill 561— Hill 521— TANEYTOWN— FARM at Point 
352.5-729.5-456— Point 349.4-730.6 (all incl.) to North Subsector. 

3. (a)l. The 1st Brigade, with 1st L Tank Co. (less 3d Platoon) 
and one company 1st Engineers attached, will organize and defend 
the North Subsector. 

o2. The 2d Brigade, with 3d Platoon 1st L Tank Co. and one 
company 1st Engineers attached, will organize and defend the South 
Subsector. 

aZ. Each brigade will organize two centers of resistance on the 
battle position. 

a4. The subsector reserve battalions will be located as follows: 



122 Employment of Machine Guns 

3d Battalion, 2d Infantry, near Point 355.2-730.5 ; 3d Battalion, 
3d Infantry, near Point 354.8-728.3. 

All of these troops will be employed in organizing the battle posi- 
tion. When this position has been completed these troops will be 
employed on the intermediate position. 

b. In the outpost position, the commander of each center of re- 
sistance will employ the minimum number of machine guns necessary 
to assure local protection. These guns will be prepared to concen- 
trate their fire on river crossings. The bulk of the machine guns 
will be placed so as to put down an effective barrage in front of the 
firing line of the battle position. 

The division machine-gun officer, by arrangement with the di- 
vision on the north, will assure the covering by machine-gun fire of 
the river salient south of PINE HILL MILL. 

c. The 1st Field Artillery is assigned to the support of the North 
Subsector. 

The 2d Field Artillery is assigned to the support of the South 
Subsector. The commanding general, 1st Brigade F. A., will submit 
plans with sketches for supporting the present front line of the out- 
post position with protective and counter-preparation barrages. 

Approximately one-half the light artillery will be located so that 
it can place an effective protective barrage in front of the outpost 
position. 

Approximately one-half of the Light Artillery will be emplaced 
in rear of the Intermediate Position. 

Plans for interdiction fire, retaliation and reprisal fire will be 
submitted to division headquarters for approval. 

Group "A" of the Corps Artillery will assist in the support of 
the 1st Division. {See Artillery Plan.) 

d. The 1st L Tank Co. (less 3d Platoon) is attached to the 1st 
Brigade and will take position in the woods north of Road Junction 
463. C. O. North Brigade Sector will employ it to assist counter- 
attacks against penetrations between PINEHILL MILL and 
BRIDGEPORT. 

The 3d Platoon, 1st L Tank Co., is attached to the 2d Brigade 
and will take position along creek 800 yards south of Road Junction 
433. C. O. South Brigade Sector will employ it to assist counter- 
attacks against penetrations between FINK and STULL. 

e. The 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 4th In- 



Defensive Zone 123 

fantry, will constitute the divisional reserves. These troops will be 
quartered as follows: 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, near point 358.1- 
729.8; 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, near point 357.0-727.0. When 
alerted the divisional reserves will assemble in their camps ready to 
move. 

/. The 1st Observation Squadron from the Landing Field at 
STUMPTOWN daily will make reconnaissance during the hours of 
daylight of enemy positions opposite our front to a depth of 5 miles. 
Friendly front lines will be marked twice daily upon call of airplanes, 
at daybreak and just before sunset. (See Air Service Plan.) 

g. The division engineer officer, after consultation with the sub- 
sector commanders, will insure in each subsector a minimum of four 
foot-bridges and two wagon-bridges across PINEY CREEK. 

The 1st Engineers will construct removable obstacles for all fords 
of the MONOCACY and will prepare for demolition all bridges 
across that river. 

x. Conduct of Defense. 

a. The outpost position will deny to the enemy any foothold east 
of the MONOCACY RIVER. Aggressive and strong reconnais- 
sance will be made west of this river. Except in the case of a fore- 
seen attack, the outpost position will be held until further orders. 
Conduct of troops in outpost position, in case of a foreseen attack, 
will be governed by orders to be issued at the time. 

The battle position will be held at all hazards. The reserves will 
be held mobile and will be used in counter-attacks and to maintain 
the line of resistance. 

The Intermediate Position covers the artillery and forms the base 
of departure for counter-attacks by the main reserves. 

b. Through the employment of connecting groups, subsector 
commanders will insure mutual support between adjacent centers of 
resistance within the Division Sector. 

The commander of the North Subsector will organize a connect- 
ing group to consist of at least one section of infantry and a machine- 
gun section which will maintain connection with similar group of the 
8th Division on the north at Point 351.8-733.0. 

The commander of the South Subsector will arrange with the 
commander of the 2d Division on the south to establish a similar 
group to be located at hill at 347.8-727.5. 

Each brigade may use not to exceed the equivalent of one bat- 
talion in the outpost position. 



124 Employment of Machine Guns 

c. Conduct in case of attack. 

(1) In the event of a foreseen general attack the battle position 
will be held at all costs, the outpost troops withdrawing to the battle 
position upon receipt of orders from division headquarters. The 
division reserves will be assembled in alert positions ready to 
move. 

(2) In case of any other class of attack all troops will fight in 
their present positions to the last without yielding ground. There 
will be no withdrawal of any character. 

d. Counter-attacks will be launched by brigade and" subordinate 
commanders to insure possession of the battle position. 

e. Counter-attack artillery and machine-gun barrages will be 
placed within the outpost position and between the outpost and battle 
positions in accordance with artillery and machine-gun annexes at- 
tached and upon call by subsector commanders. The light artillery 
batteries most favorably located will designate one or two guns for 
direct fire on hostile tanks. 

Sufficient planes will be held available for cooperation with the 
artillery. 

4. See Administrative Orders. 

5. a. See Plan of Signal Communications. 

b. Axes of Signal Communication : 

Division — STUMPTOWN — TANEYTOWN — BOYD 

(Forward communication center at TANEYTOWN). 
1st Brigade— Point 354.8-730.4— Point 354.8-7307— Point 

352.8-731.2. 
2d Brigade— Point 354.2-728.3— Road Junction 471-445— 

Point 352.3-728.2-441. 

c. Command Posts: 

1st Division: STUMPTOWN. 

1st Brigade: Farmhouse at 354.8-730.4. 

2d Brigade: Farmhouse at 354.2-728.3. 

"A," 
Maj. General. 
Distribution : 

C. G. 1st Army, C. G. 1st Corps, C. G. 2d Corps, C. G. 8th 
Division, C. G. 2d Division, C. G. 4th Division, Division Staff, C. O. 
1st Engineers, C. O. 1st Signal Co., C. O. Tns., Brig. Commanders. 



Defensive Zone 125 

Required : 

The Machine-Gun Annex prepared by the Division Machine-Gun 
Officer as Annex No. 1 to Field Orders No. 7. 

ANNEX No. 1 to Field Order No. 7, 1st Division, 2 June, 1920. 

MACHINE GUNS 

1st Division, 
STUMPTOWN, PA., 
2 June, '20, 6.00 p.m. 
[Map: Gettysburg 3-inch Map.] 

1. The enemy has been forced across the MONOCACY RIVER. 
Our advance elements are in contact with the enemy at the river 
crossings. Our army halts on the general line of the MONOCACY. 

Our corps, holding the line of the MONOCACY, defends the 
general line: LONGVILLE (inc.)— Hill 526— Hill 532— Hill 483— 
Hill 524— Ridge one-half mile west of MOUNT ZION CHURCH. 

Our division organized and defends the TANEYTO WN Sector. 

Northern boundary of division sectors : BIG PIPE CREEK 
MILL— LONGVILLE— ALLAW AY CREEK, all inclusive. 

Southern boundary of division sector : Point 362.0-725.0 — 
CRABSTER— R. J. 498— R. J. 489— STULL, all inclusive. 

Boundary between brigade sectors: MAYBERRY— STUMP- 
TOWN— Hill 561— TANEYTO WN— FARM at point 352.5-729.5 
— Point 349.4-730.6, all included in North Brigade Sector. 

North Brigade Sector: 1st Brigade. Organizes two Centers of 
Resistance. 

South Brigade Sector : 2d Brigade. Organizes two Centers of 
Resistance. 

Positions 
Outpost Position: 

Line of Resistance: Point 351.8-733.0— Point 351.4-732.4 — 
MOUNTAIN VIEW FARM— Hill 503— Hill 483— Road Junction 
433— Hill 427— Hill at Point 347.8-727.S. 

Battle Position: 

Main Line of Resistance: LONGVILLE (inc.)— Hill 526— 
Hill 532— Hill 524— Point 350.5-729.7— Hill 483— Point 348.6- 
728.5— Road Junction 489— Hill 524. 

Battalion Reserve Line: Road Junction 545— Hill 531— BOYD 
—Hill 476— Point 349.8-728.5— Hill 506— Road Junction 498. 



126 Employment of Machine Guns 

Regimental Reserve Line: Point 355.8-732.4 — Point 354.4- 
731.1— Point 353.6-730.1— Point 352.3-728.2— CLEAR VIEW S. 
H.— Point 351.0-726.5. 

Intermediate Position: 

Hill 588— Hill 587— TANEYTOWN— Hill 561— Hill 540. 

2. The machine guns will assist in the defense of the Outpost 
Position, Battle Position, and Intermediate Position. 

3. a. Commanders of Centers of Resistance will employ the mini- 
mum number of machine guns in the Outpost Position necessary to 
assure local protection. 

Commander of the right C. R. of North Brigade Sector will so 
place his guns as to enfilade the river in the sector of the 2d Corps 
for 700 yards north of PINE HILL MILL. The 2d Corps enfilades 
the river for 800 yards south of PINE HILL MILL. The com- 
mander of the left C. R. of South Brigade Sector will enfilade the 
river in the sector of the 2d Division for 1,000 yards south of 
STULL. 

Commanders of Centers of Resistance will assign machine-gun 
sections to connecting groups as follows : 

Right C. R. of N. Brigade Sector to connecting group maintain- 
ing contact with the 2d Corps. 

Right C. R. of S. Brigade Sector to connecting group to 1st 
Brigade. 

Left C. R. of S. Brigade Sector to connecting group to 2d Di- 
vision. 

All guns not employed in the Outpost Position or with connecting 
groups will be used for flanking the Main Line of Resistance. 

b. Regimental commanders will employ one machine-gun com- 
pany in defense of the Battle Position, the guns being echeloned in 
depth from the Maine Line of Resistance to the Battalion Reserve 
Line. 

c. Brigade commander will employ the machine-gun companies 
of the sub-sector reserve battalions on the Regimental Reserve Line, 
posting the guns across the most probable lines of an enemy advance 
with the mission of limiting the penetration between Centers of Re- 
sistance and of assisting counter-attacks. 

d. The machine-gun companies of the Division Reserve will be 
under the direct command of the D. M. G. O. 

Company M, 1st Infantry, will take position near Point 358.1— 



Defensive Zone 127 

729.8. It will reconnoiter and prepare positions on the Intermediate 
Position from TANEYTOWN inclusive to the northern boundary 
of the Division Sector. 

Company M, 4th Infantry, will take position near 357.0-727. 
It will reconnoiter and prepare positions on the Intermediate Position 
from TANEYTOWN exclusive to the southern boundary of the 
Division Sector. 

x(l) Details of positions and missions will be prescribed as 
follows : 

(a) By regimental commanders for all guns not in reserve bat- 
talions. 

(b) By brigade commanders for guns in sub-sector reserve. 

(c) By D. M. G. O. for guns in division reserve. 

After positions have been selected and missions assigned, maps 
showing dispositions and missions will be forwarded to the D. M. 
G. O. without delay. Thereafter all changes will be reported at once. 

(2) All guns on or in advance of the Battalion Reserve Line, 
in addition to their battle missions, will be given an S. O. S. mission 
in front of the Line of Observation. The maximum amount of enfi- 
lade fire will be directed on the MONOCACY RIVER and on its 
right bank. All bridges over the MONOCACY will be covered by 
direct fire. 

(3) Guns on the Regimental Reserve Line will be prepared to 
place a barrage between the Line of Resistance of the Outpost Posi- 
tion and the Main Line of Resistance. This barrage will be put 
down only on the orders of brigade commanders. 

(4) In the Battle Position, one gun in each section, and in the 
Division Reserve, one platoon in each company, will be designated 
for Anti-Aircraft Defense. 

(5) Emplacements and cover trenches will be constructed in all 
positions and will be carefully camouflaged. 

(6) In case of attack, positions in the Outpost Position will be 
held until the receipt of orders to withdraw; in the Battle Position 
they will be held at all costs; troops in Division Reserve will be 
alerted. 

(7) Routes for withdrawal from the Outpost Position will be 
reconnoitered. 

(8) Barrages will be prepared for the assistance of local counter- 
attacks. 



128 Employment of Machine Guns 

4a. Aid stations will be announced later. 

b. There will be 10,000 rounds of ammunition in each emplace- 
ment. Each company will establish an ammunition dump of 48,000 
rounds, including armor-piercing and tracer bullets. Combat wagons 
and carts at disposal of company commanders. 

c. Field train will join companies. 
5a. Command Posts: 

1st Division— STUMPTOWN. 

Companies — To be designated by regimental commanders. 
By Command of Major General A. 

X, Chief of Staff. 
Distribution : 

Same as F. O. No. 7, 1st Division, and following additional: 
All M. G. Cos. 

Discussion 

It is assumed that during the time that the 1st Division was 
driving the enemy west of Monocacy there had been some oppor- 
tunity for reconnaissance and the division machine-gun officer has 
some knowledge of the ground which will assist him in making up 
the machine-gun plan. The ground is held temporarily by the troops 
that took it in the attack. While the dispositions of these troops 
would not be satisfactory for a defensive zone, they are such as to 
permit the division to occupy the defensive zone much more deliber- 
ately than troops would take up a defensive position in a meeting 
engagement. The amount of detail in the division order indicates 
that the division is not making a hurried occupation of a position but 
such a methodical occupation as to avoid future changes. From his 
conference with G3 the division machine-gun officer knows that this 
is the case. For this reason he will make as full and complete a plan 
as is possible with his present knowledge of the terrain. In a meet- 
ing engagement there would usually be no machine-gun plan. The 
paragraph of the division order pertaining to machine guns would 
cover the few details that would be given to the troops. This para- 
graph would indicate the number of companies to be posted on each 
line by each brigade, and the number to be held in brigade and di- 
vision reserves. Attention probably would be directed to any strong 
points which could be made the key to the position by defending 
them strongly with machine guns or to points of special weakness. 



Defensive Zone 129 

On the contrary, if the division had been holding the position for a 
month and a new order was being issued reorganizing the position, 
the machine-gun plan would go into much more detail. In that case 
paragraph 3 of the plan would be accompanied by tables and maps 
showing the exact location of all guns and the exact lines of fire both 
for their battle missions and S. O. S. missions. 

The information of our own troops shown in paragraph 1 is 
necessarily quite complete. The subordinate commanders cannot 
place their guns to defend certain lines without knowing the definite 
location of those lines. In the same way they must know the limits 
of the sectors and sub-sectors in order to consult with the infantry 
commanders as to the mutual support of the infantry and machine 
guns. In the copies of the machine-gun annex that accompany the 
division order, paragraph 1 could be omitted, but it is absolutely 
essential that all this information be furnished to machine-gun 
companies. 

The division commander had directed that the minimum number 
of machine guns necessary for local protection should be used in the 
outpost position. This provision was repeated in the annex. Plac- 
ing guns in position to enfilade the river is of extreme importance. 
The outpost position offers the best positions for this purpose. A con- 
siderable number of guns can be used to very great advantage. There 
are portions of the river in the 2d Corps and the 2d Division which 
cannot be covered by fire from position in these sectors. It is assumed 
that they have requested the 1st Division to cover these stretches. It 
is also assumed that the D. M. G. O. has arranged with the 2d Corps 
for it to cover the river for 800 yards south of Pinehill Mill. 

The ground from the main line of resistance to the battalion re- 
serve line is naturally strong and offers more opportunities for 
machine-gun defense than the ground between the battalion reserve 
line and the regimental reserve line. For this reason the guns intended 
for the immediate defense of the main line of resistance are not 
echeloned farther to the rear than the battalion reserve line. 

The division commander had designated two machine-gun com- 
panies to be used in division reserve. It was not deemed necessary 
to hold any guns in brigade reserve. The Monocacy is a considerable 
obstacle which will give more time for the bringing up of division 
reserves. There would be no objection, however, to holding in bri- 
gade reserve the companies that were assigned to the regimental re- 



130 Employment of Machine Guns 

serve line. If these companies had been held in reserve, they would 
have been directed to prepare positions on the regimental reserve line. 

The companies in the division reserve were directed to prepare 
positions on the intermediate line since the division must be prepared 
to defend this line. There might be occasions when these companies 
would be used to reinforce the regimental reserve line, but animal- 
drawn machine guns are not mobile enough to occupy positions 
quickly on both the intermediate position and the regimental reserve 
line. 

In defending a river line the first real defense usually will be 
offered at the river itself. With this in view all of the guns in 
advance of the battalion reserve line were given an S. O. S. mis- 
sion of firing on the river and its right bank. The guns in rear of 
this line could not reach the river and could be useful only after the 
enemy had penetrated the line of resistance of the outpost position. 
They were directed to prepare barrages to be placed between the line 
of resistance of the outpost position and the main line of resistance. 
These barrages, however, must be used with discretion or they will 
cause losses to our own troops. Therefore it was considered advis- 
able to permit them to be ordered only by brigade commanders. 

Maps showing location and missions of all guns were called for 
in order that a careful study might be made of the machine-gun de- 
fense and needed changes ordered. Changes of location of guns was 
not prohibited after these maps were furnished, but reports of all 
changes were ordered. In some units in France, changes in position 
or missions of machine guns were only permitted with authority of 
division headquarters. This tends to destroy initiative. It is be- 
lieved to be better to permit the changes, but to require reports. If a 
study of the situation shows that the change is detrimental to the 
scheme of defense as a whole, the guns should then be returned to 
their original positions. 

Where guns are actually in position the anti-aircraft defense can 
best be carried out by designating a gun in each section. In the rear 
areas, however, this would keep an unnecessarily large number of 
guns constantly on duty. The designation of a complete platoon of 
each company for the protection of the reserves will give the other 
platoons an opportunity to do much better training. 

The Monocacy offers a very serious obstacle to tanks. Their use 
by the enemy appears highly improbable. Therefore it was not 



[ap No. 6. Chapter XI 



m 



.r 



733' 



I 



m 



\s--- 



i 






are west of Monocacy a 



Map No. 6. Chapter XI 




Xote Red Lines are west of Monocacy and arc not shown 



Defensive Zone 131 

deemed necessary to give any orders in regard to defense against 
tanks. 

Standing orders for gun positions require 10,000 rounds of am- 
munition to be kept at each gun position. However, since the situa- 
tion is just changing from the offensive to the defensive, it may be 
well to order that this ammunition be provided. Some officers might 
assume that the offensive would soon be resumed and that the ammu- 
nition was unnecessary. 



Chapter XII 

Regimental Machine-Gun Annex in a Defensive 

Zone 

[Maps: Getty sburg-Antietam 1-21120, Emmittsburg , Taney town and Kings- 
dale sheets. (Map No. 6.) Getty sburg-Antietam General Map.] 

General Situation (Blue): 

Major M, machine-gun officer, 2d Infantry, received the Ma- 
chine-Gun Annex to Field Orders No. 7, 1st Division, at 6.30 p. m. 
At this time he was at the command post of the 2d Infantry at the 
farmhouse 700 yards northwest of Hill 507. When the advance had 
been brought to a halt a few hours earlier Major M had been sent 
forward by the colonel to make a reconnaissance, so that he knew the 
situation from personal observation. The 1st Battalion had one com- 
pany west of Hill 503 and the other two in the vicinity of Hill 524. 
The machine-gun company had taken up positions to the west of Hill 
524 but had no ammunition except what was on the carts and had not 
dug in. The 2d Battalion was in the ravine east of Boyd, and the 
machine guns had not gone into position but had made a reconnais- 
sance in the vicinity of Hill 524 and south of Hill 532. The 3d Bat- 
talion was south of Taney town in brigade reserve. 

Upon receipt of the division field order the colonel of the 2d In- 
fantry gave Major M the following additional information and di- 
rected him to prepare the machine-gun annex for the regimental field 
order. 

Northern boundary of 2d Infantry: Point 349.0-733.1 — House 
at 350.2-732.55— House at 351.4-732.05— Eckhardt— Point 355.1- 
730.7. 

Southern boundary of 2d Infantry: Point 349.5-730.5 — House 
at 350.0-730.15— House at 352.55-729.45— Hill 521. 

The 1st Battalion will occupy the outpost position, the main line 
of resistance, and the battalion reserve line. It will employ one rifle 
company in the outpost position, two platoons on the battalion re- 
serve line, and the remainder of the rifle companies on the main line 
of resistance. 

The 2d Battalion (less Company H), in regimental reserve, will 

132 



Regimental Defensive Zone 133 

organize the woods and orchard west of Hill 507. Company H will 
function directly under regimental headquarters. 

The 3d Battalion, in brigade reserve, takes position in the vicinity 
of Point 355.2-730.5. 

Required : 

The machine-gun annex to the field order of the 2d Infantry. 
Annex No. 1, 

To Field Orders No. 9, 2d Infantry. 

MACHINE GUNS 

2d Infantry, 
FARMHOUSE 700 YARDS 
NORTHWEST OF HILL 507, 

2 June, '20, 8 p. m. 
[Maps: Gettysburg 3-inch, Emmittsburg and Taney town sheets.] 

1. The enemy has been forced across the MONOCACY RIVER. 
Our advance elements are in contact with the enemy at the river 
crossings. 

Our enemy halts on the general line of the MONOCACY 
RIVER. 

Our division holds the line from ALLAWAY CREEK to 
STULL. 

North boundary of 2d Infantry: Point 349.0-733.1 — House at 
350.2-732.55— House at 351.4-732.05— ECKHARDT— Point 355.1- 
730.7, all points inclusive. 

South boundary of 2d Infantry: Point 349.5-730.5 — House at 
350.0-730.15— House at 352.55-729.45— Hill 521, all points inclu- 
sive. 
Outpost Position: 

Line of Resistance: Point 351.&-733.0— Point 351.4-732.4 — 
MOUNTAIN VIEW FARM— Hill 503— Hill 483— Road Junction 
433— Hill 427— Hill at point 347.8-727.5. 
Battle Position: 

Main Line of Resistance: LONGVILLE (incl.)— Hill 526— 
Hill 532— Hill 524— Point 350.5-729.7— Hill 483— Point 348.6- 
728.5— Road Junction 489— Hill 524. 

Battalion Reserve Line: Road Junction 545— Hill 531— BOYD 
—Hill 476— Point 349.8-728.5— Hill 506— Road Junction 498. 



134 Employment of Machine Guns 

Regimental Reserve Line: Point 355.8-732.4 — Point 354.4- 
731.1— Point 353.6-730.1— Point 352.3-728.2— CLEAR VIEW 
S. H.— Point 351.0-726.5. 
Intermediate Position : 

Hill 588 — Hill 587— TANEYTOWN— Hill 561— Hill 540. 

The 1st Battalion occupies the Outpost Position, Main Line of 
Resistance and Battalion Reserve Line. The 2d Battalion (less Co. 
H) takes position on the Regimental Reserve Line. The 3d Bat- 
talion, in Brigade Reserve, takes position in the vicinity of Point 
355.2-730.5. Company M occupies positions on the Regimental 
Reserve Line of the Brigade. 

2. The machine guns will assist in the defense of the Outpost 
Position and Battle Position. 

3a. The C. O., 1st Battalion, will employ four guns in the Out- 
post Position and the remainder for flanking in the Main Line of 
Resistance. 

b. Company H will be employed for the defense of the Battle 
Position, being echeloned in depth not farther to the rear than the 
Battalion Reserve Line. 

x (1) For details of positions and missions see Table 1. The 
C. O., 1st Battalion, will be consulted as to exact positions and lines 
of fire. After exact positions have been selected and lines of fire as- 
signed, maps showing dispositions and lines of fire will be forwarded 
to the regimental machine-gun officer without delay. Thereafter all 
changes will be reported at once. 

(2) In the Battle Position, one gun in each section will be 
designated for anti-aircraft defense. 

(3) Emplacements and cover trenches will be constructed in all 
positions and will be carefully camouflaged. 

(4) In case of attack, positions in the Outpost Position will be 
held until the receipt of orders to withdraw : in the Battle Position 
they will be held at all cost. 

(5) Routes for withdrawal from the Outpost Positions will be 
reconnoitered. 

(6) Barrages will be prepared for the assistance of local counter- 
attacks. 

4a. Aid stations will be announced later. 

b. There will be 10,000 rounds of ammunition in each emplace- 
ment. Each company will establish an ammunition dump of 48,000 



Regimental Defensive Zone 



135 



rounds, including armor-piercing and tracer bullets. Combat wagons 
and carts at disposal of company commanders. 
c. Field train will join companies. 
5a. Plan of Signal Communications : No change. 
b. Command Posts : 

2d Infantry — Farmhouse 700 yards northwest of Hill 507. 
1st Battalion — Farmhouse 300 yards southeast of Hill 524. 
2d Battalion — Same as 2d Infantry. 
Company D — Same as 1st Battalion. 
Company H — Boyd. 

By order of Colonel B. 

Y, Adjutant. 
Official 

M. Regimental M. G. O. 
Distribution : 

Same as F. O. No. 9 and additional copies to Cos. D and H. 

TABLE 1.— TO ANNEX NO. 1 TO FIELD ORDER NO. 9 





Position 




S.O.S. or Nor- 


Organization 


vicinity of 


Battle Mission 


mal Mission 


Co. D, 2d Inf.: 








One section . 


Mountain 


Enfilade Mt. View Farm— 419 


Same as battle 




View Farm. 


road. Cross fire with guns at 
350.6-730.8. 


mission. 


One section. 


350.6-730.8. 


Cover Emmittsburg- Bridgeport 


Same as battle 






road. Cross fire with guns at 


mission. 






Mt. View Farm ; cover ridge to 








southwest. 




One section . 


351.4-730.9. 


Enfilade Emmittsburg — Bridge- 


River north of 






port road. Flank woods west 


Bridgeport. 






of Eckhardt. 




One section . 


351.1-730.5 


Cover ravine to southwest. 


River north of 






Flank south side of woods to 


Bridgeport. 






the west. 




Co. H, 2d Inf. 








One section. 


351.5-730.5 


Cover ridge to southwest. Cross 


Road leading 






fire with guns at 351.4-730.9 


south west 
from Bridge- 
port. 


One section. 


351.8-730.8. 


Enfilade Bridgeport road and 


Road leading 






unimproved road leading 


southwest 






north. 


from Bridge- 
port. 



136 Employment of Machine Guns 

One section. 352.0-731.4. Flank woods to north Mt. View River north of 

Farm and Hill 524. Cross fire Pinehill Mill. 

with guns at 351.4-730.9. 
One section. 352.7-730.8. Enfilade the 491^76 road. None. 

Flank the southeast corner of 

woods on hill 524. 

Comments 

Additional machine guns could have been used to advantage in the 
outpost position, but the division machine-gun annex provided that 
the minimum number would be employed that would assure local 
protection. The division commander thus had indicated that in case 
of a foreseen attack that the outposts would not be reinforced but 
would withdraw. Had the plan been to reinforce the outposts the 
proportion of machine guns to infantry probably would have been 
larger. 

The machine guns assigned to the battle position were not dis- 
tributed in very great depth, the total depth being only 1,500 yards. 
This was necessary for two reasons. The position was extremely 
wide for a regiment and the best ground for machine-gun positions 
was between the main line of resistance and the battalion reserve line. 
The ground between the battalion reserve line and the regimental re- 
serve line was not so favorable. This lack of depth was compen- 
sated for to some extent by the fact that the machine-gun company 
of the brigade reserve battalion was ordered to occupy positions along 
the regimental reserve line. Very frequently these positions would 
be selected and prepared under the direction of the regimental ma- 
chine-gun officer, although the company was in brigade reserve. 
However, in this case the reserve machine-gun company probably 
would be employed by the brigade commander in the sector of the 
1st Infantry. The creek heading north of Road Junction 491 pro- 
vides a covered approach for the enemy and the woods north of Road 
Junction 491 a suitable forming-up place. Positions on the regimental 
reserve line in the sector of the 1st Infantry are best for arresting 
an advance from this direction. On the regimental reserve line the 
positions selected should be opposite the weak points of the line where 
the enemy is most likely to penetrate. While the infantry would 
be so placed as to counter-attack these local penetrations from the 
flank, machine guns can be used most effectively by reinforcing the 
points of the salients. They are thus in a position to take in flank 






Regimental Defensive Zone 137 

any attempt of the enemy to widen the salient and are in the most 
favorable position for supporting the counter-attacking infantry. 

In this case the positions and missions would be given by a table 
better than a diagram. Accurate locations and lines of fire cannot 
be selected by the map alone but can be determined only after a de- 
tailed reconnaissance of the ground. For that reason it is preferable 
to state the missions in general terms and require the subordinate 
commanders to submit maps showing the exact positions and lines of 
fire. The commanding officer of Company H was directed to con- 
sult with the commander of the 1st Battalion, although he was not 
under the orders of the battalion. A certain amount of adjusting of 
positions of the machine guns and infantry always will be necessary, 
although, as a rule, the infantry positions should conform to the best 
machine-gun positions. 

Where there is time to organize a position or in a prepared posi- 
tion the question of command of the machine guns will be determined 
largely by the mission of the guns. Company H in the beginning of 
a fight would act in support of the 1st Battalion. Should the 
enemy penetrate the position and counter-attacks become necessary, it 
probably would act in support of the 2d Battalion. For these reasons 
it was withdrawn from its battalion and placed under the direct com- 
mand of the regimental commander. The machine-gun support would 
thus be more flexible than if the company were placed under either 
battalion. The command of this company probably would be exer- 
cised through the regimental machine-gun officer. 

Barrages for the assistance of local counter-attacks would be pre- 
pared by company or platoon commanders after consultation with 
the infantry commanders. The placing of these barrages would de- 
pend on the method of counter-attack of the infantry. This method 
must be thoroughly understood by both the infantry and machine 
guns if counter-attacks are to be launched without losss of time. 

It may appear unnecessary to direct that emplacements and cover 
trenches be constructed. However, these most essential requirements 
are neglected frequently by tired troops. The safe thing is not only to 
order such construction but to make an early inspection to see that 
the orders have been carried out. 

The field trains probably will not be able to remain with the 
companies, but it will be a great convenience if they can join them for 
a few hours. 



Chapter XIII 

Use of Machine Guns in Advance Guards, Rear 

Guards, Connecting Groups, Outposts and 

Combat in Woods. Employment of 

Machine Guns for Anti-Aircraft 

Defense 

Advance Guards 

The duties of an advance guard are : 

1. To guard against surprise and furnish information by recon- 
noitering to the front and flanks. 

2. To push back small parties of the enemy and prevent their 
observing, firing upon or delaying the main body. 

3. To check the enemy's advance in force long enough to permit 
the main body to prepare for action. 

4. When the enemy is encountered on the defensive, to seize a 
good position and locate his lines, care being taken not to bring on 
a general engagement unless the advance guard commander is em- 
powered to do so. 

5. To remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in every way 
possible the steady march of the column. 

Machine guns can assist very materially in performing the first 
four of these duties and should always be assigned to advance guards 
the size of which is sufficient to guarantee reasonable safety to the 
machine guns while in draft on the road. The factor that will deter- 
mine whether it is practicable to assign machine guns to an advance 
guard is usually the distance from the point to the tail of the reserve. 
If this distance is as great as 700 or 800 yards, machine gunners in 
draft on the road will usually be able to remove the guns from the 
carts before coming under annihilating fire. Machine gunners can- 
not be expected to advance their guns by hand and keep up with a 
marching command all day. This will be possible for very short 
marches, in which case a smaller advance guard could have machine 
guns assigned to it. 

The company of infantry is the smallest unit that will ordinarily 
have sufficient depth when acting as an advance guard for the assign- 

138 



Machine Guns in Advance Guards 139 

ment of machine guns with carts. Where sufficient guns are avail- 
able, a platoon of machine guns is a suitable number of assignment 
to an advance guard consisting of a company. A battalion acting as 
an advance guard would usually have a machine-gun company assigned 
to it. A force larger than a battalion would usually have a machine- 
gun company for each battalion which is likely to have to perform the 
duties of an assaulting battalion. 

The nature of the terrain will be a large factor in determining 
the number of machine guns to be assigned to an advance guard. 
Where the country is rolling and affords excellent opportunities for 
flanking and overhead fire, the proportion of guns to infantry should 
be large. Where the country is so flat or densely wooded as to pre- 
clude the use of overhead fire the number of guns would be relatively 
smaller. 

Where the advance guard consists of a battalion of infantry or a 
smaller force, the machine guns, as a rule, will form part of the re- 
serve. Where the advance guard consists of two or more battalions, 
the machine guns usually will form part of both the support and re- 
serve. 

In addition to the necessity for providing for the safety of the 
machine guns, there are other reasons for not pushing the guns too 
far forward. Very frequently there will be high ground on the 
flank which will offer the most favorable opportunity for the use of 
machine guns. If the guns are too far forward at the time the enemy 
opens fire it will be impossible for them to occupy this ground, as 
they would have to move by the flank under fire. On the other hand, 
if they are farther to the rear they usually will be able to occupy the 
high ground under cover. It is a serious mistake, however, to place 
the guns too far to the rear, as prompt action is one of the most es- 
sential factors in the work of advance guards. 

The employment of machine guns with an advance guard will fol- 
low the general lines laid down for their employment in the offensive 
or defensive, depending upon whether the mission of the advance 
guard is temporarily offensive or defensive. There are essential 
differences, however. Very frequently their mission will not be to 
seek a decision but to force a premature deployment, or otherwise to 
delay the enemy or to gain a temporary advantage. For this reason 
machine guns should enter the action early and should make the 
maximum use of long-range fire. Delaying the enemy long enough 



140 Employment of Machine Guns 

to permit the infantry to gain and hold important ground may be of 
far greater value than inflicting more serious losses on the enemy by 
holding the fire until he is closer. 

Holding good defensive positions, bridges, defiles or other fea- 
tures of the terrain essential to the success of the advance guard or 
main body will be some of the most important missions assigned to 
machine guns. 

The advance guard on the defensive will deploy on a wider front 
than that ordinarily allotted to a force of its size on the defensive, so 
as to secure the position, completely engage the enemy, or deceive 
him and force an early deployment. It will be disposed of in groups 
more or less detached, which will occupy those positions the posses- 
sion of which will most protect the deployment of the main body. 
The machine guns will be placed to cover the most important avenues 
of approach. This will cause the machine guns to be more widely 
scattered than they would usually be in a defensive position where 
reinforcements could not be quickly expected. Advance guard work 
calls for great initiative and boldness on the part of the junior officers 
and noncommissioned officers of machine-gun organizations. 

Balck says : "Machine guns will be able to bring all their powers 
into play to the best advantage at the beginning of a rencontre, when, 
from their position as far forward as possible in the column, they 
are pushed to the front to occupy important points and compel the 
enemy to deploy his infantry. The commander should, however, 
endeavor to withdraw the machine guns from the fight as soon as his 
own infantry has deployed, in order to avoid involving the guns in a 
protracted fire fight necessitating the expenditure of a great amount 
of ammunition and in which the accuracy of their fire would grad- 
ually suffer." 

Colonel Applin of the British Army expresses a similar opinion. 

It is believed that the policy of withdrawing the machine guns is 
in direct opposition to the best thought on the use of machine guns 
today. It is recognized as a principle that they must exert a contin- 
uous influence in the fight and that their use must not be limited to 
critical stages of the action. 

Where machine guns form part of the support the commander 
of the guns so assigned should remain with the commander of the 
support until the time for the machine guns to go into action. Where 
no machine guns are assigned to the support, the machine-gun com- 



Machine Guns in Advance Guards 141 

mander would be with the advance-guard commander. Such an ar- 
rangement enables the machine-gun commander to learn the inten- 
tions of the commander and to get the guns into action with the 
minimum loss of time, when the emergency demanding their use 
arrives. 

Rear Guards 

The purpose of the rear guard is to protect the main body from 
attack in rear. In retreat, it checks pursuit and enables the main 
body to increase the distance between it and the enemy and to reform 
if disorganized. It is important to offer the greatest opposition possi- 
ble to the enemy but to make good the retreat. 

Machine guns, by reason of their ability to suddenly develop a 
concentrated and intense fire, are peculiarly fitted for compelling the 
enemy to deploy at long range. They also can withdraw much more 
readily than a body of infantry capable of developing an equal volume 
of fire. These characteristics make them extremely valuable to rear 
guards. They should habitually form a part of any rear guard larger 
than a platoon of infantry. A section of machine guns may be em- 
ployed profitably with a rear guard consisting of a platoon of infan- 
try. The proportion of machine guns to infantry should not be less 
than a machine-gun company for each battalion of infantry in the 
rear guard and frequently will be much greater. 

When it is not necessary to withdraw in deployed lines, the 
greater part of the rear guard marches in column of route on the 
road, taking up a formation of an advance guard faced to the rear. 
When the rear guard is in this formation, machine guns, as a rule, 
should form part of both the support and reserve. There is not the 
same danger of surprise as in an advance guard, and the machine guns 
can safely be much nearer the rear party of the rear guard than to the 
point of the advance guard. 

When the rear guard retires in column of route but under men- 
ace of immediate attack by the enemy, the machine guns should re- 
tire by echelon, part of them being always in position to protect the 
remainder of the rear guard by fire from commanding positions on 
the flank or in the rear. These echelons should preferably be platoons 
in order that there may always be an officer responsible for the con- 
duct of the machine guns. When guns move to the rear an officer 
should precede them to select the succeeding position and prepare 
fire data. 



142 Employment of Machine Guns 

The most important points in the selection of positions are the 
following : 

1. A good field of fire at long and medium ranges. The question 
of a field of fire at short ranges usually will be relatively unimportant 
as the guns will withdraw, as a rule, before the enemy reaches close 
range. 

2. Positions chosen should be on the flank of the line of march 
unless the ground is suitable for overhead fire. 

3. Covered lines of retreat. Only with good covered lines of re- 
treat that have been reconnoitered by a machine-gun agent will it be 
possible for the guns to fire up to the last moment and then safely 
withdraw. 

If the rear guard becomes engaged with the enemy, the distribu- 
tion of the machine guns is quite different from what it would be in 
a defensive position. There is not nearly so much distribution in 
depth. The purpose is to quickly develop the maximum fire power so 
most of the guns will be in the fight and very few in reserve. There 
usually will be two lines of guns retiring alternately, with a possible 
third where the time necessary to move from one position to another 
is considerable. Machine guns should never make short retirements. 
When they retire they should move such a distance to the rear as will 
give them time to occupy the position without haste, obtain the fire 
data, and prepare cover where necessary. This enables them to re- 
main in action the maximum amount of time. 

If the enemy is bold and aggressive so that breaking off the en- 
gagement is difficult, every effort should be made to surprise him at 
short range, guns being placed in carefully concealed positions com- 
manding important avenues of approach. One successful surprise 
by machine guns will make the boldest adversary cautious. 

The fullest use must be made of the carts. Machine guns carried 
by hand cannot possibly continue to possess the necessary mobility 
during a prolonged rear-guard action. The question of ammunition 
supply will be a serious one, as a rear-guard action makes greater 
demands on the machine guns than any other. 

Close communication with the infantry is of the greatest impor- 
tance. There should always be a small amount of infantry left to 
cover the withdrawal of the machine guns unless an infantry escort 
has been assigned. 

The probable loss of guns must never deter the machine gunners 



Machine Guns in Advance Guards 143 

from remaining long enough to insure the retirement of the main 
body. 

Marches 

On good roads the marching ability of machine guns will be 
slightly greater than infantry, as the men do not carry rifles. On 
bad roads or across country the machine guns will be less mobile 
than infantry. Whenever conditions are such that the guns must be 
carried by hand, the mobility of machine-gun organizations is very 
much reduced and they cannot be expected to keep up with infantry 
for any great distance. 

In marches where there is no tactical situation involved, machine 
guns ordinarily should march in rear of the infantry in the column. 
This will add greatly to the comforts of the infantry, owing to the 
amount of dust raised by the carts. 

Where an engagement is probable, all or a large percentage of 
the machine guns in the main body should be near the head of the 
organizations of which they form a part. All of the machine-gun 
companies of a regiment ordinarily will march in rear of the leading 
battalion of the regiment. Machine guns near the head of the 
column will be able to come into action quickly and, by long-range 
fire, protect the infantry during the early stages of its deployment. 

Connecting Groups 

Both in the offensive and defensive, connecting groups are used 
for maintaining communication between brigades or divisions. These 
groups vary in size from a platoon of infantry and a section of ma- 
chine guns to a battalion of infantry and a company of machine guns. 

The mission of machine guns assigned to connecting groups is 
usually essentially defensive in character. The principal uses to 
which they will be put are : 

1 . Filling a gap. 

2. Protecting the flanks of the organizations with which they are 
maintaining connection. 

The chief offensive use of these groups will be to support local 
counter-attacks. 

Outposts 

The ease with which a machine gun can be concealed, its mobility, 
its adaptability to night firing, and its concentration of fire on a nar- 



144 Employment of Machine Guns 

row frontage make it the ideal resisting weapon for use with an out- 
post for the purpose of covering roads, bridges, defiles or other 
marked lines of approach. 

A judicious use of machine guns stiffens the line of resistance and 
permits the employment of the minimum number of riflemen. How- 
ever, the machine gun is solely for increasing the stopping power of 
the outpost, and in return must have the protection of the outpost. 

The size and disposition of the outpost, with the number of guns 
assigned to the different subdivisions thereof, depend upon many 
circumstances, such as the size of the main body, the proximity of 
the enemy, and the situation with respect to him, the nature of the 
terrain, etc. In general the ratio of machine guns to infantry in the 
outposts will be greater than in advance guards. 

The greater part of the machine guns will be assigned to the sup- 
port and will be placed at or near the line of resistance. If the num- 
ber of guns is sufficient, machine guns should be so placed as : 

1. To command all avenues of approach, such as roads, defiles, 
or favorable places for attack. 

2. To command any neighboring ground from which the enemy 
would be able to either view or annoy the main body. 

3. To sweep thoroughly all ground between the outguards, and 
to bring an effective crossfire to bear on as much of it as possible. 

Machine guns ordinarily will not be assigned to small outguards 
but may be assigned to important pickets or detached posts. Auto- 
matic rifles are better suited for furnishing the fire power for small 
outguards. Machine guns should be used with small outguards only 
where they would cover such important avenues of approach that 
their usefulness would more than counterbalance the danger of their 
capture. 

Machine guns usually should be placed by pairs. Where natural 
cover is lacking, the guns should always be dug in and protection pro- 
vided for the men. 

Where the number of guns assigned to the outposts is too small 
to permit of the distribution indicated above, emplacements should 
be prepared or firing positions reconnoitered, the guns being held at 
a central point in rear from which they can be moved easily and 
quickly to that portion of the line where they are needed. 

When the outpost line is thinly held it is advisable to assign some 
machine guns to the reserve so that they will be available for rein- 



Machine Guns in Advance Guards 145 

forcing any part of the line. In such cases emplacements should be 
prepared or firing positions reconnoitered as indicated above. 

Unless an attack is imminent, machine guns assigned to the out- 
post may not be mounted during the day if there is any danger of 
disclosing their position. 

The night position of a gun often will be different from the one 
used during the day. The night position should be selected and all 
arrangements made for firing during the day. The gun should be 
mounted in its night position at dusk. It should be loaded at this 
time. Indirect fire data must be prepared for covering all approaches 
or targets assigned to the gun. 

Machine guns assigned to pickets frequently will be used to place 
harassing fire at night on important roads to deny their use to the 
enemy beyond our outguards or patrols. 

Harassing fire also may be used to cover difficult ground in front 
of the outpost that is not visited by our patrols. 

The orders given section leaders or the corporal of any detached 
gun squad detailed for duty with any fraction of an outpost should 
be clear and definite and should include: 

1. Information as to the situation sufficiently complete to enable 
him to act intelligently upon his own initiative should the necessity 
arise. 

2. The exact mission of the guns and the conditions under which 
they are to open fire. 

3. The location of adjoining guns. 

4. The disposition to be made of carts. 

5. Where to communicate with the commander of the subdivision 
of the outpost to which assigned and with the next higher machine- 
gun commander. 

6. Where to obtain rations, ammunition and supplies. 

The machine-gun commander, upon arriving at the designated 
subdivision of the outpost to which he is assigned, ascertains the loca- 
tion of the neighboring infantry groups and sentinels and the routes 
of patrols and hours of departure and return. He then: 

1. Selects firing positions for his guns. 

2. Arranges a system of signals for communication between him- 
self and his guns. 

3. Studies his sector of fire, prepares range cards, and points out 
to the corporals all of the points shown on range cards. 



146 Employment of Machine Guns 

4. Marks out the limits of his sector of fire by stakes. 

5. Provides for protection of the gun and of the men. 

6. Makes preparation for night firing. 

7. Locates neighboring guns and arranges for mutual support. 

8. Provides for the necessary ammunition supply. 

9. Posts his sentinels at the gun or near the gun emplacements 
(one by day and two by night). 

10. Holds the other members of the gun squads at a convenient 
distance from the guns. 

11. Sends carts to the designated point. 

12. Explains the situation fully to his men and makes sure that 
each understands his duties. 

13. Arranges for communication with the subdivision of the out- 
post to which assigned and with his next higher machine-gun com- 
mander. 

14. In general, takes every possible means to coordinate his work 
with the unit to which assigned. 

Sentinels over machine guns on outpost duty have the same orders 
as in a defensive position. 

Woods Fighting 

Attack. — Woods may be attacked in two different ways: 

1. They may be enveloped and then attacked from the rear. 

2. A direct attack may be made on the woods. 

When the woods are to be enveloped, machine-gun fire should be 
concentrated on the front and flanks of the woods. Long-range indi- 
rect fire also can be used to cover the exits from the woods thus pre- 
venting reinforcements and barring the lines of the retreat to the 
defenders. As the attack progresses this long-range fire on the exits 
can be replaced by fire from the flanks by machine-gun organizations 
that have advanced considerably. By this means, fire can be kept on 
the exits almost up to the time the attacking infantry enters the woods 
from the rear. 

A direct attack on the woods comprises three general phases : 

1. The advance over open ground to the edge of the woods. 

2. The advance through the woods. 

3. Egress from the woods. 

During the advance of the infantry over the open ground the 
machine guns should bring a heavy fire, preferably flanking or direct 



Machine Guns in Advance Guards 147 

overhead, on the front of the woods and should at the same time use 
long-range indirect fire to cover the exits from the woods. When 
the edge of the woods is carried by the infantry, the majority of the 
machine guns should be kept in a position to repel a possible counter- 
attack until the infantry has reorganized for its advance through the 
woods. A small number of guns, usually not exceeding the number 
assigned to assaulting battalions, should be pushed forward to the 
woods to give immediate protection to the infantry during reorgani- 
zation. 

If the woods are open and the country rolling, the machine guns 
would support the infantry as in the attack on open ground. If the 
woods are dense, the machine guns should follow closely behind the 
assaulting platoons. Their chief usefulness will be to cover the in- 
fantry during its reorganization at openings in the woods and to sup- 
port it in case of counter-attack. Automatic rifles are better suited 
to furnish the fire power for an advance through dense woods than 
are machine guns. If additional fire is required to enable the line to 
advance, however, the machine guns will be used. Under such con- 
ditions the machine guns will be placed in intervals in the firing line. 
They should open a terrific fire for a minute or two, at the end of 
which time they should suddenly cease firing while the infantry rushes 
forward as far as possible. Under cover of the fire of the infantry 
they should again be brought forward into the line and the process 
repeated indefinitely. Such a methodical advance through woods is 
very costly in time and ammunition and should be resorted to only 
when it is impossible to advance in any other way. 

Before the infantry debouches from the far edge of the woods, 
the machine guns should be placed near the edge of the woods pre- 
pared to cover the egress of the infantry by fire. If overhead fire is 
not possible, it usually will be best to put the machine guns near 
the flank of the woods where they can support the infantry longer. 

Defense. — If a heavy artillery bombardment is improbable, ma- 
chine guns should be placed along the edge of the woods to fire on the 
approaching infantry. Some guns may be placed in trees. Fire can 
thus be placed in areas that are defiladed from the ground. If a 
longer artillery bombardment is expected, the guns should be placed 
in the open in advance of the woods, where they will suffer less from 
high explosive and gas. In any case, some of the guns should be so 
placed as to enfilade the edge of the woods. 



148 Employment of Machine Guns 

All clearings, roads and paths should be swept by machine-gun 
fire. Where time is available it may be profitable to make narrow 
clearings, place wire in them and sweep them by machine-gun fire. 
In such cases, however, only the underbrush should be cleared so 
that the airplanes will be unable to detect the clearings. Arrange- 
ments should be made for flanking the edges of the woods. Extensive 
use should be made of strong points flanked by machine guns to am- 
bush the enemy during his progress through the woods. 

Anti-Aircraft Defense 

In discussing anti-aircraft defense by machine guns, no explana- 
tion will be made of the mathematical calculations involved in the 
construction of a sight for firing by machine guns or in the deter- 
mination of the correct point of aim when the ordinary sights are 
used. The methods used will simply be stated. 

The Browning machine gun is equipped with "Sight, Anti-Air- 
craft, Trench, for Browning Machine Gun Model of 1918." The 
equipment prescribed for all machine-gun companies of an infantry 
division is four, or enough to equip the guns of one platoon. A simi- 
lar sight is made for use on the Browning automatic rifle. 

The anti-aircraft trench sight consists of a rear peep sight at- 
tachable to the regular rear sight leaf or other part of the breech 
of the gun and a double, oval-shaped front sight of metal stamping 
mounted on a suitable support and clamped around the barrel, radi- 
ator, or water jacket of the machine gun, and readily detachable 
therefrom. It is of the type known as a "fixed sight." In this sight 
the angle of fire deflection, or amount of firing ahead of the target, is 
primarily designed for effective fire under average conditions against 
a plane traveling 100 miles per hour, at 1,000 feet height and 50 de- 
grees angle of sight, or 120 miles per hour, at 200 feet altitude and 
15 degrees angle of sight. 

With the sights properly attached and at the correct distance 
apart, the gunner sights through the rear peep at the flying target and 
shifts the line of the gun towards the aircraft so that it will constantly 
appear to be flying towards the center of the front sight. 

Given the altitude of the aircraft by the observer, the gunner 
chooses the oval which more nearly approximates the range. He then 
fires when the nose of the target just touches the outer edge of the 
oval chosen and continues to fire in as long bursts as practicable while 



Machine Guns in Advance Guards 149 

changing the line of aim to maintain always the same relative posi- 
tion of the aircraft and the front sight; that is, to have the aircraft 
always flying towards the center of the sight with its nose just touch- 
ing the rim of the oval used. 

When special sights are not available, the ordinary sights may be 
used with the sight setting and point of aim as indicated in the fol- 
lowing table : 

Direction of flight Sight setting Point of aim 

Coming 2,000 At the airplane. 

Coming and crossing diagonally 1,700 V/ 2 fingers to the right or left 

according to the direction of 
the flight. 

Crossing 600 2 fingers in front of airplane. 

Going and crossing diagonally Zero iy 2 fingers at 4.30 or 7.30 o'clock 

according to the direction of 
the flight. 

Going Zero V/ 2 fingers below the airplane. 

The proper zone of effectiveness for machine guns against air- 
craft is generally considered to be within 2,000 feet and at 15 degrees 
or more elevation. The limit of range for effective fire is 1,300 yards. 
Firing at longer range is ineffective and wasteful. 

It will be exceptional where only one gun is employed. Ordi- 
narily not less than a section, and preferably a platoon, should be 
employed against any airplane. The chances of hitting with a single 
gun are extremely small. It must be remembered that bringing down 
planes, however, is not the only purpose in firing at them, and that 
you have performed a great part of your mission if your fire 
frightens them away and prevents them from obtaining information 
or carrying out bombing operations. 

When several guns are employed for the protection of towns, 
dumps, etc., each gun is assigned a certain sector, and when the 
alarm is given it puts up a protective barrage in the sector. The 
object of this barrage is to create a danger zone for the airplane and 
to drive it away. 

Tracer bullets are a great assistance in firing on airplanes. They 
not only enable the gunner to adjust his fire more accurately but 
they add to the moral effect by informing the airplane that it is being 
fired upon. The Ordnance Department is working on a bullet to trace 
to 1,500 yards. 

Special anti-aircraft mounts are provided for issue to the anti- 



150 Employment of Machine Guns 

aircraft machine-gun battalions. In the past machine guns belonging 
to divisions have used improvised mounts. The Browning tripod is 
suitable for firing at aircraft. 

The following are the important points in training machine gun- 
ners for anti-aircraft firing. 

1. To differentiate between friendly and enemy planes. 

2. To estimate distance correctly enough to know if plane is 
within effective range. 

3. To use the "anti-aircraft trench sight." 

Machine guns used for anti-aircraft defense may be classified as 
follows : 

1. The anti-aircraft machine-gun battalions, one of which is as- 
signed to each army corps. This battalion is used for the defense 
of rear areas, protection of ammunition dumps, hospitals, depots, 
hangars, etc. 

2. Machine guns which form part of the equipment of batteries 
of artillery. Each battery of 75-mm. guns and 155-mm. howitzers 
is equipped with two machine guns. These guns are for the imme- 
diate defense of the guns, including protection from airplanes. When 
mounted for firing on aircraft they should be so placed as to give 
protection to the guns without disclosing the position of the guns. 

3. Machine-gun companies of the division. 

When a machine-gun company is taking part in an offensive, one 
section in each platoon should be equipped with anti-aircraft sights 
and should be given the mission of protecting the machine-gun com- 
pany and the infantry battalion with which it is operating from 
attacks by airplanes. 

A machine-gun company in position on the defensive should 
provide for one gun in each section to fire on aircraft unless the guns 
are in emplacements which make such firing impracticable. 

When troops are moving by train in the theater of operations, 
one or two sections of machine guns should be mounted on flat cars, 
ready for instant firing on airplanes. 

When troops move by bus in the theater of operations, machine 
guns should be placed at regular intervals in the column, mounted 
and ready for instant firing. 

On the march in the theater of operations, the infantry columns 
should have machine guns distributed along them for protection 
against air attacks. 



Machine Guns in Advance Guards 151 

Troops billeted in the theater of operations must place guns for 
the protection of all billets, store-houses, hospitals, etc. Troops must 
provide for their own protection; they cannot expect the regular 
anti-aircraft organizations to furnish sufficient protection. 

Observation balloons always will be protected by machine guns 
placed in the vicinity. 



Chapter XIV 

Machine-Gun Company with Advance Guard 

Tactical Ride 

[Map: References: Topographical Map Fort Leavenworth and Vicinity 
1-21120, Leavenworth sheet. {Map No. 7.) General map of Vicinity 
of Leavenworth.] 

Part I 
Situation : 

A state of war exists between Kansas (Red) and Missouri 
(Blue). October 1 the 1st Division (Blue), with very little oppo- 
sition, crossed the Missouri at Leavenworth and Fort Leavenworth. 
The 1st Infantry Brigade camped at Fort Leavenworth the night of 
October 1 and the 2d Brigade at Leavenworth. At 9 p.m., Major A, 
commanding the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, received the following 
order : 

Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, 

1 October, '19, 8.00 p.m. 
Field Orders | 
No. 17 J 

1. Only slight resistance from small detachments was met with 
in crossing the Missouri today. Reliable reports indicate that there 
is a company of infantry at KICKAPOO and a regiment at HAW- 
THORNE where a considerable quantity of supplies has been col- 
lected. One division will remain at LEAVENWORTH tomorrow. 

2. This brigade will march tomorrow towards HAWTHORNE. 

Troops: 

a. Advance Guard : 

Major A. 

1st Battalion, 1st Infantry. 

Battery A, 1st F. A. 

b. Main Body (in order of march) : 

1st Infantry (less 1st Battalion). 

1st Battalion, 1st F. A. (less Battery A). 

2d Infantry. 

1st Field Artillery (less 1st Battalion). 
3a. The Advance Guard will start at 7.00 a. m. tomorrow and 
152 



Company with Advance Guard 153 

march by the B-C-D-E Road, ATCHISON PIKE, FRENCH- 
MAN-KICKAPOO ROAD, 23— 77— 57-HAWTHORNE ROAD. 

b. The Main Body will follow the Advance Guard at 800 yards. 

c. The Outposts will remain in position until the vanguard has 
crossed the line of supports. 

4. The field train will follow the Main Body at 1 mile. 

5. I shall be at the head of the reserve. 

A, Brigadier General. 

Required : 

Statement of Major A giving the subdivision of his advance 
guard and the distribution of the machine guns to the various sub- 
divisions and their places in the march. 

Part II 

Major A and the vanguard commander made the following divi- 
sion of the Advance Guard : 
Advance Party: 

One platoon of Company A, 1st Infantry. 
Support: 

Company A, 1st Infantry (less 1 Platoon). 
Company B, 1st Infantry. 
Reserve (in order of march) : 

1st Battalion, 1st Infantry (less Cos. A and B). 
Battery A, 1st Field Artillery. 
Combat trains following immediately behind units. 
Distances between the various subdivisions were as follows: 
Point to Advance Party, 200 yards. 
Advance Party to Support, 400 yards. 
Support to Reserve, 600 yards. 
Just as the point reached the bridge over the creek 300 yards 
east of Roberts it was fired on from the vicinity of Roberts. At the 
same time the advance party received rifle, automatic and machine- 
gun fire from along the ridge for 200 yards, north and south of 
Roberts. 

Required : 

a. A statement as to the approximate location of : 
Head and tail of Advance Party. 
Head and tail of Support. 
Head and tail of Reserve. 



154 Employment of Machine Guns 

Head and tail of Machine-Gun Company. 
Major A, commanding Advance Guard. 
Captain M, commanding Machine-Gun Company. 

b. What detail was with Captain M ? 

c. A statement of the detailed plan of action decided upon by 
Major A. 

d. Orders as actually issued by Major A to Captain M. 

Part III 

a. At the time the point was fired upon : 

The head of the advance party was about 50 yards down the west 
slope of the ridge just east of the bridge, and the tail was coming 
over the crest of the same ridge. Depth 50 yards. 

The head of the support was just west of Road Crossing 23, and 
the tail was about 100 yards east of 23. Depth 160 yards. 

The head of the reserve was at Road Junction 29 and the tail 
was 100 yards north of Road Junction 816. Depth 1,200 yards. 

The head of the machine-gun company was 150 yards east of 
Road Junction 29 and the tail 100 yards north of Road Junction 45. 
Depth 190 yards. 

Major A, anticipating trouble in the vicinity of Kickapoo, was 
riding at the head of the support. 

Captain M was with Major A. 

b. The 1st Sergeant and 2 buglers were with Captain M. 

c. Major A decided to attack at once, enveloping the enemy's 
right; to support the attack by artillery from the vicinity of 345.2- 
755.1 and by machine guns from the ridge just west of Crossroads 
23 and the high ground in the vicinity of 344.2-756.3. 

d. Verbal order of Major A to Captain M, captain of Battery A, 
captains of Companies A and B. 

Message to Captain C to report to him at once when verbal orders 
would be given to him. 

"The enemy is holding the ridge running from northwest to 
southeast at Roberts. He appears to be holding about 200 yards 
each side of the road. 

"We attack at once, enveloping the enemy's right. 

"Company A will attack south of the road, enveloping the 
enemy's right. 

"Company B will attack north of the road. 



Company with Advance Guard 155 

"Company C will be held in position on the road 500 yards south 
of the crossroads 23. 

"Battery A will take up a position in the general vicinity of 
345.2-755.1 to support the attack concentrating on Roberts House at 
beginning of action. 

"The machine-gun company will support the attack from this 
ridge (just west of 23) and from the high ground in the vicinity of 
344.2-756.3). 

"Combat train of rifle companies 200 yards south of Crossroads 
23. Combat trains of the artillery and machine guns at disposal of 
respective commanders. 

"I shall remain at this point." 

Required : 

a. Captain M's actions. 

b. Orders actually issued by Captain M. 

Part IV 

Captain M studied the country before him for a few minutes and 
then said to one of the buglers : 

"Smith, the 1st Platoon will go into position on this ridge just 
south of where we are. Their target will be that part of the enemy's 
line south of the road. Take a good look at the target and the posi- 
tion so that you will be able to point them out to Lieutenant A." 

Captain M, with the 1st Sergeant and buglers, galloped rapidly 
back towards the reserve and joined the machine-gun company just 
as it reached Road Junction 33. He halted the company and said : 
"Officers, fall out and join me. Smith, guide the 1st Platoon toward 
the ridge we just left. You will remain with the platoon. Turn 
over your horse to Lieutenant A now. 1st Sergeant, turn the re- 
mainder of the company north and then west at the first road and 
halt upon reaching the north and south road about 600 yards from 
here." 

To the assembled officers Captain M gave the following verbal 
orders : 

"The enemy is holding the ridge that runs from northwest to 
southeast of Roberts. He is occupying it for about 200 yards each 
side of the road. 

"The 1st Battalion attacks at once, enveloping the enemy's right. 

"Battery A supports the attack from the vicinity of 345.2-755.1. 



156 Employment of Machine Guns 

"The 1st Platoon will support the attack from the ridge west of 
23 and will have as a target that part of the enemy's line south of the 
road. Bugler Smith can point out the position and target. 

"The 2d Platoon will support the attack from the vicinity of 
344.2-756.3. 

"Combat train 200 yards south of road junction. 

"Lieutenant A, rejoin your platoon. 

"Lieutenant B, you will follow me in advance of the company 
to make a reconnaissance of the position. Bring your section leaders 
with you. 

"Lieutenant C, take charge of the company and conduct it under 
cover towards 344.2-756.3. Have the 1st Sergeant join me as I pass 
the company. 

"Lieutenant D, halt the combat train 200 yards south of Road 
Junction 41." 

Captain M, with platoon and section leaders, 1st Sergeant and 
bugler, proceeded to the vicinity of 344.2-756.3 and assigned that 
part of the enemy's line north of the road to the 2d Platoon. 

Required : 

Orders actually issued by Lieutenant A, commanding 1st Platoon. 

Part V 

Lieutenant A, upon coming up with his platoon, directed the 
section leaders and Bugler Smith to proceed with him, and the 
platoon sergeant to bring the platoon to Crossroads 23. 

Upon reaching the crest of the ridge Smith pointed out the posi- 
tion and target to Lieutenant A. Lieutenant A scaled the ranges 
from his map and gave the following order : 

"You have seen the position and target pointed out by Smith. 

"1st Section will occupy the right of the position, the 2d Section 
the left. Mount your guns under cover and drag them into position. 

"Belt-filling stations 50 yards down the slope. Carts 100 yards 
north of Crossroads 23. Combat train 200 yards south of Cross- 
roads 41. 

"Combined sights, No. 4 gun, range 600, add 50. 

"1st Section, take the right half of the target, 2d Section the left 
half. 

"Rate of fire 150 per minutes. 

"Signal when ready and open fire on my signal." 



Chapter XIV 




Map No. 7, Chapter XIV 




Chapter XV 

Machine Guns with a Small Rear Guard 

[Maps-' General Map Gettysburg— Antietam. Gettysburg— Antietam 1-21120, 
Kingsdale Sheet. (May No. 8.)] 

Part I 
General Situation: 

Pennsylvania (Blue) and Maryland (Red) are at war. The 1st 
Brigade (Blue) with the 1st Battalion, 1st Field Artillery attached, 
has been sent from Littlestown to Westminster with instructions 
to destroy the railroad at that point and to return to Littlestown 
without becoming seriously engaged with the enemy, if possible. On 
the night of September 5—6, 1919, the 1st Brigade having accom- 
plished its mission camped on the north bank of Big Pipe Creek in 
the vicinity of Arter's Mill with an outpost on the south bank. . 

A Red reinforced brigade, which had been sent in pursuit of the 
1st Brigade, reached Mayberry (2y 2 miles southwest of Arter's 
Mill) on the night of September 5-6, 1919, and went into camp. 

Special Situation: 

General A, commanding the 1st Brigade, decided to continue the 
march on the morning of September 6, 1919, and issued orders for 
the march directing the main body to clear road junction 623 (north 
of Arter's Mill) at 6.00 a.m. Major B, the outpost commander, was 
informed that the outpost troops, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and 
Company D, 1st Infantry, reinforced by Battery A, 1st Field Ar- 
tillery, would form the rear guard and would follow the main body 
at 1,000 yards. He was also informed that the command would 
march via the Arter's Mill— 564— 679— 704— 669— 528— 557 — 
Littlestown Road. 

The main body marched as directed, and Major B, without being 
molested by the enemy, formed his rear guard and followed the main 
body at a distance of 1,000 yards. Major B and the commander of 
the support made the following disposition of the rear guard : 

Reserve (in order of march) : 
Combat trains. 
Battery A, 1st Field Artillery. 

157 



158 Employment of Machine Guns 

2d Battalion, 1st Infantry (less Companies E and H). 

Distance, 800 yards. 
Support: 

Company E, 1st Infantry (less one platoon). 

Distance, 600 yards. 
Rear Party : 

One Platoon of Company E, 1st Infantry. 

Required : 

The distribution of the machine guns to the various subdivisions 
and their places in the column. Reasons for assignments made. 

Company D was assigned to the reserve and directed to follow 
Battery A, 1st Field Artillery. Company H was assigned to the 
support and marched at the head of the support. 

In determining the assignments of the machine guns Major B 
may employ them in any one of the following ways : 

1. He may hold all the machine guns under his own command, 
using all of them in direct support of the infantry echelons succes- 
sively without assigning them to the support of any particular in- 
fantry element. 

2. He may assign all of them to the reserve. 

3. He may assign all of them to the support. 

4. He may assign part of them to the reserve and part to the sup- 
port, the machine guns to support only the particular infantry echelon 
to which assigned. 

The short range of the machine gun makes it impracticable for 
the machine guns to support two successive echelons from the same 
position as the artillery does. Were the range sufficient, this would 
be the most effective way of employing them, since the combined fire 
of all of the guns could be brought against the enemy at each position. 

Using all of the machine guns to support each infantry echelon 
in turn from successive position will be possible only where the mo- 
bility of the machine guns is such that they can support the infantry 
at one position, go out of action and reach the next position to the 
rear before the enemy comes within effective range. Animal-drawn 
machine guns are not sufficiently mobile to be employed in this 
manner. Where good roads are available, motorized machine guns 
could be profitably employed in this way, and it would be advan- 
tageous for the commander of the rear guard to retain the whole 



Small Rear Guard 159 

of the machine guns under his direct command and employ it to sup- 
port the infantry echelons successively. 

Since the machine guns in this case are animal drawn, the only 
good solution appears to be to assign one company to the reserve 
and one company to the support. Major A and the support com- 
mander must now decide upon the positions in the column. 

The machine-gun company assigned to the reserve must not pre- 
cede the artillery. Whether it precedes or follows the infantry is 
not particularly important. There are some advantages, however, in 
having it precede the infantry. It takes the machine guns a little 
longer to go into position than the infantry. By preceding the in- 
fantry, the machine guns will have about three minutes' additional 
time for the occupation of the position and movement of the animals 
to the rear. The machine guns are also somewhat safer by preceding 
the infantry. If following the infantry, there would be an unoccu- 
pied space of about 800 yards between them and the support, and it 
would be possible for an enemy cavalry patrol to penetrate the sup- 
port and fire on them while in draft on the road. 

The machine-gun company assigned to the support must be so 
placed as to be reasonably safe while in draft on the road. Placed 
ahead of the infantry, the machine guns would be about 900 yards 
from the rear of the rear guard, assuming that a rear point was 
dropped back about 200 yards from the rear party. This would be 
ample protection, since the danger of surprise is not so great with 
rear guards as with advance guards. 

Part II 
Situation : 

At 7.05 a. m. September 6, 1919, the rear point had reached 
Crossroads 655, the leading element of the support was about 200 
yards south of Road Junction 564, the combat trains were 400 yards 
south of Road Junction 704, and Battery A, 1st Field Artillery, 200 
yards north of Road Junction 679. As the point reached Crossroads 
655, it was fired upon from the patch of woods just north of Hill 
651. The rear party took up a position along the crest about 100 
yards north of 655 and returned the fire. After a few minutes the 
enemy opened fire from the woods 400 yards south of 655. It soon 
became apparent to the commander of the rear party that the enemy 
was employing not less than a company against him and that he 
would not be able to maintain his position very long. Lieutenant X, 



160 Employment of Machine Guns 

commanding the rear party, sent a report to this effect to the support 
commander, who was marching in rear of the infantry of the support. 

Captain B, commanding the support, upon hearing the firing, 
halted the infantry company at the creek 800 yards north of Cross- 
roads 655 and sent a messenger to the machine-gun company to halt 
in the ravine 300 yards west of Road Junction 564. 

When Captain B received the message from the commander of 
the rear party, he read it and handed it to Major B, who was with 
him. Major B, after reading the message, gave the following verbal 
order to Captain B: 

"The support will at once take up a defensive position in the 
vicinity of Hill 709. 

"Battery A, 1st Field Artillery, will support you from the vicinity 
of Hill 727. 

"The infantry and machine guns of the reserve will take up a 
position in readiness at Hill 742. 

"You will hold the position until the receipt of orders to with- 
draw and will then withdraw to Hill 727. 

"Combat wagons at woods 300 yards north of Crossroads 669. 

"I shall be at Road Junction 718." 

Required : 

The orders of Captain B and the reasons for the same. 

Captain B gave the following verbal orders to the officers of 
Company E: 

"At least a company of the enemy is attacking the rear party 
vigorously. 

"The reserve takes up position in readiness at Hill 742. 

"The support will take up a defensive position on Hill 709 at 
once. 

"One platoon of Company E will take position in the woods 300 
yards northeast of Road Junction 679. One platoon of Company E 
at road cut 400 yards north of Road Junction 564. The remainder 
of the company will be held in an assembly formation in the woods 
north of Road Junction 679. 

"Company H will take position on Hill 709. 

"Battery A, 1st Field Artillery, supports this command from 
Hill 727. 

"The position will be held until the receipt of orders to withdraw. 
The command will then withdraw to Hill 727. 



Small Rear Guard 161 

"Combat wagons in woods 300 yards north of Crossroads 669. 
"I shall be on Hill 709." 

Captain B sent the following message to the commander of the 
rear party : 

"800 yards north of C. R. 655, 
"Lieutenant X. 6 September, '19, 7.15 a.m. 

"Support takes up a defensive position on Hill 709. Hold your 
present position for fifteen minutes and then withdraw to woods 
north of Road Junction 679. 

"B, Captain:' 

Captain B then galloped rapidly back to the machine-gun com- 
pany and gave the captain of the company the same order that he had 
given to the officers of Company E. 

In making his disposition, Captain B considered that he should 
offer the greatest opposition possible to the enemy but still make good 
his retreat. The two chief purposes of his command are : 

1. To force the enemy to deploy, thus gaining time. 

2. To inflict losses on deployed or marching columns. 

The first is more important than the second, since the gaining of 
time is the primary consideration. 

Machine guns by reason of their ability to suddenly develop a 
concentrated and intense fire are peculiarly fitted for compelling the 
enemy to deploy at long range. They also can withdraw more readily 
than a body of infantry capable of developing an equal volume of 
fire. Captain B should therefore make the maximum use of his 
machine guns, using his infantry only in so far as it is necessary to 
protect the machine guns or if he is required to hold the position so 
long that it becomes necessary to employ his whole command. By 
placing a platoon of infantry on each flank he will give the machine 
guns sufficient protection. The remainder of the infantry he placed 
in such positions that it could quickly reinforce the machine guns 
or withdraw to the next position. 

Captain B directed the machine-gun company to take up a posi- 
tion on Hill 709 rather than on the lower slopes for two reasons : 

1. He desired a good field of fire at long and medium ranges. 
He did not consider the question of a good field of fire at short 
ranges as very important, since he hoped to withdraw before the 
enemy reached close range. 



162 Employment of Machine Guns 

2. Retreat was easier from the top of the hill. The machine guns 
can fire up to the last moment only when they have good, covered 
lines of retreat. The line of retreat in this situation is extremely 
favorable since there is a good road leading directly to the rear to 
the next position and the machine guns of the reserve are in a posi- 
tion on the flank ready to protect the retreat. 

It will be noted that there was no distribution in depth of the 
machine guns of the support. In this respect the machine-gun dis- 
positions are quite different from an ordinary defensive position. In 
a rear -guard action the purpose is to develop quickly the maximum 
fire power rather than to offer the most stubborn resistance. 

The carts of the machine guns would be held in close proximity 
to the different platoons. The gunners must not be required to carry 
the guns if it can be avoided. A rear-guard action calls for greater 
use of machine guns than any other type, and the gunners can meet 
all of the demands only by making the maximum use of the carts. 

As soon as the machine guns were in position, the captain of 
Company H would send his reconnaissance officer to select routes 
to the position at Hill 727 and prepare fire data for the new position. 
This officer would send back an agent to guide the company to the 
position while he remained at the position and prepared the fire data. 
Captain B had this point in mind when he announced the next posi- 
tion in his order for taking up the position. 

Part III 
Situation : 

By 8.15 a. m. the enemy had deployed a battalion west of the 
655—564 road and had crossed Silver Run Creek. The remaining 
platoon of Company E, 1st Infantry, had been placed in position 
along the southern edge of the woods northeast of Road Junction 
679. At this time Captain B received a message from Major B to 
withdraw at once to Hill 727. 

Required : 

The orders of Captain B to carry out the withdrawal. 
Captain B gave the following verbal orders to the commanding 
officer of Company H : 

"This command withdraws at once to Hill 727 . 

"One platoon of Company E withdraws at once by the 718—669 



Small Rear Guard 163 

road. The platoon at the road north of 564 withdraws at once by a 
route to be selected by its commander. One platoon of Company E 
will remain in position on southern edge of woods until the machine- 
gun company has withdrawn and will then withdraw, covering the 
rear of the command. 

"The ammunition carts of Company H will withdraw at once by 
the 718-669 road. Company H will remain in position until Com- 
pany E (less two platoons) has cleared Road Junction 704 and will 
then withdraw, covered by a platoon of Company E. Route of with- 
drawal 718—669 road or the unimproved road to the east at the dis- 
cretion of the company commander as determined by the advance 
of the enemy. 

"I shall be at Hill 727 and shall assign positions to the troops as 
they arrive." 

Captain B then sent a message to the platoon in the cut north of 
Road Junction 564 to withdraw at once to Hill 727 , the route of 
withdrawal to be at the discretion of the platoon commander. 

Captain B then galloped back to the position of Company E along 
the southern edge of the woods. He gave the captain of this com- 
pany the same verbal order that he had given to Company H and 
also informed him that he had already notified the platoon north of 
Road Junction 564 to withdraw. Captain B then galloped rapidly 
to Hill 727 to make a reconnaissance of the position before the 
arrival of his troops. 

Captain B thus provided that the machine guns should cover the 
withdrawal of the bulk of the infantry, but in turn he left a small 
amount of infantry to cover the withdrawal of the machine guns. If 
pushed vigorously by the enemy, this platoon could take advantage 
of cover that would not be practicable for the machine guns. 

It is decidedly advantageous to the machine guns to withdraw 
by the 718-669 road if this is practicable, since they will make much 
more rapid progress on it. Captain B, however, cannot tell at this 
time how vigorously the enemy will push forward when the evacua- 
tion of the position is begun and considers it better to leave the route 
of withdrawal of the machine-gun company to the captain of the 
company. The unimproved road to the east of the main road and 
over Hill 726 offers much more cover than the main road. 

There was no necessity for Company H to withdraw by echelon, 
since the machine guns of the reserve on Hill 742 would cover the 



164 Employment of Machine Guns 

withdrawal of the company. There was every advantage in the 
company's withdrawal all at once, since it could bring a heavy fire 
against the enemy as long as any guns remained in position and then 
make its get-away before the enemy reached Hill 709, which would 
be the first point from which he could fire on it. 

There would be no serious criticism of leaving the ammunition 
carts of Company H with the company and letting them withdraw 
at the same time. However, the column in withdrawing would be 
64 yards longer and would take an additional chance of being caught 
by the enemy's fire before reaching cover. The gun carts carry 1,250 
rounds of ammunition, which certainly would be sufficient to com- 
plete the withdrawal. 

It should be noted that the retirement was about 2,000 yards. It 
is a mistake to make short retirements with machine guns. They 
should move far enough to the rear to give them time to occupy 
the new position without undue haste and to make all preparations 
for opening fire on the enemy as soon as he comes within effective 
range. 



14 






jooo Yards 



Map No. 8, Chapter XV" 




Chapter XVI 

Machine Guns of a Brigade Outpost 

[Maps' General Map Gettysburg— Antietam. Gettysburg— Antietam 1-21120, 
Bonneauville Sheet. (Map No. 9.)~\ 

Part I 

General Situation: 

The Susquehanna River forms the boundary between two states, 
Blue (east) and Red (west). War has been declared and a Blue 
army is marching on Gettysburg. 

Special Situation: 

June 1, 1920, the 1st Blue Corps advanced from the vicinity of 
Hanover towards Gettysburg. The corps advanced with 1st, 2d, 
and 3d Divisions abreast on parallel roads, with the divisions from 
right to left in the order named. The 2d Division had been assigned 
all roads from the Hanover Road, exclusive, to the Littlestown— 
Barlow Road, inclusive. The 3d Brigade on the right was advancing 
on the roads between the Hanover Road and the Baltimore Turnpike. 

When the support of the advance guard of the 2d Brigade reached 
Bashore Mill, Major A received the halt order of the brigade which 
directed him with the 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry, and Company M, 
5th Infantry, to form the outpost for the brigade. Major A issued 
the following verbal order : 

"Gettysburg is occupied by a hostile corps. Our cavalry has been 
stopped all along the line Cedar Ridge — Bonneauville Two Taverns 
— Barlow, by the Red outposts. Infantry patrols have been encoun- 
tered as far east as Square Corners — Whitehall — Germantown. Our 
corps halts for the night and goes into camp, establishing outposts 
from Irishtown to Littlestown. Our brigade camps in the vicinity 
of Sells Station. 

"2d Battalion and Company M, 5th Infantry, will establish the 
outposts for the 2d Brigade. 

"Line of Resistance: Hill 607— Hill 603— Hill 627— Pleasant 
Hill School House. 

"Line of Observation: Crossroads 601 — Road Junction 606 — 
Whitehall School House— Road Junction 564. 

165 



166 Employment of Machine Guns 

"Company E will establish a march outpost at Crossroads 633 

while the battalion is moving into position. With of machine 

guns it will constitute Support No. 2 at Crossroads 633. It will 
cover the sector from the fence 400 yards southwest of Road Junc- 
tion 577 to the fence 450 yards south of Crossroads 633. After the 
march outpost has been relieved it will send one platoon to the woods 
400 yards south of Road Junction 613 to form part of the reserve 
of the outpost. The commander of this platoon will command the 
reserve. 

"Company F with of machine guns will constitute Support 

No. 1 at Road Junction 577. It will cover the sector from Hill 607, 
inclusive, to the fence 400 yards southwest of Road Junction 577. 
It will establish and maintain communication with the outpost of the 
1st Division at Rebert. 

"Company G with of machine guns will constitute Support 

No. 3 at Pleasant Hill School House. It will cover the sector from 
the left of Support No. 2 to the road bend 600 yards southwest of 
Pleasant Hill School House. It will establish and maintain commu- 
nication with the outpost of the 3d Brigade in the vicinity of Toll- 
gate. It will send one platoon to the woods 400 yards south of Road 
Junction 613 to form part of the reserve of the outpost. 

"In case of attack the outpost line of resistance will be held at all 
costs, the outpost being reinforced by the main body of the brigade 
if necessary. Outguards will be intrenched. Machine-gun emplace- 
ments will be constructed in all positions. 

"Battalion aid station in woods, 300 yards east of Road Junc- 
tion 632. 

"Baggage wagons and rolling kitchens will join companies. 

"My command post will be at farmhouse 300 yards south of Road 
Junction 613." 

Required : 

The assignment of machine guns to the various supports and to 
the reserve. 

The following assignments of machine guns are made : 

To Support No. 1 — Company M (less one platoon). 

To Support No. 2 — Company H. 

To Support No. 3 — One platoon of Company M. 

To the Reserve — None. 



Brigade Outpost 167 

Comments 

The greater part of the machine guns of the outpost will ordi- 
narily be employed in defense of the line of resistance and will be 
posted in the vicinity of the line of resistance. Therefore they most 
frequently will be assigned to the supports. 

There will be cases, however, where they will be assigned to the 
reserves. Where the enemy is at a distance and it is known that 
he is not at all aggressive, all of the machine guns may be assigned 
to the reserve. Under such conditions the machine guns would re- 
connoiter positions and routes thereto but would not necessarily con- 
struct emplacements. Where the number of guns assigned to the 
outpost is not sufficient to properly defend the outpost line of resist- 
ance, all or part of the machine guns may be assigned to the reserve. 
Under such conditions they would reconnoiter positions and con- 
struct emplacements along the whole of the line of resistance and 
would be held at a central point in rear from which they could be 
moved quickly to any portion of the line where they might be needed. 

In the present situation the enemy is both near and aggressive. 
The line of resistance must be held strongly. The use of a con- 
siderable number of machine guns on the line of resistance will not 
only stiffen it but will permit of the use of a minimum number of 
infantrymen. Fortunately there are sufficient guns available to prop- 
erly defend the line of resistance, so it is not necessary to hold part 
of the guns with the reserve with emplacements prepared at a num- 
ber of places. 

The supports are of about equal importance. An enemy advanc- 
ing on the Bonneauville— Whitehall Road might approach the position 
by any one of the roads leading to the three supports. An enemy 
advancing by the Hanover Road might advance against Support No. 
1. An enemy advancing by the Baltimore Turnpike might advance 
against Support No. 3. The probability of attack is about the same 
in all cases. 

The ground in the vicinity of Support No. 2 and Support No. 3 
is more favorable for the employment of machine guns than the 
ground in the vicinity of Support No. 1. For this reason Support 
No. 1 was made strong in infantry, the platoons for the reserve being 
drawn from the companies assigned to Supports No. 2 and No. 3. 
The system of roads was not favorable to the employment of two 
companies with the supports and a complete company as a reserve. 



168 Employment of Machine Guns 

Had the unfavorable ground been in the vicinity of Support No. 2, 
it would have been well to hold a platoon in reserve, since Support 
No. 2 could be reinforced very quickly. 

Had the outpost commander deemed it unwise to permit the bag- 
gage wagons and rolling kitchens to join the supports, it might have 
been advisable to hold one section of each company of machine guns 
in reserve at such points that the baggage wagons and rolling kitchens 
could join them. These sections could then be used to prepare and 
carry the meals forward to the machine-gun companies. This would 
add greatly to the comfort of the troops. The outpost commander 
would have to decide whether the tactical situation would permit of 
such an arrangement. 

Part II 

Special Situation: 

The various support commanders issued orders providing for the 
following disposition of the infantry: 

Support No. 1 in woods just west of Road Junction 577. 

Picket No. 1, one platoon, at Hill 607, posted a sentry squad 
at H. Felty, patrolled to Support No. 1 and to the outpost 
of the 1st Division. 

Picket No. 2, one platoon, at Road Junction 582, posted sentry 
squads at Road Junctions 594 and 606 and patrolled to 
Whitehall S. H., Picket No. 1, Support No. 2 and to Sup- 
port No. 1. 

Sentinel posts for immediate protection of the support and 
visiting patrols furnished by the support. 

Support No. 2 just north of Crossroads 633. 

Picket No. 1, two squads at Hill 622, posted a cossack post 
at northwestern corner of cornfield west of Hill 622 and 
patrolled to neighboring pickets and to Support No. 2. 

Picket No. 2, one platoon (less two squads), in woods 1,000 
yards west of Crossroads 633, posted sentry squads at Road 
Junctions 599 and 200 yards west of Schild and patrolled 
to Whitehall S. H., neighboring pickets, and to Support 
No. 2. 

Sentinel posts for the immediate protection of the support 
and visiting patrols furnished by the support. 



Brigade Outpost 169 

Support No. 3 at Pleasant Hill S. H. 

Picket No. 1, one platoon (less two squads), at Road Junc- 
tion 598 posted sentry squads at Grawner and at Road 
Junction 564 and patrolled to neighboring pickets and to 
Support No. 3. 

Picket No. 2, two squads, at road bend 600 yards southwest 
of Pleasant Hill S. H., posted a cossack post in woods 
400 yards west of picket and patrolled to the outpost of 
4th Brigade and to Support No. 3. 

Sentinel posts for the immediate protection of the support and 
visiting patrols furnished by the support. 

Required : 

The positions and missions of the machine guns assigned to the 
three supports. 

The following positions and missions were assigned to the ma- 
chine guns of the various supports : 

Support No. 1. 

One section on Hill 607 to enfilade road to west and sweep 

ground toward Rebert, cover Crossroads 601 and flank 

Hill 603. 
One section at house 500 yards east of Road Junction 582 to 

enfilade 582-606 road and 594-609 road and to flank 

Hill 622. 

Support No. 2. 

One section at Hill 622 to cover 582-594 road and Crossroads 
606 and to flank the woods northwest of Road Junc- 
tion 599. 

One section at 363.3-743.4 to enfilade the 599-611 road and 
the Whitehall S. H. — Schild Road and to flank sentry 
squad at Grawmer. 

One section on northern part of Hill 647 to flank Hill 622. 

One section on southern part of Hill 647 to flank Hill 627 
and Pleasant Hill S. H. 

Support No. 3. 

One section at north edge of woods on Hill 627 to flank Hill 
622, Grawmer, and Schild, and to cover Road Junctions 
at 593 and Whitehall School House. 



170 Employment of Machine Guns 

One section at road cut north of Pleasant Hill S. H. to flank 
Hill 647, Hill 607, and Hill 621. 

Comments 

In general, machine guns assigned to the supports should be so 
posted as : 

1. To command all avenues of approach, such as roads, defiles, 
or favorable places for attack. 

2. To command any neighboring ground from which the enemy 
would be able to either view or annoy the larger fractions of the 
outpost or the main body. 

3. To sweep thoroughly all ground between the outguards and to 
bring an effective cross fire to bear on as much of it as possible. 

These conditions have been realized in the present situation to 
an unusual degree. Enfilade fire can be brought to bear on all roads 
leading to the front. The ridge running southwest from Marysville 
to Whitehall S. H. offers the most favorable ground to the enemy 
to view or annoy the outpost. This ridge can be brought under 
effective fire. In practically all cases the ground between the out- 
guards can be swept by a cross fire. 

All of the guns are either on or in the immediate vicinity of the 
line of resistance. 

In this situation it was unnecessary to assign machine guns to 
small outguards. The smallest outguard to which guns would be 
assigned would be the picket of two squads on Hill 622. As a rule 
it is well to avoid assigning guns to small outguards. They should 
be used with small outguards only when the mission is so important 
as to justify the danger of their loss. 

If the outpost remains in position for some time it will be neces- 
sary to select additional positions for some of the guns so that the 
day and night positions will not be the same. Such additional posi- 
tions, however, will not need to be selected before tomorrow morning, 
when it will be known whether the command will remain in its 
present position. 

The outpost commander may wish to place harassing fire upon 
the important roads and crossroads tonight. If such fire is ordered, 
it will be necessary to make detailed arrangements with the outguards 
concerned to make sure that no outguards or patrols are on the roads 
at the time of firing. 



Map No. 9. Chapter XVI 




Chapter XVII 

The Division Machine-Gun Officer 

Organization 

The division machine-gun officer is a technical staff officer on the 
staff of the division commander. He is not a general staff officer 
but is the technical adviser of the commanding general and of the 
general staff on all matters relating to machine guns. 

"The division machine-gun officer is charged with the duty of 
keeping the division commander informed at all times as to the effi- 
ciency of the machine-gun units of the division. He is an adviser 
of the division commander on all matters affecting the efficiency of 
these units, and particularly on their coordination in the plans of 
attack or defense. For combined instruction, or when the tactical 
situation requires it, division commanders may place the division 
machine-gun officer in direct command of all or any part of the 
machine-gun units of the division." (Paragraph 2, G. O. 91, G. H. 
Q., A. E. F., June 10, 1918.) 

His primary duty is that of a staff officer and not that of a com- 
mander of troops. As the representative of the division commander 
he will make constant inspections of the machine-gun organizations 
both during the training period and in actual campaign, whether the 
troops are holding the line in a stabilized sector or participating in 
an offensive. The purpose of these inspections will be two-fold : to 
keep the division commander informed as to the state of efficiency 
of the organizations, and to give them assistance. His usefulness 
will depend not alone on his technical and tactical knowledge of 
machine guns, but to a very great extent on his tact. He should 
deal with the machine-gun units through brigade and regimental 
commanders, and should be on such terms with these commanders 
that they will always feel that his chief aim is to be of assistance 
to them in the training of their commands. 

The division machine-gun officer is not an assistant of G-3, but 
most of his work will be done under instructions from G-3. The 
Chief of Staff may give instructions directly to the division machine- 
gun officer, but this will be the exceptional rather than the normal 
procedure. His office should be in close proximity to that of G-3 in 

171 



172 Employment of Machine Guns 

order that there may be the greatest possible degree of cooperation 
between the two. If room is scarce, he should be in the G-3 office. 

No provision is made in the tables of organization for personnel 
for the office of the division machine-gun officer. However, the 
proper performance of his duties demands that he should be pro- 
vided with a clerk and a draftsman. These men should be detailed 
from the machine-gun organization of the division. It may be neces- 
sary to detail the draftsman from the engineers. 

Tables of organization make no special provision for transpor- 
tation for the division machine-gun officer. As in the case of other 
staff officers of the division, transportation used by him would come 
from that allotted to the headquarters company. His duties ordi- 
narily will require the use of a motor car or side car. 

Duties in Mobilization, Equipment and Training 

Mobilisation. — Where the units are formed of untrained men, 
or of men with previous training, but who have not been previously 
assigned to units, the division machine-gun officer consults with G-l 
as to the selection of men for the machine-gun organizations. The 
following classes of men should be assigned to machine-gun units: 

1. Men having previous training or service in machine-gun units. 

2. Men of good physique and of previous mechanical training. 

3. Men of intelligence as high as that of men assigned to infantry 
organizations. 

Equipment. — The division machine-gun officer performs the fol- 
lowing duties in connection with the equipment of the machine gun 
units : 

1. Sees that all officers are provided with equipment manuals and 
are familiar with their use. 

2. Sees that all organizations submit their requisitions promptly 
for all articles of equipment required. 

3. Consults with G-4 concerning the procurement of equipment, 
and obtains all information possible from the ordnance officer, quar- 
termaster, division engineer, munition officer and gas officer as to the 
status of supplies. 

4. Makes such inspections of the organizations as are necessary 
to keep himself fully informed of the amount and condition of the 
property on hand. 

5. Keeps such a record of the important articles of equipment 



Division Machine-Gun Officer 173 

on hand as will enable him to determine the availability of units for 
service. 

Training. — Under instructions from G-3, the division machine- 
gun officer prepares a scheme of training for all of the machine-gun 
organizations in the division. This scheme will provide for progres- 
sive instruction and will make a definite allotment of time to the 
various subjects to be covered. He will check up and review the 
company schedules of instruction submitted by regimental command- 
ers. These schedules should specifically cover the work from day 
to day, making a definite assignment of work for each hour of 
the day. 

The following is a suggested training program for a division 
which has been mobilized without previous training and is based on 
a training period of four months. The machine guns should be 
segregated for the first six weeks for technical training, and during 
the remainder of the four-months period should join their organiza- 
tions, or at least be available for participation in the maneuvers with 
the infantry. 

Company agents should be trained under the supervision of the 
Signal Corps for the first six weeks. Thereafter they should be 
given a minimum of two hours of signal work per day. They should 
receive the full amount of training with the pistol, and sufficient 
training with the machine gun to be able to load and fire it. Platoon 
agents should spend two hours per day on signal work and the re- 
mainder of the time on regular platoon instruction. Men armed with 
the rifle should be given the same individual instruction and range 
practice, with the exception of fire problems, as the men in a rifle 
company. 

This program is based on six hours' work per day for five days 
per week. Saturdays should be devoted to inspections, tests of train- 
ing, and correction of deficiencies. 

If sufficient instructors for the training of the troops are not 
available, the division machine-gun officer, under instructions from 
G-3, should establish and conduct a school for the training of officers 
and noncommissioned officers. 



174 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Subject 



Hours of training 
per month 



1st 



2d 



3d 



4th 



Close Order Drill 

Dismounted Machine-Gun Drill 

Mounted M. G. Drill; Training of Animals; Pack- 
ing Carts 

Military Courtesy 

Instruction in Mechanism of M. G., Including 
Stoppages 

Sighting, Position and Aiming Drills with M. G. . . 

Target Designation and Fire Orders 

Belt Filling 

Firing with M. G. on 1,000- Inch Range 

Packing of Barrels 

Manual of Pistol; and Sighting, Position and Aim- 
ing Drills 

Mechanism of Pistol 

Pistol Firing 

Adjustment of Equipment and Making of Packs. . 

Pitching Shelter Tents 

Rough Ground Drill 

Barrage Drill 

Estimating Distance 

M. G. Firing on Long Range, including Automatic 
Sight Correction and Auxiliary Aiming Target . . 

Combat Drill Exercises 

Fire Problems with Assumed Tactical Situation . . . 

Operation Orders, Siting of Guns, Preparation of 
Range Cards, Construction and Equipment of 
Emplacements 

Indirect Fire with Map. Both Compass and R. O. 
Methods 

Indirect Fire without Map 

Grenade Instruction 

Hand and Arm Signals 

Practice Marches 

Maneuvers with Infantry, from Battalion to 
Division 

Gas Instruction 

Night Firing 

Firing with Gas Masks 

Individual Cooking 

Instruction in Guard Duty 

Written and Verbal Messages 



12 
12 

12 
2 

29 
& 

10 
2 

19 
1 

3 
3 
3 
2 

2 



12 
6 



6 
1 
6 

36 



12 



72 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 



96 

4 



Movement by Rail and Water 

In movement of the division by rail the division machine-gun 
officer is responsible that proper provisions are made for the fol- 
lowing : 



Division Machine-Gun Officer 



175 



1. For the anti-aircraft defense of the entraining and detraining 
points and of all trains. One section of guns mounted on flat cars 
near the center of the train, or two sections mounted on flat cars 
near the ends of the train, should be employed. 

2. That machine-gun units understand the methods to be em- 
ployed in loading. 

Combat carts, combat wagons, ration carts, and baggage wagons 
should be fully packed, loaded on flat cars and protected by paulins 
and wagon covers. Water carts should be full. All vehicles should 
be properly blocked. 

Combat carts are loaded twelve on a car. Wagons are loaded 
three on a car. 

Harness is placed on carts and wagons. 

Animals are loaded twenty in a stock car. 

The following is the transportation necessary to move machine 
organizations : 



Organization 





Number of 


cars 




Tourist 


Stock 


Flat 


Box 


Kitchen 


4 


2 


3 


1 


1 



Total cars 



Machine-Gun Company . . 



11 



3. Consults with G-3 as to mission at end of move. If entering 
training area, the type of training would determine whether machine- 
gun units should be segregated or placed convenient to infantry units. 

In movements by water the men will usually be sent on one boat 
and equipment on another. In case of an extended voyage, machine 
guns should go with troops to permit of training in mechanism en 
route. 

March of Concentration to a Bivouac 

Before the march of the division, the division machine-gun officer 
consults with G-3 as to placing of troops in the bivouac to best carry 
out their future mission. He determines by reconnaissance or from 
the map, bivouacs having sufficient stables for the animals and makes 
recommendations accordingly. 

He is responsible that provision is made for the anti-aircraft 



176 Employment of Machine Guns 

defense of all columns, by placing machine guns at proper distance in 
columns. 

During the march he inspects troops, observing the following: 
Road discipline; uniformity and neatness in making packs; loading 
of carts ; fitting of harness ; that no men ride on carts ; that no un- 
authorized articles are carried on carts; condition of men and their 
equipment, especially of their shoes. 

Relief of a Division Holding a Defensive Front — Upkeep of a 
Sector in a Stabilized Situation — Defense Plans 

Division machine-gun officer keeps a roster of front-line duty 
performed by each machine-gun company. When the division is 
ordered to relieve another division in a defensive sector, he prepares 
for G-3 a table showing what companies should relieve the different 
companies of the outgoing division. If possible, he should precede 
the division by two or three days and make a detailed reconnaissance 
with the division machine-gun officer of outgoing division. 

In the relief of machine-gun units the following are important 
considerations : 

In any sub-sector the machine guns and infantry should not be 
relieved on the same night. 

Incoming units should take over the sector just as occupied by 
the outgoing units and make changes later. 

The relief should be made at the earliest hour possible without 
the units marching during daylight. 

Where time necessitates move by trucks, the guns must accom- 
pany the men on the trucks and the trucks must go to a point suffi- 
ciently far forward that the relief can be made without the use of 
carts. 

During the occupation of the position the following are the duties 
of the division machine-gun officer : 

As soon as the sector is taken over, he makes a detailed inspec- 
tion of all machine-gun positions. He gets in touch with the infantry 
and artillery and sees if the machine guns, infantry and artillery 
are cooperating fully. If the machine-gun annex of the outgoing 
division is unsound or incomplete, he prepares a new annex. (For 
samples of division and regimental machine-gun annexes see pages 
120-124, 133-135.) 



Division Machine-Gun Officer 177 

The following points should be borne in mind in the preparation 
of the machine-gun defense: Machine guns should be so placed as 
to bring oblique or enfilade fire against the enemy lines ; the ground 
over which the enemy must pass should he attack; our own front 
lines should the enemy penetrate them. 

To accomplish these purposes the machine guns are distributed 
in depth. Usually not to exceed one-third of the guns are placed in 
the outpost position. The greater part of these guns are employed 
for the defense of the line of resistance of the outposts. They 
should be posted with small outguards only where the importance 
of the mission justifies the danger of loss of the guns. 

The bulk of the machine guns are employed to defend the main 
line of resistance of the battle position, usually being echeloned to 
the rear as far as the battalion reserve line. Usually about one- 
sixth of the guns will be placed in the vicinity of the regimental 
reserve line to limit the penetration of the enemy between centers 
of resistance and strong points and to support counter-attacks. 

From two to four companies of the machine guns will usually 
be held in brigade and division reserve. If the division organizes 
an intermediate position, these guns will reconnoiter and prepare 
positions on it; otherwise on the regimental reserve line. 

All guns employed in the outpost position and in the battle posi- 
tion should be given S. O. S. missions in front of the line of resist- 
ance of the outpost position, where the range permits, in addition to 
their battle missions. 

One gun in each section should be designated for anti-aircraft 
defense. 

The following are essential points in siting of guns : 

1. All guns are sited for direct fire, but are also prepared for 
indirect fire. 

2. Guns usually are sited in pairs. 

3. Gun positions should be sited for all-round defense. 

4. Guns must be concealed. 

5. Emplacements and cover trenches must be provided. 

6. In a stabilized situation, guns in the front line will be destroyed 
unless protected by concrete emplacements. 

7. Ammunition dumps must be established. 

8. Animals should not be placed in areas subject to heavy shelling. 



178 Employment of Machine Guns 

The division machine-gun officer sees that instructions are issued 
prescribing a minimum number of inspections for company com- 
manders. For points to be covered on inspections see page 118. 
For standing orders for gun positions see pages 116, 117. 

The division machine-gun officer, in conjunction with the chief 
of artillery and G-3, should prepare schedules of harassing fire. 

After the machine-gun plan of defense has been put into execu- 
tion, the machine-gun officers in the line prepare maps showing all 
machine-gun positions, directions of their fire, dead spaces in the 
lines of fire, and the S. O. S. barrages for the guns assigned such 
missions. The division machine-gun officer consolidates these and 
prepares a map showing the complete machine gun defense of the 
division. 

A Withdrawal from the Line and Movement of the Division 
by Truck and Marching 

The division machine-gun officer turns over to the incoming divi- 
sion machine-gun officer the machine-gun annex, all maps, and 
schedule of harassing fire. He makes such reconnaissance with the 
new division machine-gun officer as time permits. 

The following points are important to outgoing units: 

1. Guides must meet incoming units at designated times and 
places. 

2. Plans and maps must be turned over to incoming units. 

3. All ammunition and equipment, except that pertaining to the 
regular equipment of the organization, are turned over to incoming 
units. 

4. Machine-gun units or tripods must not be exchanged. Signal 
equipment may be exchanged. 

5. The relief should be completed in time for outgoing units to 
complete their march, or pass beyond the danger zone before daylight. 

6. Machine-gun units usually move by marching. Trucks ordi- 
narily will be employed only when the units are without animals or 
the distance is so great that they cannot be gotten out of the danger 
zone before daylight. 

Special Training for an Offensive — Replacements 

Upon the completion of one operation, training always should be 
begun for the next operation. The division staff may have infor- 



Division Machine-Gun Officer 179 

mation as to the future use of the division. In the absence of infor- 
mation an estimate should be made of the most probable use of the 
division, and the troops trained along that line. 

The division machine-gun officer can tell from his roster what 
companies are due to act with assault battalions. These companies 
should be given terrain exercises, and maneuvers with infantry bat- 
talions, until they know perfectly their part under such conditions. 
Where it is known what the next operation will be, the troops should 
be trained on similar terrain. For instance, if the theater of opera- 
tions is wooded, the troops should be put through every phase of 
woods fighting. 

All companies that will not be used with assault battalions should 
be specialized on barrage work, but not to the exclusion of some exer- 
cises with assault battalions. If the division is in for many days, 
all units may serve with front-line battalions. 

Before an attack, special emphasis should be laid on safety angles 
for overhead fire. All noncommissioned officers and gunners should 
be tested. 

All organizations should be exercised in formations suitable to 
cross terrain of the kind that will be encountered. 

Agents, runner and signalmen should be given special training. 

All gunners should be given some target practice. 

Replacements should be distributed uniformly throughout the 
company, if necessary, transferring old men from one squad to an- 
other. It is seldom advisable to transfer men out of their companies. 

Preparation for the Attack— The Prepared Attack 

The division machine-gun officer prepares the machine-gun plan. 
For sample machine-gun annex see pages 88-91, 97-100. 

The following points should be considered in preparation of the 
machine-gun annex. 

1. The division machine-gun officer obtains and studies carefully 
all information of the enemy, giving to the various units that of 
special interest to them. 

2. Cooperation of artillery and machine guns. 

3. Infantry formations, line of departure and rate of advance 
must be communicated to all machine-gun units. 

4. A machine-gun company is usually employed with each assault 
battalion. 



180 Employment of Machine Guns 

5. A machine-gun company is not employed with a reserve bat- 
talion unless there is a special reason for such employment. 

6. Machine-gun sections or platoons may be assigned to con- 
necting groups. 

7. Make the maximum use of overhead fire. 

8. All guns not assigned to infantry units should participate in 
barrage fire in the beginning of the attack. 

9. Machine guns employ standing barrages, not rolling barrages. 

10. Enfilade and oblique fire will be employed as far as practi- 
cable. 

11. Units designated for duty with infantry organizations should 
report for instructions twenty-four hours before the attack. 

12. Units designated for barrage fire should reconnoiter and pre- 
pare positions, and prepare indirect fire data the second night before 
the attack. Positions should be occupied at least four hours before 
the attack. 

13. Spare barrels must be provided for all organizations. 

14. Dumps of ammunition, oil, and water must be provided. 
General assignment of targets is made by the division machine- 
gun annex, but details are left to regimental commanders. 

In forward movement the division machine-gun annex specifies 
general locations for companies, and regimental commanders give 
exact positions. 

During the attack the division machine-gun officer usually does 
not exercise command over any unit. He may, however, command 
all of the machine guns designated for barrage work. The division 
machine-gun officer frequently will control the machine gun-units of 
the division reserve. He frequently will be sent forward to observe 
the machine-gun units during the action. At other times he should 
be at division headquarters. 

The Pursuit 

Machine guns are placed well forward in the pursuing columns. 

They are used to stop the enemy by fire, while the infantry 
attacks. 

All flank columns should have machine guns with them. 

Machine guns with infantry in trucks should attempt to gain and 
hold defiles, bridges, or other points of vantage on the enemy's line 
of retreat. 



Division Machine-Gun Officer 181 

When resistance is encountered, action should be the same as in 
attack. 

A Forward March and Attack in the Open 

In advance guards of a battalion of infantry or less, machine guns 
will be with the reserve. In larger advance guards, machine guns 
will constitute part of both support and reserve. Usually the pro- 
portion of machine guns will be one machine-gun company for each 
battalion of infantry. 

In the main body, all machine-gun companies of a regiment ordi- 
narily should follow the leading battalion of the regiment. 

In a meeting engagement a division machine-gun annex is not 
issued. Directions to machine guns are given in the division field 
order. 

The machine guns of a regiment in reserve usually are assigned 
a position near a road and, where it is practicable, are directed to 
support the brigade making the main attack. 

For samples of field orders issued by regimental machine-gun 
officers see pages 58, 71, 74. 

The following are the principal tasks of the machine guns : 

1. To occupy and hold important positions. 

2. To cover the deployment of the infantry and its advance to 
the first fire position. 

3. To support the attack of the infantry. 

4. To assist in the pursuit after capture of the enemy's position. 

5. To assist in consolidation when advance stops. 
Commanders of all machine-gun organizations precede their com- 
mands for reconnaissance, when going forward to take up positions. 

A Retreat 

Machine guns furnish the chief resistance of rear guards. They 
form part of all rear guards larger than a platoon of infantry in the 
proportion of not less than one company to each infantry battalion. 

They habitually retire by echelon. 

They make the miximum use of long and medium-range fire. 

They make the maximum use of surprise. 

They are posted on the flank of the line of march, unless ground 
is suitable for overhead fire. 



182 Employment of Machine Guns 

They must have covered lines of retreat, and must reconnoiter 
same. Machine guns do not make short retirements. 
They make the fullest use of the carts. 

Machine-Gun Data 

Organisation. — Each infantry battalion has a machine-gun com- 
pany of 8 guns, making a total of 96 guns for the division. 

Transportation: 

Machine-gun 
company 

Carts, combat, 1 mule 16 

Carts, ration, 2 mule 1 

Carts, water, 2 mule 1 

Kitchen, rolling 1 

Wagons, combat, 4 mule 2 

Wagons, ration and baggage, 4 mule 1 

Horses, riding 8 

Mules, draft 36 

Mules, riding 1 

Bicycles 3 

Motorcycles with side cars 1 

Road Spaces: 

Combat Field 
Troops train train 

Machine-gun section 45 

Machine-gun platoon 90 

Machine-gun company 190 75 35 

Weights: 

Pounds 

Machine gun filled with water 37 

Tripod, model 1918 47 

Ammunition box and filled belt 15^4 

Ammunition, 1,200 rounds in original case 100 

A mmunition Carried : 

Per gun 
Per gun in in 
Per gun combat division 
in carts wagons train 

Ball cartridges, cal. .30 4,000 5,250 2,625 

Tracer cartridges, cal. .30 white 50 100 50 

Armor-piercing cartridges, cal. .30 200 400 200 

Total 4,250 5,750 2,875 



Division Machine-Gun Officer 183 

Total for company: In carts, 34,000; in combat wagons, 46,000; in 

division train, 23,000. 
Pistol ball cartridges, cal. .45, carried per pistol: On the man, 35; 

in combat train, 21 ; in division train, 21. 

Effective Ranges of Machine Guns. — Browning, 2,600 meters; 
Vickers, 2,900 meters ; Hotchkiss, 3,500 meters. 

Rates of Fire: 60 rounds per minute. This is the rate used for 
prolonged barrage fire. 

Medium Fire: 120 rounds per minute. This rate cannot be 
maintained for more than 30 minutes. 

Rapid Fire: 250 rounds per minute. This rate is used in re- 
sponse to S. O. S. calls and for the first minute or two of a barrage 
to cover an attack. It can be maintained for only a few minutes. 

Harassing Fire: Usual rate 1,000 rounds per hour. The fire is 
intermittent and may be carried out at any rate. 

Frontage Covered by One Gun — Frontal barrage : The normal 
frontage for one gun executing a frontal barrage is as follows : 

At ranges less than 1,200 meters, 60 meters. 
At ranges from 1,400 to 1,800 meters, 60 to 40 meters. 
At ranges from 1 ,800 to 2,200 meters, 40 to 25 meters. 
At ranges from 2,200 to 2,600 meters, 25 to 15 meters. 

If the objective is on a gentle reverse slope the danger space is 
increased and the frontage can be correspondingly increased. 

Oblique and Flanking Barrages: The fact that a barrage may be 
oblique or flanking does not affect the frontage that can be covered 
by each gun, other things being equal, except within the zone of the 
battle sight. On account of shallow depth of barrage, two parallel 
flanking barrages about 50 yards apart should be employed. 

Graphs. — For use of trajectory graphs pages 219-220. 

For use of searching reverse slope graph see pages 220-222. 

Orders. — For form of machine gun (annex attack) see pages 
39-41. 

For sample paragraph of division order pertaining to machine 
guns in the attack see page 84. 

For sample machine-gun annex of a division in a prepared attack 
see pages 88-91. 

For sample of paragraph of regimental order pertaining to ma- 
chine guns in the attack see page 96. 



184 Employment of Machine Guns 

For sample machine-gun annex of a regiment in a prepared at- 
tack see pages 97-100. 

For sample orders of regimental machine-gun officers in a meet- 
ing engagement see pages 71, 74—75. 

For sample orders of a machine-gun battalion in reserve which 
has been ordered to support the attack see page 58. 

For form of machine-gun annex (defense) see page 119. 

For sample paragraph of division orders pertaining to machine 
guns in defense see page 122. 

For sample division machine-gun annex on the defensive see 
pages 125-128. 

For sample regimental machine-gun annex in defense see pages 
133-135. 

For machine-gun standing orders for a defensive sector see pages 
116, 117. 

For form for inspection of machine-gun organization see page 
118. 



Chapter XVIII 

Organization and Equipment of the Machine Guns 
of a Cavalry Division 

Table 429-P. — Machine-Gun Troop, Cavalry Machine-Gun Squadron 

(Peace Strength) January 11, 1921 

Road Space— 

Tonnage 





1 


2 


3 


4 


5 


6 


7 


8 


9 


1 


Units 


_C 

u 

_jo 

.Is 

'o 
<u 

a 

CO 


u 

<D 

6 
n 

"o 

1 

CO 


3 

tfl 

C 
<L> 

a 

O 
O 

u 

H 


tO 
(H 
<D 
t-i 

cfl 

cr 
■a 

rt 

41 

a 
o 
o 

la 

S 


C 
O 


to 

•a 

d 

3 
O 1 
w 

o 
a 

O 

o 
"S 

0, 
O 


CO 

C 
O 
O 

ta 

0) 

1 


d 

o 

8 

13 
o 


? 


Captains 






1 










1 


3 


Lieutenants 






1 




1 


3 


3 














4 


Total commissioned 






1 


1 




1 


3 


4 












5 


First sergeant 






1 

4 
<D* 
(1)6 

(Dh 

(1)6 

3h 
(1) 
(7) 
15 
(7) 
(1) 
(1) 










j 


6 


Sergeants, incl 






2* 




7 


6 


10 


7 


Mess 








8 


Stable 



















Supply 
















10 


Miscellaneous 






(7) 










11 


Corporals, incl 






1 


7 


6 


9 


12 


Troop clerk 








13 


Liaison agents 
















14 


Privates 1st class and privates, incl 






7 


lOfe 


77 


66 


81a 


IS 


Bugler 








16 


Cooks, assistant 


5th 
4th 
5th 
4th 
4th 
6th 
6th 














17 


Cooks, first 












18 


Gunners, assistant 




(1) 


(7) 


(6) 




19 


Horseshoers 




(7) 
(1) 
(1) 






70 


Mechanics, chief 












71 


Mechanics 












27 


Messengers 












73 


Messengers 


(DA 
(l)* 




(1) 
(1) 


(3) 
(3) 




74 


Orderlies 






(D* 

(1) 

(DA 




?5 


Saddler 


5th 






76 


Miscellaneous 




(9)(5A) 






















77 


Total enlisted 






73 


(4) 


(11) 


(76) 


78 


101 












78 


AGGREGATE 






74 


(5) 


(11) 


(27) 


81 


105 












?Q 


Horses, riding (d) 






75 
3m 


(6) 


(11) 
(5) 


78 
(10) 


84 
30 


109 


.SO 


Horse, pack 






33 












31 


Total animals 






78 


(6) 


(16) 


(38) 


114 


147 












37 


Bolos 










(7) 

(1) 

(5) 

(11) 


(4) 

(7) 

(17) 

(77) 

1 


17 

6 

36 

81 

3 


17 


33 


Machine guns, heavy 










6 


34 


Rifles 






11 

74 


(2) 

(5) 


47 


35 


Pistols 






105 


36 








4 

















(o) The troop includes: 77 Privates first class; 54 Privates. Summary of Specialist Ratings: 
4th Class, 4; 5th Class, 8; 6th Class, 5. (b) Carries the guidon and has charge of led horses. 
(c) Range finder. (d) Two horses per officer. (h) Armed with rifle. (») One as second in command, 
one as file closer. (k) Five as horse leaders. (w) One picket line and pannier; one kitchen outfit; 
one rations. 

185 



186 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Table 429-W. Machine-Gun Troop, Cavalry Machine-Gun Squadron 

(War Strength.) February 3, 1921 

Road Space 

Tonnage 





1 


2 


3 


4 


5 


6 


7 


8 


9 


1 


Units 


be 
C 

"5 

u 

.Is 

'o 

a 


u 

u 

6 

C 

o 

e 
>. 


m 

u 
u 

•e 

3 
O* 

"S 

1) 

a 
o 
o 

u 

H 


in 

<u 

!3 

3 
CT 

a 

V 

a 

o 
o 

OS 

s 


Cj 

3 
cr 
m 
<u 

c 
O 


t) 
cd 
3 
O" 

CO 

O 
& 

C 

o 
o 

JJS 

"o. 
o 


to 

a 
o 
o 
-t-> 

c3 
O. 
4> 
U 

U 


6, 
o 
o 

o 


2 




1 
le 












3 








1 




1 


3 


4 












4 








7 


1 




1 


3 


5 












S 








1 

4 

(DA 

(1)6 

(1)6 
(l)c 

3fc 
(1) 
(2) 
19 

(2) 

(2) 

(1) 










1 


6 








2* 




2 


6 


10 


7 










8 


Stable 
















9 


















10 








(2) 










11 








1 


2 


6 


9 


17. 










13 


















14 








7 


lOfc 


77 


66 


85a 


15 










16 




5th 
4th 
5th 
4th 
4th 
6th 
6th 














17 














18 






(1) 


(2) 


(6) 




1Q 






(3) 
(1) 
(1) 
(4) A 






70 














71 














77 














73 




(D* 
(DA 




(1) 
(1) 


(3) 
(3) 




74 








(2)* 

(2) 

CD* 




25 




5th 






7.6 






(9) (5) 






















77 








77 


(4) 


(ID 


(26) 


78 


105 












78 


AGGREGATE 






29 


(5) 


(11) 


(27) 


81 


110 












79 








31 

3to 


(6) 


(ID 
(5) 


(28) 
(10) 


84 
30 


115 


30 








33 












31 








34 


(6) 


(16) 


(38) 


114 


148 












32 


Bolos 










(2) 

(1) 

(5) 

(ID 


(4) 

(2) 

(12) 

(27) 

1 


12 

6 

36 

81 

3 


12 


33 












6 


34 


Rifles 






17 

79 

7 


(7) 
(5) 


48 


35 


Pistols 






110 


36 








5 

















(a) The troop includes: 78 Privates First Class; 57 Privates. Summary of Specialist Ratings: 4th 
Class, 5; 5th Class. 10; 6th Class, 5. (&) Carries the guidon and has charge of led horses. (c) Range 

finder. (d) Two horses per officer. (e) Liaison officer. (h) Armed with rifle. (i) One as 

second in command, one as file closer. (k) Five as horse leaders. (to) One picket line and pannier; 

one kitchen outfit; one rations. 



Table 430-P. Cavalry Machirre-Gun Squadron 

(Peace Strength.) January 11, 1921 



Road Space- 
Tonnage — 





1 


2 

be 
ra 

.2 

o 

d> 
a 

CO 


3 

u 

£ 

C 

O 
.C 

E 
>> 

CO 


4 


5 6 


7 


8 


9 


10 


11 


12 


13 




Units 


Squadron headquarters and 
headquarters detachment. 


c 




6 

0) 

H 


c 


•c 

05 
3 
C 

6 

73 



a 

-a 
•d 

<u 

E 

4) 

< 






t/3 

cr 
■a 

c 
o 

•S 

C 
CO 


o 

m 

U 

o 
•v 
c 
a 

CO 


V 

C 
O 

Is 

'2 

B 
E 
o 
O 


Transpor- 
tation 
Section. 


O 

Eh 






CTT) 


a 
o 
o 
u 


00 
a) 

a. 

< 


? 


Lieut, col. or maj 






1 










. 1 


"'3' 

" '9' 
12 


1 
3 
2 
9 
15 




- 


3 


Captains 
















3 
4 
9 
17 


4 








2(c) 










2 


2/2 (lr) 


5 


Lieutenants 














6 








3 










3 


2 


















7 


First sergeants 


















3 


3 
2 




3 

2 


8 










2 

(1) 
(1) 
1 
(1) 








2 




9 


Squad, serg.-maj 
















10 


Squad, supply serg 
























11 












1 




2 


30 


32 


2A(1») 


34 


1? 


Personnel 








13 


Wagon-master 










(1)« 














14 


Corporals, incl 










1 

(1) 
2 




1 


27 


28 




28 


15 


Signal, wire 
















16 










7 


7 


12 


28 


243 
(6) 
(3) 
(3) 
(18) 
(6) 
(3) 
(3) 


271 


8(2n3z;A) 


279 


17 


Buglers 








18 


Cooks, assistant 


5th 
4th 
5th 
4th 
4th 
6th 
4th 
6th 
6th 






















19 


Cooks, first 






(1) 
















20 


Gunners, assistant 

Horseshoers 
















71 










(l)m 












22 


Mechanics, chief 




















?3 


Mechanics 






















24 


Med. dept. technicians. . . . 
Med. dept. technicians. . . . 

Messengers 

Messengers 


















(1) 
(3) (lw) 




25 






















26 
















(12) 
(9) 






27 






















28 


Motorcyclists 

Orderlies 


6th 






(1) 
(3) 
















79 










(12) 
(3) 








30 


Saddlers 


5th 
6th 
6th 




















31 


Scouts 






(2) 
















32 


Wagoners 

Wagoners 




(3) 
(3) 


(6) 
(6) 












33 




















34 


Miscellaneous 










(2) 
3 




(165) 
303 








35 


Total enlisted 








10 


8 


12 


33 


336 


10 


346 












36 


AGGREGATE 






3 


10 


3 


8 


12 


36 


315 


351 


12 


363 










S7 








6 


9 


3 
1 






18 

1 

8 

? 

60 

89 


327 
99 

426' 


3456 

100 

8 

2 

60 

515 


9 


354 

100 

8 


38 












39 


Horses, draft 










2 

2 
24c 
28 


6 

36 

42 




40 


Mules, riding 














41 














4 
13 


64 

528 


4? 








6 


9 


4 










43 


Wagons, escort (combat) . . . 














6 
3 

"3* 


6 

4 

4 
4 




6 

4 

4 

4 




6 

4 

4 
4 


44 


Wagons, escort (ration, 












1 

4 

1 




45 


Wagons, escort (forage, 
pioneer) 














46 
















47 


Wagons, medical, 4-mule. . . 












1 


48 










1 








1 


'36' 

18 

141 

315 

12 


1 

36 

18 

170 

351 

17 


1 
36 


49 


Bolos 
















50 


Machine guns, heavy 




















18 


51 


Rifles 








6 
10 

2 


3 
3 


8 
8 


12 
12 


29 
36 

5 




170 


52 


Pistols 






3 
3 




351 
17 


53 


Sabers 









The Squadron Headquarters Detachment includes: 9 Privates First Class; 19 Privates. The total 
Squadron (Cavalry Personnel) includes: 90 Privates First Class; 181 Privates. Summary of Specialist 
Ratings for total Squadron (Cavalry Personnel): 4th Class, 14; 5th Class, 24; 6th Class, 27. (a) The 
Squadron Staff consists of: Adjutant; Intelligence Officer; Plans and Training Officer; Supply Officer. 
In peace one of the Squadron Staff Officers combines the duties of Adjutant and Supply Officer and one 
the duties of Intelligence Officer and Plans and Training Officer. (b) Includes two horses per officer 
(c) Four extra to replace sick, etc. (h) Mounted on horse. (m) Mounted on mule. (v) Veterinary' 



Table 430-W. 



Road Space- 
Tonnage 



Cavalry Machine-Gun Squadron 

February 3, 1921 





1 


2 


3 


4 


5 


6 


7 


8 


9 


10 


11 


12 


13 




Units 


M 
to 

CO 

.5 

'o 

0) 

a 


u 

CD 

■a 
S 
c 
o 

X) 

6 
>> 


Squadron headquarters and 
headquarters detachment. 


w 
i 
g 



ca 

S CO 

a, ft 

£ 


a 

M 
<L 
C 

co 

B-S 

-3 co 

CO £ 

oa 1 


i 

<D 
CJ 

•3 

<D 
fi 

CD 

Sg 
I 6 






ca 
a w 

M 


CD 

u 

o 

•° ~ 
a c 

ca.O 
CO CD 


c 
o 

Is 
o 

'3 • 
3 5 
fi-2 
8 u 
o £ 


Transpor- 
tation 
section. 


"c3 





1 


T3 en 
3.3*0 


ft 




CD 
<D 
U 

H 


CD 

I 

bo 
<9 


2 


Lieut, col. or maj 






i 

la 








1 


'"3" 


1 

4 




1 

4 

2 

14 

21 


3 


Captains 
















4 


Captains or lieuts 














2h(lv) 


s 


Lieutenants 






la 
4 










2 
4 


12 
15 


14 
19 


6 
















2 






— 










7 


First sergeants 
















3 


3 
2 




3 

2 


$ 


Staff sergeants, incl 








2 
(1) 

(1) 

(1) 








2 




9 


Squad, serg.-mai 
















10 


Squad, supply serg 
























11 












1 




2 


30 


32 


2h(lv) 


34 


12 










13 


Wagon-master 










(l)m 














14 










(1) 


1 




2 


27 


29 


1 


30 


is 


Bugler 












16 


Signal, vyire 








(1) 
3 
















17 










14 


8 


12 


37 


255 
(6) 


292 


10(5/*3i/fe) 


302 


1S 


Buglers 








10 


Clerks 


5th 
5th 
4th 
5th 
4th 
4th 
6th 
4th 
6th 
6th 






(2) 
(1)«J 

(1) 
















^O 


Cooks, assistant 










(6) 

(3) 
(18) 
(9) 
(3) 
(3) 








''I 


Cooks, first 
















22 


Gunners, assistant 

Horseshoers 
















?1 










(2)m 












24 






















2S 
























26 


Med. dept. technicians. . . . 
Med. dept. technicians. . . . 


















(1) 
(3) (It/) 




97 






















28 






(2) 










(12^ 
(9)' 






29 


















3n 


Motorcycles 


6th 






(1) 
(5) (lei 
















31 




) 








(15) 
(6) 








32 




5th 
6th 
6th 




















S3 








(2) 
















34 






(3) 


(6) 








(1) 




35 




















36 












(3) 
4 




(165) 
315 


358' 


(5) 
13 




37 


Total enlisted 








18 


9 


12 


43 


371 














38 


AGGREGATE 






4 


18 


4 


9 


12 


47 


330 


377 


15 


392 








— 


39 






8 


17 


4 
1 






29 
1 

3 
60 
101 


345 
99 

"444' 


3746 

100 

8 

3 

60 

545 


13 


387 


40 












100 

8 


41 


Horses, draft 










3 
24c 
29 


36" 
42 




42 
















3 


43 














4 
17 


64 


41 








8 


17 


5 


562 












45 
















6 

3 

"3' 


6 

4 

4 
4 




6 

4 

4 

4 




<S 


46 


Wagons, escort (ration, 












1 

4 




4 


47 


Wagons, escort (forage, 














4 


48 
















4 


49 














1 

1 


1 


50 










1 








1 


"36' 

18 

144 

330 

15 


1 

36 

18 

180 

377 
21 


2 


si 


Bolos 














36 


52 






















18 


S3 


Rifles 








11 

18 
2 


4 
4 


9 
9 


12 
12 


36 

47 

6 




180 


54 


Pistols 






4 




377 


55 


Sabers 








21 



The Squadron Detachment includes : 12 Privates First Class; 25 Privates. The total Squadron (Cavalry 
Personnel) includes: 96 Privates First Class; 196 Privates. Summary of Specialist Ratings for total 
Squadron (Cavalry Personnel): 4th Class, 18; 5th Class, 33; 6th Class, 29. (a) The Squadron Staff con- 
sists of: Adjutant; Intelligence Officer; Plans and Training Officer; Supply Officer. The Adjutant is a 
captain. One lieutenant acts as both Intelligence Officer and Plane and Training Officer. One lieutenant 
is Supply Officer. (6) Includes two horses per officer. (c) Four extra to replace sick, etc. (d) 
Officers' Mess. (h) Mounted on horses. (m) Mounted en mule. (v) Veterinary. 



Cavalry Organization and Equipment 189 

Organization 

The Division Machine-Gun Squadron, Motorized and the Ma- 
chine-Gun Troop of the Cavalry Regiment no longer exist. The 
machine guns of a cavalry division consist of only two machine-gun 
squadrons assigned to the two brigades. This gives a total of six 
troops of six guns each, making a total of thirty-six guns for the 
division. 

The machine-gun squadron is both an administrative and a tacti- 
cal unit, although its use as a tactical unit will be rare. 

The machine-gun troop, platoon, and squad have functions similar 
to the machine-gun company, platoon and squad of the infantry 
division. 

In general the duties of the personnel are similar to the duties of 
the personnel in the machine-gun organization of the infantry divi- 
sion. The most marked departure is in the squad, the squad of the 
machine-gun troop having five horse leaders, where the squad of the 
machine-gun company has two drivers for carts. 

Equipment 

A tabulation of the main articles of organizational equipment of 
Machine-Gun Squadrons and Troops is given in Tables 429-P, 429- 
W, 430-P, and 430-W. The following extract from Circular No. 
290, War Department, gives the basic allowances of equipment for 
Machine-Gun Squadrons and Troops : 

WAR DEPARTMENT 

Washington, November 7, 1921. 

Extract 
Circular 
No. 290 

Basic Allowances of Equipment Special for Cavalry, Table IV-B- 
Supplemental to Circular No. 169, War Department, 1921 — Rescis- 
sion of Circular 134, War Department, 1920. 

Circular No. 134, War Department, 1920, is rescinded and the 
following table with notes substituted therefor. This table with notes 
prescribes the basic allowances of equipment special for organizations 
of Cavalry up to and including brigade, in addition to the equipment 
authorized in Circular No. 169, War Department, 1921. (Tables of 



190 Employment of Machine Guns 

basic allowances.) Abbreviations for use in this circular are author- 
ized as follows : 

Cavalry brigade Brig. 

Cavalry regiment Regt. 

Cavalry squadron (including Cavalry training squadron Sq. 

Cavalry machine-gun squadron MG Sq. 

Cavalary brigade headquarters troop Brig Hq Tr. 

Cavalary regimental headquarters troop Regt Hq Tr. 

Both the brigade and regimental headquarters troop Hq Tr. 

Cavalry service troop Serv Tr. 

Cavalry troop (including Cavalry training center troop and 

special troop) Tr. 

Cavalry machine-gun troop (including Cavalry separate ma- 
chine-gun troop ) Mg Tr. 

Machine gun Mg. 

Machine rifle (automatic rifle) Mr. 

Sergeant Sgt. 

Training center Tc. 

Platoon Plat. 

Table IV-B. — Basic allowances of equipment special for Cavalry, 
in addition to the equipment authorized in Circular No. 169, War 
Department, 1921. 

Section I. Armament. 

II. Engineer equipment. 

III. Fire-control equipment. 

IV. Machine-gun equipment. 
V. Miscellaneous equipment. 

VI. Signaling equipment. 
VII. Transportation equipment: 
Animal 
Pack 
Vehicle. 
VIII. Notes. 



Cavalry Organization and Equipment 191 



Branch Articles of Equipment 1 
Ammunition . 



Cartridges, ball, cal. .30 . A — 



Cartridges, ball, cal. .30. A 

Tracer (red and white) A 
cal. .30. 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 

For training purposes. — For an- 
nual allowances of cartridges, 
rifle, cal. .30 (ball, tracer, 
armor-piercing, blank, range 
dummy, dummy, and gallery 
practice), shotgun, sporting 
type, and pistol, cal. .45 (ball, 
blank, and range dummy) 
for training purposes see 
Special Regulations. Until 
cartridges, blank, cal. .45, are 
available for issue, cartridges, 
blank, cal.. 38 will be issued in 
lieu thereof at an annual al- 
lowance of 1,000 rounds per 
M. G. Tr. 

For combat. — Ammunition for 
combat is carried on the per- 
son or horse, in combat wag- 
ons, and in the ammunition 
train. Allowances for this 
purpose are indicated below. 
Ammunition is issued to in- 
dividuals only when ordered 
by C. O. 

A. On person or pack horse. — 90 
per E.M. armed with a rifle. 
(Where cartridges, tracer and 
armor-piercing are issued, 
deduct an equal number of 
cartridges, ball, from the 
above allowance.) 4,875 per 
M. G. carried on pack horses. 

In combat train. — 110 per rifle 
(60 rounds loaded in cav. 
bandoleer), 5,525 per M.G. 
(includes 22}^ loaded belts) 
for all units equipped with 
combat wagons. 

In ammunition train. — 60 per 
rifle, and 6,000 per M.G. 

A. On person or pack horse. 
40 per scout, 50 per M. G. 
(carried on pack horse). 

In combat train. — 10 per rifle, 
and 100 per M. G. 



A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



192 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Branch Articles of Equipment 1 



Armor-piercing, cal. .30 . A 



Pistol, cal. .45 A 



o 


Bolo 




A 


o 


Guns, machine, 

ing. 
Pistols: 


Brown- 


A 


o 


Automatic, cal. 


.45.... 


A 





Very, 25-mm. . 




A 



O Pyrotechnics A 

O Revolvers, cal. .38 A 

O Rifles, cal. .30 A 



O Sabers, cavalry A — 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 
In ammunition train. — 5 per 

rifle, and 100 per M. G. 
A. On person or pack horse. — 

200 per M. G. (carried on 

pack horse). 
In combat train. — 400 per M.G. 
In ammunition train. — 400 per 

M.G. 
A. On a person. — 21 per pistol. 
In combat train. — 21 per pistol. 
In ammunition train. — 21 per 

pistol. 
A. 2 per M. G. squad. 
A. 1 per M. G. squad. 



A. 1 per O., W.O. and E.M. 

A. 2 per M. G. in Tr. (Until 
available for issue Very pis- 
tols, 10 gauge will be issued.) 

In ammunition train 

A. As ordered and directed by 
CO. 

A. 8 per M. G. Tr. (Issued only 
. until device for firing blank 
ammunition with pistol, cal. 
.45 is available for issue.) 

A. 1 to each of following E.M. : 
Sgts. (mess and supply), cor- 
porals (troop clerk), messen- 
gers, orderlies, scouts, 5 
pvts. per M. G. squad 
(horse leaders) , motorcy- 
clists, Pvt. misc. (Tr. Hq.), 
and all E.M. of communica- 
tion and transportation sec- 
tions of Squadron Hq. and 
wagoners, 

A. 1 to each O, W.O. In M.G. 
units no E.M. carry sabers 
except staff sgts. and supply 
sgts. 



1 A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



Cavalry Organization and Equipment 193 



Branch 
E 



O 



SECTION II 
Engineering Equipment 



Articles of Equipment 1 
Glass, reading, 4^ inch, 
with case. 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 
— A. 1 per M. G. Sq. 



SECTION III 
Fire-Control Equipment 
Alidade protractor A 



Angle of site instrument, 
with case. 



Boxes, night-firing, or A 

night-firing device. 
Clinometer, machine gun, A 

with case. 
Compass, lensatic, with A 

case. 

Protractor, semicircular, A 
Model 1918. 

Range finder, 80-cm. A 
base, with case and 
tripods. 

Rules : 

Musketry A 



— A. 1 per M. G. Sq., M. G. Tr., 

and M. G. Plat. To T.C. 
units at the rate of 1 per 
M.G. 
A — A. 1 per M.G. Tr. and M.G. 

Plat. To T.C. units at rate 
of 1 per M.G. 

— A. 1 per M.G. 

— 1 per M.G. 

— 1 per M.G. Sq., and M.G. Tr. 
To T.C. units at rate of 1 per 
M.G. 

— A. 1 per M.G. Sq., M.G. Tr- 
and M.G. Plat. To T.C. 
units at rate of 1 per M.G. 

— A. 1 per Sq. and M.G. Tr. 



Zinc 



Sights: 

Front area, anti-air- A — 

craft machine gun. 
Luminous, front and A — 

rear machine gun. 
Machine gun, pano- A — 

ramie, complete. 
Squares, zinc A — 



Stakes, aiming A — 



A 


. 1 per N.C.O. 


in Tr. 


and 




M.G. Tr. not 


issued 


field 




glasses. 






A 


. 1 per M.G. Sq. 


, M.G. 


Tr., 




and M.G. Plat. 


To 


T.C. 




units at rate of 1 


. per M.G. 


A 

A 


. 1 per 2 M.G. 
. 1 per M.G. 







A. 1 per M.G. Tr., T.C. Spe- 
cial Troop and M.G. 

A. 1 per M.G. Sq., M.G. Tr., 
and M.G. Plat. To T.C. 
units at rate of 1 per M.G. 

A. 1 per M.G. 



1 A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



194 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Branch 
A.G. 



O 



Articles of Equipment 1 
Tables of fire for Brown- 
ing machine gun. 



A — 



Tables, plane, 40-cm. A 
square, with declinator 
attached, and tripod. 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 
A. 1 per M.G., 2 per M.G. Sq., 

and 1 per officer in M.G. Tr. 

and M.G. Plat. T.C. units. 
A. 1 per M.G. Sq., M.G. Tr., 

and M.G. Plat. To T.C. 

units at rate of 1 per M.G. 



SECTION IV 



Machine-Gun Equipment 

Barrels, spare, for Brown- A — A. 1 per M.G. 

ing machine gun. 
Belts, ammunition, 250 A — A. 43 per M.G. 

rounds. 
Belt, filling machine, with A 

box and spare parts. 





Boxes: 







Ammunition 


A 


o 


Spare parts 


A 


o 


Water 


A 





Cases, spare parts, or 

gunner's pouch. 
Covers : 


A 





Canvas, machine gun.. 


A 


o 


Canvas, spare barrel. . 


A 





Devices, steam condens- 
ing. 


A 





Devices for firing blank 
ammunition. 


A 


o 


Flash hider 


A 





Gun book, machine-gun. 


A 


A.G. 


Handbook, machine-gun. 


A 





Hanger: 






Ammunition for ma- 


A 




chine gun. 






Machine gun 


A 




Tripod 


A 


O 


Mittens, asbestos, pair.. 


A 


Q 


Pick mattocks, large .... 


A 



A. 2 per M.G. plat. (1 in re- 
serve, normally carried on 
combat wagon, but may be 
carried by platoons, when de- 
tached). Each box carries 
12 extra needles. 

A. 1 per ammunition belt, 250 

rounds. 
A. 1 per M.G. (see note 6). 
A. 4 per M.G. 
A. 1 per M.G. (see note 7). 



— A. 1 per M.G. 

— A. 1 per square barrel. 

— A. 1 per M.G. 

— A. 1 per M.G. 

— A. 1 per M.G. 

— A. 1 per M.G. 

— A. 1 per M.G. 

— A. 4 per M.G. when available 

for issue. 

— A. 1 per M.G. when available 

for issue. 

— A. 1 per tripod when available 

for issue. 

— A. 1 per M.G. 

— A. 1 per M.G. 



1 A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



Cavalry Organization and Equipment 195 

Branch Articles of Equipment 1 Remarks and Basis of Issue 

O Rods,cleaning, for Brown- A — A. 1 per M.G. 

ing machine gun. 

Q Shovels, short handled . . A — A. 1 per M.G. 

O Tripod, gun, Model 1918. A — A. 1 per M.G. 



SECTION V 
Miscellaneous Equipment 



Bags, water, canvas, pair. A 
Bandoleers, cavalry A 



Blades, machine clipping — 
extra (upper and 
lower). 

Bodies, picket pin, M. A 
1910 with eyes. 



Bridle, halter M. 1910.. . A — 

Brushes, whitewash — B 

Buckets, watering, canvas. A — 



Cans, galvanized iron 



A — 



Cases : 

Map or dispatch A 

Record, noncommis- A 
sioned officers. 

Container, saddle soap, A 

size 2 ounce. 
Cooking outfit, pack type A 



Covers, canvas, rigging . 



A — 



A. 1 per M.G. Tr. 

A. 1 per E.M. armed with the 
rifle and M.G. Tr. in squad- 
ron. Normally carried in 
combat wagons and issued to 
troops when separated from 
them or when engagement is 
pending. 

B. 12 upper and 12 lower per 
clipping machine. 

A. 2 per field line and 1 per 
every 100 feet of length of 
line or major fraction there- 
of. 

A. 1 per pack horse. 

B. 1 per 25 animals or major 
fraction thereof. 

A. 1 per 8 riding or pack ani- 
mals or major fraction there- 
of. 

A. 4 per M.G. Tr. (2 large and 
2 small carried nested in 
spring wagon). 

A. 1 per duty sgt. 

A. 1 per 1st sgt., master sgt., 

staff and supply sgts. of M. 

G. Sq. and all sgts. 
A. 1 per mounted E.M. 

A. 1 per M.G. Tr. (Until new 
type is available, cooking 
outfit, mountain artillery, 
will be issued in lieu thereof. 
(See note 8.) 

A. 1 per M.G. in equipment. 



1 A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



196 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Branch Articles of Equipment 1 
O Devices for firing blank 

ammunition with pis- 
tol, cal. .45. 
O Glasses, field, type EE . . 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 
— A. 1 per pistol, cal. .45 (when 
available for issue). 



A — 



A. Issued in war to O., master 
sgts. (except Serv. Tr.), 1st 
sgts., duty sgts., and to 
scouts as follows : 1 per scout 
in M.G. Sq. Issued in peace 
to 1st sgts. in M.G. Tr., 1 per 
plat.in M.G. Tr. and to M.G. 
Sq. at rate of 1 per scout. 

Q Halters, complete A — A. 1 per pack horse and extra 

draft mule. 

Q Hammers, sledge A — A. 1 per field picket line. 

O Holster, pistol, Very A — A. 1 per Very pistol. 

Q Lariat, with strap A — A. 1 per E.M. mounted on 

horse. 

Q Machine, clipping A — A. 1 per M.G. Tr. 

Q Machines, sharpening for — B B. 1 per M.G. Sq. 

clipping blades. 
Q Padlocks, with keys, hasp A — A. 2 per M.G. Tr. 

and chain. 
Rope: 
Q Picket line, field, feet. . A — A. Issued at the rate of 23^ 

feet per animal. 
Q Picket line, 1M inch or — B B. As directed by CO. 

cable with necessary 
posts. 

Q Tie, halter, extra A — A. 1 per 8 animals or major 

fraction thereof. 

Q Tie, halter, white — B B. 1 per animal for ceremonies 

(only one issued for officers' 

mounts, none for extra 

mules). 

Q Sacks, supply (Nos. 1 A — A. 1 each of No. 1 and No. 2 

and 2). per M.G. Tr. (for leather and 

saddlers' supplies). 

Q Saddlers' supplies A — A. See note 9. 

Q Saddle, McClellan (extra) A — A. 1 per officer's second mount. 
AG Scorebook (Soldiers' A — A. 1 per O, and E.M. per year 
Handbook of the Rifle). firing range rifle practice. 

Q Shovels, scoop — B B. 1 per M.G. Sq., and M.G. 

Tr. 

Q Sponges, 4-inch A — A. 1 per mounted E.M. 

Q Tanks, water, canvas, M. A — A. 1 per M.G. Tr. and M.G.Sq. 

1912. 
Q Tape, metallic, 50-foot... A — A. 1 per M.G. Tr. 

1 A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



Cavalry Organization and Equipment 197 



SECTION VI 
Signaling Equipment 

Branch Articles of Equipment 1 Remarks and Basis of Issue 

S Bags, tool, service A — A. 1 per M.G. Sq. for use with 

telephone detail (see note 10). 
Batteries: 

S Type BA-9 A — A. 3 per telephone, type EE-5 

(2 spare). 

S Type BA-10 A — A. 4 per call bell (2 spare). 

Q Bells, vibrating, 4-ohm. .A — A. 1 per M.G. Sq. 
S Blank forms: 

Delivery sheets A — A. 200 per M.G. Sq. 

S Register sheets A — A. 100 per M.G. Sq. 

Q Buttons, push A — A. 1 per call bell. 

S Chests, type BC-5 A — A. 1 per M.G. Sq. for use with 

telephone and radio systems. 

S Cipher device A — A. 1 per M.G. Sq. 

S Clips, Frankel, testing. . . A — A. 2 per telephone, EE-5. 

S Fuses, monocord A — A. 2 per telephone line (for 

switchboards). 

S Ground rods, type GP-16 A — A. 2 per switchboard. 
S Kits: 

Inspector's pocket .... A — A. 1 per telephone switchboard 

(see note 11). 
S Panels: 

Squadron set, type AP- A — A. 1 per MG. Sq. 

29. 

Troop set, type AP-30 A — A. 1 per M.G. Tr. 

S Reels, Type RL-9 A — A. 1 per M.G. Sq. 

S Sets: 

Monocord, operator's A — A. 1 per monocord switch- 
type EE-64. board. 

S Signs, location A — A. 1 per M.G. Sq. 

S Strips, terminal, 5 pair . . A — A. 2 per M.G. Sq. 
S Switchboard: 

Monocord telephone 4 A — A. 1 per M.G. Sq. 
line, type BD-9. 

S Switchboard unit, mono- A — A. 1 per M.G. Sq. 
cord telephone, type 
EE-2. 
Q Tape: 

Friction, pounds A — A. 2 per M.G. Sq. and 1 per 

M.G. Tr. 

Q Rubber, pounds A — M. 1 per M.G. Sq. 



1 A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



198 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Branch Articles of Equipment 1 
S Telephone, Type EE-5 . . A 

Q Tent, wall, small, com- A 

plete. 
S Voltameter, battery, O- A 

35 amperes, 0-11 volts 
Wire: 
S Outpost, single A 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 
A. 2 per M.G. Sq. and 1 per 

M.G. Tr. 
A. 1 per M.G. Sq. (for tele- 
phone exchange) . 
A. 1 per M.G. Sq. 

A. 2 miles per M.G. Sq., 1,000 
feet per M.G. Tr. 



SECTION VII 

Transportation 
Animal 
Horses : 

Draft A — 

Pack A — 

Riding A — 

Mules: 

Draft A — 

Riding A — 



Pack 
Packs, pannier . 



Pack, saddles. 



A. 2 per spring wagon. 

A. 3 per M.G. Tr. (for troop 
pack outfits), 5 per M.G. in 
equipment A, M. G. Sq. (for 
signal supplies). 

A. 2 per O, 1 per E.M., except 
the following : wagoners and 
operators (switchboard). 

A. 4 per combat wagon, ration 
and baggage wagon, and for- 
age and pioneer wagon; and 
4 extra per M. G. Sq. 

A. The following E.M. of M.G. 
Sq. Hq. are mounted on 
mules: Horseshoers, sgts. 
(wagon master). 

A. 1 per draft animal for com- 
bat wagons (see note 20). 

A. Until new type is available 
aparejos will be issued (see 
note 21). 

Troop packs.— 3 per M.G. Tr. 
(1 for picket line, 1 for ra- 
tions, and 1 for cooking out- 
fit) . McClellan saddles may 
be used. 

Machine gun. — 5 per M.G. (for 
hanger equipment, see Sec- 
tion IV, M.G. equipment). 

Signal supplies. — 1 per M.G. 
Sq. 



1 A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



Cavalry Organization and Equipment 199 



Branch Articles of Equipment 1 

Vehicle : Accessories, A 

tools, etc., for vehicles. 



Motorcycles with side A 

cars. 
Wagons: Combat (escort), A 

4-mule. 
Forage and pioneer (es- A 

cort), 4-mule. 
Ration and baggage (es- A 

cort), 4-mule. 
Spring A 



Remarks and Basis of Issue 

— A. For accessories, tools, spare 

parts, harness, etc., see note 
30, Cir. No. 169, W.D. 1921. 

— A. 1 per M.G. Sq. 

— A. 2 per M. G. Tr. 

— A. 4 per M. G. Sq. 

— A. 2 per M.G. Sq. and M.G.Tr. 



— A. 1 per M.G. Sq. and M.G.Tr 
Accessories and harness are 
the same as those authorized 
for spring wagon, complete, 
Model 1918. 
SECTION VIII— Notes 



Note 6: Boxes, Spare Parts and Contents, for Browning machine gun, M. 

cal. .30, water-cooled. 



1917, 



Spare Parts Box Contains: 
1 barrel extension (assembled complete). 
1 bolt (assembled complete). 
1 filling cup. 

1 chamber cleansing brush. 
1 oil can. 

1 tool roll (with contents). 
1 spare parts roll (with contents). 
1 W. D. Document No. 856. 
12 locking springs for pins. 

(a) Breech lock pin. 

(b) Accelerator pin. 

(c) Belt feed pawl pin. 

First Spare Parts Envelope Contains: 
1 water plug (assembled). 

1 water plug and cork (assembled). 

2 buffer disks. 
1 bolt handle. 

Second Spare Parts Envelope Contains: 

3 sear springs (assembled). 

1 breech lock pin (assembled) 1 Identi- 
1 accelerator pin (assembled) J cal. 
1 sear. 

1 belt feed lever pivot (assembled). 

2 barrel locking springs. 

1 belt holding pawl split pin. 



Spare Parts Tin Contains: 
2 firing pin spring pins. 

1 ejector. 

2 ejector pins. ^Identical 
2 extractor cam plunger pins, j 

1 belt holding pawl spring. 
1 trigger pin. 

1 trigger pin spring. 

Spare Parts Roll Contains: 

2 spare parts envelopes (with contents) . 
1 extractor (assembled complete). 

1 accelerator. 

1 spare parts tin (with contents). 

1 belt feed lever. 

1 belt feed slide (assembled complete). 

1 trigger. 

1 firing pin (assembled complete). 

1 barrel plunger spring. 

1 cover extractor spring. 

3 yards asbestos packing. 
1 driving spring. 

Tool Roll Contains: 
1 combination tool. 

1 ruptured cartridge extractor, Mk.III 
3 drifts (small, medium, large). 
1 pair pliers (side cutting). 



A, War set. B, Additional for use at posts and camps. 



200 



Employment of Machine Guns 



Note 7 : Spare Parts Case or Gunner's Pouch 
Such articles as may be required are taken from the spare parts box and 
carried in this pouch. 

Note 9: Saddlers' Supplies 
Only such articles are provided in this table as are considered necessary for 
emergency repairs. 



Articles 


Estimated 6 months' con- 
sumption, which is one- 
half of maximum stock 
authorized to be on 
hand 


Minimum stock 1 




100 sets 
of riding 
equipment 


100 sets 
double 
harness 


50 pack 
outfits 


100 sets 
of riding 
equipment 


100 sets 
double 
harness 


50 pack 
outfits 


Leather: 


4 
4 






2 
2 


















400 




100 






115 

2 

1 

2 
2 

2 


100 
2 


20 
1 

V2 
1 


20 




1 


Rivets and burs, brass, pounds: 
H" No. 12 




y&" No. 10 




















Rivets and burs, copper, pounds: 
No. 8, H" 


" "4"' 

4 
4 
4 


2 




1 


No. 8, 1%" 




2 
2 
2 

2 




No. 9, W 










No. 9, 1" 










No. 12, y 2 " 










Thread, pounds: 

Carpet, No. 18, olive drab 

Saddlers', No. 3, brown 

Saddlers*, No. 10 


1 

1 

2 




V2 

i 




5 

5 
4 


....... 

3 


3 
3 

2 


........ 




1 







1 When in garrison the stock should not be permitted to fall below the amount stated herein. 
These quantities are to be retained for use when ordered into the field. 

To prevent deterioration, the articles held in reserve will be replaced from time to time by 
similar articles received from the estimated 6 months' allowances. 

Supplies not listed above ordinarily used for repairs made in garrison such as 
buckles, buttons, fasteners, hooks, etc., will be issued as directed by the com- 
manding officer, and requisitions for the same will be based on the existing supply 
and allowance tables, together with a knowledge of local conditions. 

Note 10: Bag Tool Service, Complete 
The bag is made of canvas, approximate dimensions 17 inches long, 7 inches 
wide at the base, and 8 inches high; the bag was formerly made of leather 1534 
inches long, 3>}/i inches wide, and 12 inches high. 



Equipment 
1 try-square, steel, 4-inch blade. 
1 chisel, cold 3^-inch. 
1 chisel, wood, 3^-inch socket blade, 

iron ring-topped handle. 
1 hammer claw, 16-ounce. 
1 handle with tools. 
1 knife. 



Equipment 

1 screw driver, 10-inch. 

1 solder, resin core, pound. 

1 wrench, screw, forged 6-inch monkey 
wrench. 

1 wrench, socket, for telephone appa- 
ratus, 4-inch, drawing par. 2 (A) 

1 ratchet brace, 8-inch throw. 



Cavalry Organization and Equipment 201 

1 level, pocket, spirit, 3-inch. Auger bits: 

1 plane, block, 6-inch. 1 J^-inch. 

1 pliers, pair, 6-inch, side-cutting. 1 2^-inch. 

1 pliers, pair, 8-inch, side-cutting. 1 3^-inch. 

1 4-foot rule, folding, boxwood, 8 parts. 1 24-inch. 

1 saw, hack, 10-inch. 1 1-inch. 

1 screw driver, 6-inch. 1 polarity indicator. 

Note 11: Kit, Inspector's Pocket 
1 case, carrying, inspector's pocket kit. 1 file, half-round, with handle, 3-inch. 
1 screw driver and skinning knife com- 1 tweezers, 43^-inch, pair. 

bined. with safety spring. 1 screw driver, 2-inch. 

1 scissors, electrician's, 5-inch. 1 rule, 2-foot, 4-fold, narrow boxwood. 

1 pliers, side-cutting, 5-inch. 

Note 14 : Cavalry Panels 

All panels are of light, portable, deep orange and white cotton cloth for aerial 
signal communication. 

Cavalry squad Cavalry troop 

Article type AP-29 type AP-30 

Case type CS-18 1 1 

Panel type AL-84 1 

Panel type AL-85 1 1 

Panel type AL-86 *10 6 

AL-84: Sq. identification. Circle, 12-foot diameter. 

AL-85 : Cavalry distinguishing and troop identification. A " Y " made from 3 
panels, type AL-86. 

AL-86: Code and distinguishing rectangle, 13^ by 8 feet. 

Note 20: Pack, Outfits, Pannier 
Pack, outfits, pannier, consist of: Olive-drab cotton duck, 24 by 91.25 inches, 
narrow in the center and having a 4-inch ring fastened in chape at each end. A 
flap with one 2.375 inch and two 4-inch rings fastened in chapes is sewed to center 
of top side. Two side bars and side bar connection, equipped with two quarter 
straps, two quarter-strap safes, two cinch straps, and a McClellan saddle cinch, 
are attached to bottom side and used with crupper, which is fastened to rear of 
body to hold pannier pack in place on animal's back. 

Note 21: Pack Saddle 
Until new pack saddles are available for issue this equipment will consist of: 
1 blanket, pack. 1 corona. 

1 blind, pack. 1 crupper. 

1 body, aparejo. 1 sobrejolma. 

1 cinch, aparejo. 

And where special hangers are not now available and included in the special 
equipment to be carried on pack horses, the following articles will also be issued : 

2 covers, pack, or mantas. 1 rope, lash. 
2 ropes, lair. 1 rope, sling. 

* 4 as distinguishing panels. 



Chapter XIX 

The Employment of Cavalry Machine Guns 

The brigade machine-gun squadron will rarely be employed as a 
unit. The cavalry brigade will operate as a rule on such a wide 
front that it will be impracticable for the brigade commander to use 
the machine-gun squadron to advantage under his direct control. 
The troops of these squadrons will usually be assigned to squadrons 
or regiments whose missions are such that they need machine-gun 
support. Should the cavalry make a deliberate, dismounted attack 
where considerable time would be available for preparation these 
battalions might be used as units for indirect fire at the opening 
of the attack. Such actions, however, will be exceptional. 

A cavalry squadron on an independent mission should ordinarily 
have a machine-gun troop assigned to it, unless its movements are 
to be so rapid that machine guns would seriously delay it, such as 
contact squadrons. All dismounted, first line squadrons should have 
machine-gun troops assigned to them. 

The Mounted Attack 

"The mounted combat of large bodies of cavalry is probably a 
thing of the past. While still possible against mounted units, mod- 
ern machinery of war has become so effective, and the use of obstacles 
so general, that the masses affording large targets would be destroyed 
by fire action before they could reach their objective. Small units, 
however, perhaps up to a squadron, will still have opportunities for 
mounted action, especially against troops that are shaken by fire or 
are disorganized and in retreat. Instant decision is of utmost impor- 
tance in such cases." (Report of Superior Board of Organization, 
A. E. F.) 

In units larger than a squadron, the attack will usually be a com- 
bination of mounted and dismounted action. 

Machine guns are used to augment, or as a substitute for dis- 
mounted fire action, thus permitting the use of a larger percentage 
of the cavalry for mounted shock action. The machine guns should 
by their fire hold up the enemy's progress, cause him to deploy, when- 
ever possible prematurely and in a wrong direction, and pin him to 

202 



Cavalry Machine Guns 203 

his position, while the cavalry maneuvers to get on his flank and 
make the mounted attack. 

The functions of the machine guns in the mounted attack are : 

1. To support the attack by fire up to the last moment before the 
collision. 

2. To bring fire upon the supports and reserves, thus breaking up 
their formations. This is especially important where the enemy is 
also mounted, as the side having the last reserves intact usually will 
win a mounted action. 

3. Should the attack succeed, to move immediately part of the 
guns forward where they can fire on the retreating army, retaining 
the remainder in position to give protection from any possible 
counter-attack. 

4. In case the attack is repulsed, to cover the reorganization of 
the cavalry. 

In any mounted attack, the time element is so short as to preclude 
the possibility of the use of indirect fire. In the attack against 
cavalry there would never be time for preparation of indirect fire 
data. Mounted attacks against infantry might be planned so deliber- 
ately that there would be sufficient time for preparation, but the time 
of the actual charge would be so short that it would not be practicable 
to continue the fire until the cavalry had almost reached the objective. 

Overhead fire, which is the most important type of fire in dis- 
mounted attack, very largely loses its value in a mounted attack. 
Overhead fire can be continued until the attacking line almost reaches 
the enemy only when the enemy is situated on ground that rises 
sharply. Such ground is a very serious obstacle to a mounted attack 
as it greatly reduces the speed of the cavalry and therefore reduces 
its shock effect. However, when it is necessary for cavalry to charge 
across the open for a considerable distance, the machine guns fre- 
quently will be able to support them by overhead fire in the early 
part of the charge. Overhead fire frequently can be used to protect 
the supports and reserves. There may be times when it can be used 
to protect the charging line from a mounted attack from the flank. 

The only position that will enable the machine guns to support the 
charge by fire up to the moment of collision is a position on the flank 
of the charging force. If possible, the position should be a dominant 
one from which the machine gunners can observe the progress of the 
attack and lift their fire from the objective at the last moment. 



204 Employment of Machine Guns 

Since the mounted attack usually will be made against the enemy's 
flank, such positions frequently can be obtained without difficult 
maneuvering, as this places the machine guns in the enemy's front. It 
is important that the machine guns be near the head of the column 
so as quickly to occupy important positions. 

Where it is possible, the machine guns should occupy the position 
without disclosing their presence to the enemy and thus open fire by 
surprise. The most careful arrangements should be made for open- 
ing fire just before the charge starts. A rocket signal usually will 
be the most satisfactory signal. Opening fire at a definite time is 
not as sure as it will be difficult to calculate the exact time necessary 
for the cavalry maneuver. The machine guns should fire at the 
maximum rate during the entire charge. 

While concealment until the moment of opening fire is important, 
cover or protection for the guns and men while in action is unimpor- 
tant. The guns will be in action for such a short time that they 
should not suffer serious losses. Guns supporting a mounted attack 
rarely will dig in, and then only when the attack is against dismounted 
troops in position and has been planned far enough ahead to give 
the guns time to dig in without delaying the action. 

The Dismounted Attack 

"Dismounted fire action is now the most important battle action 
of cavalry and should be frequently practiced. The principles are 
laid down in the drill regulations. As cavalry has not the numbers 
and hence not the depth of infantry, it must seek quick decisions, take 
advantage of its mobility, and look for the enemy's flanks. Its train- 
ing must be such as to enable it to deliver a determined attack on 
foot, and it should be especially skillful and strong in delaying actions, 
making use of its automatic rifles and machine guns. It must learn 
to find cover for its led horses and to counteract the activity of enemy 
airplanes by moving and scattering." (From the Superior Board on 
Organization, A. E. F.) 

In general machine guns in the dismounted attack of cavalry are 
handled as in the infantry attack, but there are some important dif- 
ferences. 

Machine-gun troops assigned to assaulting squadrons will place 
all six guns in action. In the cavalry dismounted action the machine 



Cavalry Machine Guns 205 

guns will seldom be advanced by hand such great distances that the 
gunners will be unable to carry them and bring up a sufficient amount 
of ammunition. The pack horses can be taken farther forward than 
the carts of the infantry. 

The anti-aircraft defense of the squadron and machine-gun troop 
operating with it should be provided for by having one gun in each 
platoon equipped with anti-aircraft sights. These guns would per- 
form the same functions as the other guns except when actually fir- 
ing on aircraft. This plan insures that one gun in each platoon will 
always be assisting the advance of the dismounted cavalry and that 
both guns will be except for few moments at a time. 

One or two platoons usually will be assigned to support each as- 
saulting troop. This assignment of platoons to the support of as- 
saulting troops, however, does not imply a transfer of command over 
such platoons to the rifle-troop commanders. The commander of the 
machine-gun troop retains command of the entire troop. Should 
only one troop be in the assaulting echelon, the entire machine-gun 
troop ordinarily would support it. 

During the approach march and at the beginning of the attack, 
the machine-gun platoons almost invariably will follow in rear of the 
assaulting troops. It will be very exceptional to put them in rear 
of the support troops. The aim of cavalry is to seek a quick decision, 
and the machine guns always should be where they can have an im- 
mediate effect on the situation. 

The working of platoons, use of agents, and position of platoon 
and troop commanders would be similar to machine-gun organizations 
operating with infantry battalions. The action may require more 
boldness on the part of machine-gun officers, but the principles in- 
volved will be the same. 

The brigade machine-gun squadrons seldom will be used for long- 
range covering fire. Most of the troops will be required for assign- 
ment to assault squadrons and the remainder needed for protection 
of the flanks and led horses. The flanks are the most sensitive 
points of the cavalry. Machine guns on the flanks, echeloned to the 
rear, are the best protection, and some guns usually will be assigned 
the mission of protecting the flanks. Machine guns are the ideal 
weapons for protecting the led horses. 

Should the machine guns assigned to squadrons not afford suffi- 
cient fire power to enable the line to advance, the brigade commander 



206 Employment of Machine Guns 

should use any guns he may have in reserve for long-range covering 
fire. 

In the beginning of the action the brigade commander usually 
will hold out a machine-gun reserve of a platoon or a troop. 

The Defensive 

In defense, cavalry may be required to delay an advancing enemy, 
to seize and hold important positions until the arrival of the infantry, 
to obstruct a hostile screening line, or to ward off hostile attacks of 
cavalry. It seldom will be called upon to fight a protracted defensive 
fight. The defense of cavalry thus usually will have the character 
of a containing action.' For this reason machine guns will be em- 
ployed in less depth than with infantry. They should be pushed well 
forward where they will exert an influence from the beginning of the 
fight. They should make the maximum use of long-range fire. This 
early exposure of their positions will cause them to suffer from the 
enemy's fire if they remain throughout the action in the same posi- 
tion. Arrangements should be made for changing the position of a 
gun as soon as it is brought under serious fire. 

Machine guns will be posted in pairs as far as possible. The 
principles of siting guns are exactly the same as with the infantry on 
the defensive. However, the same amount of flank protection from 
guns in rear cannot be expected. 

The character of cavalry action is such as not to give a great 
amount of time for careful reconnaissance and coordination of the 
fire of guns in great detail. All guns to be placed in position will 
have to be assigned directly to squadrons. The machine-gun officers, 
under the direction of the squadron commanders, will arrange with 
the guns on their right and left for mutual support, thus making 
possible a greater amount of flanking fire. Should the position be oc- 
cupied for any extended length of time, it will be possible for brigade 
and division machine-gun officers to arrange for a greater degree of 
cooperation. 

The lack of depth makes it necessary to hold some machine guns 
in reserve. It frequently will be advisable for regimental command- 
ers to hold a machine-gun platoon as a local reserve. The brigade 
commander would usually hold a machine-gun platoon or troop in 
reserve. Both the regimental and brigade reserve would ordinarily 
be assigned a long-range fire mission in front of the front line. 



Cavalry Machine Guns 207 

Advance Guards 

Machine guns with cavalry advance guards will act in much the 
same way and will serve the same purposes as with the infantry. 
There will be minor differences, however. The offensive action of 
cavalry advance guards usually will be in the nature of a mounted 
attack or of a combination of a mounted and dismounted attack. In 
such cases the machine guns would be used as discussed under the 
"mounted attack." 

A cavalry advance guard consisting of a troop or squadron will 
have greater depth than an infantry advance guard of a company or 
battalion, owing to the fact that the distances between the subdivi- 
sions are greater. The cavalry troop or squadron can develop less 
fire power than the infantry company or battalion. The machine guns 
carried on pack horses are less conspicuous than the carts of the infan- 
try. They are also more mobile and can more readily gain cover on 
coming under fire. All of these reasons make it advisable to push 
machine guns farther forward in cavalry advance guards than in in- 
fantry advance guards. A cavalry advance guard as large as a 
squadron usually will have some machine guns with the support. 
From this position they can come into action quickly while the re- 
serve is maneuvering to reach the enemy's flank. 

Marches 

Machine guns usually would be well forward in the column. The 
brigade machine-gun squadron would ordinarily not be farther to the 
rear than the tail of the leading regiment of the brigade. It always 
will be much easier to make assignments of machine-gun troops to 
squadrons or regiments detached for special missions, when the ma- 
chine-gun squadron is well forward. Otherwise much valuable time 
may be lost in waiting for the machine-gun troops to come up. 

When there is no tactical situation involved, it usually will be 
better to march the machine guns at the rear of the column, as the 
pace of the pack mules is too slow for comfortable marching of the 
cavalry. 

Pursuit 

In pursuit, much depends upon the initiative of squadron com- 
manders. After the pursuit is once begun it frequently will be im- 
possible for higher commanders to influence local actions. For this 



208 Employment of Machine Guns 

reason, as far as possible, each squadron participating in the pursuit 
should have a machine-gun troop attached to it at the beginning of the 
pursuit. 

The machine guns with their fire always will attempt to stop the 
enemy and cover him with fire while the cavalry charges him. 

One of the chief uses of machine guns will be to gain and hold 
defiles, bridges, or other points of vantage that may lie on the enemy's 
line of retreat. 

Rear Guards 

The employment of machine guns with cavalry rear guards is 
exactly the same as with infantry rear guards. Owing to their 
greater mobility and the greater mobility of the troops supporting 
them, however, they will be able to make use of positions on the 
flanks of the line of retreat that would be too distant from the column 
for infantry machine guns to occupy. Their greater mobility also 
adds to their ability to ambush the enemy and still make good their 
escape. 



Chapter XX 

Machine-Gun Troop with the Cavalry Squadron 

Terrain Exercise 

[General Map of Vicinity of Leavenworth. Maps: 3-inch Topographical 
Map of Fort Leavenworth and Vicinity. Fort Leavenworth sheet. (Map 
No. 10.)] 

Part I 

General Situation: 

War has been declared between Kansas (Red) and Missouri 
(Blue). The 1st Division Blue with the 1st Cavalry and two ma- 
chine-gun troops is advancing from Plattsburg to seize the bridges 
at Leavenworth and Fort Leavenworth and establish a bridgehead. 
The night of the 6th-7th of November, the 1st Cavalry camped at 
Platte City andt he infantry brigades at Woodruff and Dearborn. 

A Red infantry division has been mobilized at Valley Falls and a 
cavalry division at Kansas City, Kansas. Reliable reports received 
by the Blue commander at 10.00 p. m., November 6, stated that 
Leavenworth and Fort Leavenworth were not occupied by the enemy 
but that a squadron of Red Cavalry had gone into camp at Lansing 
about 9.00 p. m., November 6. 

Special Situation (Blue) : 

Colonel A, commanding 1st Cavalry and two machine-gun troops, 
was ordered to start at 6.00 a. m., November 7, to seize the bridges 
at Leavenworth and Fort Leavenworth and to hold the high ground 
to the west and south until the arrival of the infantry. Colonel A 
decided to lead two squadrons and a machine-gun troop against the 
bridge at Leavenworth. He directed Major A to take command of 
the 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, and Troop A, 1st Machine-Gun Squad- 
ron to start at 6.00 a. m., November 7, to seize and hold the bridge 
at Fort Leavenworth, Sentinel Hill and the high ground from south- 
west to Bell Point. 

At 8.00 a. m., November 7, Major A's command was disposed as 
follows along Augur Avenue and the A — B — C — D — E Road. The 
advance guard consisted of Troop G (less 3d Platoon). The point 
of the advance guard was halted in observation at the southwest cor- 

209 



210 Employment of Machine Guns 

ner of the National Cemetery. The advance party of one platoon 
was 400 yards in rear of the point. The support was about 100 
yards east of B. The head of the main body was at the Post Ex- 
change. The order of march of the main body was 3d Platoon, 
Troop G, Machine-Gun Troop, Troops H and I (less Machine Rifle 
Platoon). The Machine Rifle Platoon, Troop I, had been dropped 
off as a bridge guard for the immediate protection of the bridge. All 
wheel transportation had been left with the 1st Division. 

Major A, with Captain M, commanding machine-gun troop and 
commander of Troop G, was riding at the head of the support. 

When the head of the support was 100 yards east of B, a messen- 
ger from the advance party handed Captain A the following message, 
which he read and turned over to Major A : 

ADVANCE PARTY, NEAR G, 

7 November, '19, 7.58 a. m. 
C. O., 

Advance Guard. 
About a troops of enemy cavalry in advance guard formation is 
advancing north of PRISON LANE. Point is 1,000 yards north of 
the PENITENTIARY and tail just north of PENITENTIARY. 

X, Lieut. 

Major A immediately galloped to the top of the hill at B. He 
could see a troop in advance guard formation with the point about 
1,500 yards, and the tail about 600 yards north of the penitentiary. 
On the north and south road along the east side of the penitentiary 
he could see what appeared to be the remainder of a squadron. All 
elements of the enemy were moving at a walk. The enemy had ap- 
parently observed nothing. 

Required : 

A statement of the detailed plan of action decided on by Major A. 
Time allowed — 30 minutes. 

Part II 
Solution to Part I: 

Major A decided to have the advance guard cover his right flank 
and be prepared to seize the gap at E. 



Troop with Cavalry Squadron 211 

To place the machine-gun troop in action on Engineer Hill with 
the 3d Platoon, Troop G, providing the immediate protection for 
the machine gunners. 

To lead Troops H and I to South Merritt Hill by way of Grant 
Avenue and the unimproved road south of Merritt Lake. To have 
Captain B, with Troops H and I (less machine rifle platoons) 
charge the support of the advance guard and the head of the main 
body. To himself remain on South Merritt Hill where he can signal 
all parts of his command, and to hold the machine rifle platoon of 
Troop H at South Merritt Hill for the troops to rally on if defeated. 

Major A decides to have the machine-gun troop and Troop G hold 
their fire until the charge is launched. He intends to permit the 
enemy point to almost reach the machine-gun troop before charging 
so as to bring the enemy's main body in a position where it can be 
charged. 

Required : 

The orders as actually issued by Captain M, commanding the 
machine-gun troop, to carry out the plan of Major A. 
Time allowed — 30 minutes. 

Part III 

Upon receiving instructions from Major A, Captain M gave the 
following verbal order to his 1st sergeant who was with him : 

"You see that building on the hill in front of us. Gallop back to 
the troop and direct the platoon leaders to report to me at that build- 
ing as soon as possible. You will remain with the troop and guide 
it to the same place at a trot. Turn it off the "main road when you 
reach the west end of the barracks. Take Smith with you to guide 
the officers to the building." 

Captain M, with one bugler, then proceeded at a gallop to Engi- 
neer Hill. When the platoon leaders reported, Captain M gave the 
following verbal orders: 

"You can see just over the crest a squadron of enemy cavalry 
marching north on Prison Lane, with one troop in advance guard 
formation. 

"Troops H and I will make a mounted attack from South Merritt 
Hill. Troop G (less 3d Platoon) will cover the right flank. It is 



212 Employment of Machine Guns 

now just west of the cemetery. 3d Platoon, Troop A, will provide 
immediate protection for the machine gunners. 

"The machine-gun troop will support the attack, opening fire 
when the charging line emerges from the woods on South Merritt 
Hill. 

"Firing positions along the crest from here to the National Ceme- 
tery. The 1st Platoon will occupy the right third, the 2d Platoon the 
center third, and the 3d Platoon the left third. 
"Targets : 

1st Platoon, the advance party of the enemy advance guard. 
2d Platoon, the support of the enemy advance guard. 
3d Platoon, the enemy main body. 

"Mount your guns under cover and drag them into position with- 
out disclosing the position. Occupy your position at once. Animals 
in ravine in rear of your positions. Signal me when ready and open 
fire on my signal. 

"I shall remain here/' 

Situation : 

The charge was executed as planned. The advance guard and the 
head of the main body of the enemy gave way and fled southward 
pursued by the Blue cavalry. However, when the Blue cavalry 
reached Corral Creek they encountered heavy rifle and machine-gun 
fire from the high ground just north of the penitentiary, the first 
Red squadron having been followed by a machine-gun troop and a 
second squadron which hastily dismounted and went into action. The 
Blue force broke under this fire and fell back in disorder toward 
South Merritt Hill, protected by machine guns on Engineer Hill. 
Just before the fleeing troopers reached South Merritt Hill, Major A 
received the following message: 

Headquarters, 1st Cavalry, 
BRIDGE OVER MISSOURI AT LEAVENWORTH, 

7 November, '19, 7.40 a. m. 
CO., 

1st Sq., 1st Cav. 
Encountered heavy resistance just after crossing the bridge. Still 
fighting in streets of LEAVENWORTH with result in doubt. Have 



Troop with Cavalry Squadron 213 

learned from reliable reports that a brigade of cavalry detrained at 
LANSING at 6.00 a. m. today. 

Take up a defensive position and hold the FORT LEAVEN- 
WORTH BRIDGE at any cost. Assistance should reach you at 
10.00 a. m. 

Y, Col. 

Major A sent the following verbal order to Captain M by his 
adjutant, and immediately devoted his entire energy to the reorgani- 
zation of his scattered troops : 

"A brigade of enemy cavalry is engaging our squadron and the 
remainder of our regiment in Leavenworth. 

"Our regiment holds the bridge at Leavenworth. 

"This squadron will defend the position Pope Hill — South Merritt 
Hill — National Cemetery. The position will be held at any cost. 
Assistance is expected at 10.00 a. m. 

"Troop G will occupy the section National Cemetery, inclusive, to 
South Merritt Hill, inclusive. 

"Troop H will occupy the section South Merritt Hill, exclusive, to 
Pope Hill, inclusive. 

"Troop I will form on Hill 868 as a general reserve. 

"You will make a disposition of your machine guns at once to 
cover the position. The troops will make their disposition conform 
to the machine-gun positions. 

"Major A will be with the reserve." 

Required : 

The orders actually issued by Captain M, commanding ma- 
chine-gun troop. 

Time allowed — 1 hour. 

Solution to Part II : 

Captain M assembled his officers and gave them the following 
verbal orders : 

"A brigade of enemy cavalry is engaging our squadron and the 
remainder of our regiment in Leavenworth. 

"Our regiment holds the bridge at Leavenworth. 

"Our squadron will defend the position Pope Hill — South Mer- 
ritt Hill — National Cemetery. The position will be held at any cost. 
Assistance is expected at 10.00 a. m. 



214 Employment of Machine Guns 

"Troop G will occupy the section National Cemetery, inclusive, 
to South Merritt Hill, inclusive. 

"Troop H will occupy the section South Merritt Hill, exclusive, 
to Pope Hill, inclusive. 

"Troop I will form on Hill 868 as a general reserve. 

"The cavalry will make their dispositions conform to the machine- 
gun positions. 

"The 1st Platoon will take position in the southeast corner of the 
National Cemetery, flanking the front of the defensive position from 
the cemetery to South Merritt Hill. This platoon will have an in- 
terior line of fire south of Merritt Lake. 

"The 2d Platoon will take position near the saddle on South 
Merritt Hill, flanking the front of the defensive position from South 
Merritt Hill to Pope Hill, and covering the ravine from Corral Creek 
to South Merritt Hill. 

"The 3d Platoon will take position on Pope Hill so as to cover 
the bridge over Corral Creek at Grant Avenue and the ravine be- 
tween Grant Hill and Hill 862, and will cross fire with the 2d Platoon 
on South Merritt Hill. 

"The 1st Platoon will remain in its present position until South 
Merritt Hill is occupied by the 2d Platoon. 

"Other platoons will move out at once and occupy their positions. 
Notifications will be sent to me when positions have been occupied. 

"Animals will be placed in the vicinity of the platoons. 

"I shall be at Hill 868." 

Comments 

Part I. — The situation was one demanding instant action on the 
part of Major A. His mission required him to gain possession of 
the gaps at E and at Hill 1054. This could only be done by defeating 
the enemy. From what he could see the enemy had a squadron of 
cavalry. He knew that a squadron of cavalry had reached Lansing 
the night before, and he immediately arrived at the conclusion that 
this was the force in front of him. 

The enemy was apparently unconscious of his presence. This 
gave him an opportunity to defeat the enemy quickly and decisively 
by a combination of mounted and dismounted action. Engineer Hill 
directly in front of him was an excellent position for the machine 
guns, and South Merritt Hill offered an excellent position from which 



Troop with Cavalry Squadron 215 

to launch the mounted charge. The latter could be reached under 
cover before the enemy point reached Engineer Hill by taking a 
rapid gait. 

Engineer Hill was excellent in every respect for the machine 
guns. It was a commanding position on the flank so that the fire 
could be continued almost up to the moment of collision. South Mer- 
ritt Hill was in plain view so that the machine gunners could see 
the cavalry emerging from the woods for the charge. Since the 
enemy had not discovered their presence they could thus hold their 
fire until that moment, thereby adding the element of surprise and 
making the confusion in the enemy's ranks greater. 

The advance guard of the three platoons was perhaps greater than 
Major A needed to protect his right flank, but it was already in a 
position to perform that duty and there was not time to give a part 
of it another mission. 

It is always best to have a small force assigned to the immediate 
protection of the machine guns. Otherwise, in case of the mounted 
attack meeting with a reverse, a small party of the enemy might 
penetrate the machine-gun position and seriously interfere with the 
machine guns just at the time that they would be needed most to 
cover the reorganization of the cavalry. The 3d Platoon, Troop G, 
was sufficient to furnish such protection and was in a position where 
it could be readily used without delay. 

Major A considered that it would be best to lead the charging 
troops to South Merritt Hill himself and then turn the command over 
to the senior captain. This would give Major A a better chance to 
influence the action at a later stage by the employment of the ma- 
chine guns or Troop G. 

Part II. — Captain M wished to remain in observation of the 
enemy and to have a few minutes to decide upon the employment of 
his guns before the arrival of the troop. It was important, however, 
that the troop should not expose itself in coming forward, and for 
that reason he sent the 1st sergeant back for the troop instead of 
trusting to an orderly. 

The position to be occupied was an easy one to go into, with the 
ravine affording excellent cover for the animals, so that the only 
thing involving serious consideration was the distribution of his fire. 
Fire must be placed on both the advance guard and the main body. 
The advance guard, although smaller, is a more difficult target on 



216 Employment of Machine Guns 

account of being so widely scattered. For this reason Captain M de- 
cides to assign one platoon to the main body and two platoons to the 
advance guard. Captain M does not announce a range or a method 
of fire as the range cannot be determined at this time and the methods 
of fire will vary in the two platoons. 

There is a possibility that the enemy will discover the presence of 
the Blue force and that it will be necessary to open fire before the 
mounted attack emerges from the woods on South Merritt Hill. For 
this reason he tells the platoon commanders to open fire on his signal. 
He will remain in observation and will open fire at any time that the 
situation demands. 

Part III. — You were told that the cavalry dispositions would con- 
form to the machine-gun positions in order to give you a free hand 
in determining upon the location of the guns. 

Captain M faces a situation that will very often exist in cavalry, 
that of having to cover a very wide front with a few guns but having 
to hold the position for only a limited time before the arrival of as- 
sistance. Such a situation demands that all guns shall be so sited that 
they can have an influence on the action from the beginning. There 
can be little thought of distribution of guns in depth. There may be 
opportunities to assign missions to certain guns to be carried out in 
case the line is penetrated, but these missions must be secondary to 
flanking the main defensive position. 

Captain M has no time to make a reconnaissance of the whole 
position but must issue his order from the map. He may be able to 
make changes later if necessary. He has an excellent view of the 
west part of the position so he can issue more definite orders for 
that part. 

Engineer Hill, where his guns are now located, is a good position, 
but not as good as the corner of the cemetery. The field of fire is 
much better at the cemetery, as South Merritt Hill cuts off the 
southern portion of the position from his present location. Guns 
located at the cemetery would also have a grazing fire, which is a 
decided advantage. The walls of the cemetery are solid masonry 
and will offer perfect protection from small-arms fire except at very 
short ranges. 

Guns placed in the saddle at South Merritt Hill would be pro- 
tected by riflemen on the western half of the hill and would have a 
much better field of fire than if placed on the highest part of the hill, 



Troop with Cavalry Squadron 217 

as in addition to flanking the front of the position as far as Grant 
Avenue they can enfilade the ravine leading up from Corral Creek. 

The effectiveness of the guns of the 3d Platoon will depend largely 
upon the judgment of the platoon commander in selecting the exact 
positions for the guns. Captain A can see from the map that it is 
important to cover the ravine between Grant Hill and Hill 862 and 
to cover the bridges over Corral Creek at Grant Avenue. The best 
position on Pope Hill for doing this can only be determined by an 
inspection of the ground. They can cross fire with the guns on 
South Merritt Hill from almost any position as the country to the 
west is quite open. 

The character of the ground is such that places for the animals 
can be easily found in the vicinity of the guns and there is every ad- 
vantage in having them there. 

Captain A gives his command post as Hill 868, as he is sure 
that the major will want him where he can keep in touch with him 
and receive early information that the guns have all been posted. 

The following are the principal errors made in the solution of 
this terrain exercise. 

Part I. — 1. Made a dismounted attack, although the mounted at- 
tack promised more decisive results with a possibility of a complete 
surprise. 

2. Provided no protection for machine guns. 

3. Provided no covering detachment for the flank opposite the 
attack. 

4. Ordered dispositions that it would take too long to carry out. 

5. Did not make the maximum use of the element of surprise. 

6. Sent a platoon of machine guns with the mounted attack where 
the guns would have delayed the attack and been of little use. 

Part II. — 1. Placed part of the guns east or south of the building 
on Engineer Hill. The position to the west of the building per- 
mitted the guns to fire longer during the charge. 

2. Gave no information to the platoon leaders that the advance 
guard would cover the right flank. 

3. Announced ranges to platoon leaders. Since ranges were con- 
stantly changing it would have been better to leave their determina- 
tion to platoon leaders. 

4. Did not give the disposition of the animals. 

5. Did not announce the position of Captain M. 



218 Employment of Machine Guns 

6. Gave orders to combat wagons which had been left back with 
the division. 

7. Assumed carts to be part of the equipment of a machine-gun 
troop. 

8. Captain M returned to the troop instead of remaining in ob- 
servation of the enemy and sending for the troop. 

9. Did not cover Red advance guard with fire. 

10. Made no attempt to open surprise fire and launch the charge 
at the same moment. 

11. Did not assign firing positions to the platoons. 

12. Made no assignment of targets to platoons. 

Part III. — 1. Did not inform platoon leaders that the cavalry 
dispositions would conform to the machine-gun positions. 

2. Placed all of the guns in one position instead of providing for 
the flanking of the whole positions. 

3. Did not give the disposition of the animals. 

4. Did not give platoon leaders sufficient information of cavalry 
dispositions. 

5. Did not provide for the maximum amount of flanking fire. 

6. Delayed the placing of guns in position in order to make a 
reconnaissance instead of posting guns immediately and making 
changes where necessary. 

7. Placed more guns than necessary in one position in spite of the 
fact that the number of guns was inadequate to properly defend the 
position. On the defensive, machine guns were usually posted in 
pairs. 

8. Did not tell platoon leaders that line must be held at any cost. 

9. Did not inform platoon leaders when assistance could be ex- 
pected. 

10. Did not give position of Captain M. 



I ), Chapter XX 




Map No. 10, Chapter XX 




Appendix A 

Trajectory Chart and Chart for Searching 
Reverse Slopes 

In order that a commander may always know whether a mission 
which he desires to assign to the machine guns can be accomplished 
by them he must be able to carry out the following technical opera- 
tions : 

1. Find the range in case of direct fire or the quadrant elevation 
and equivalent range in case of indirect fire in order to determine 
whether the range is an effective one for machine guns. 

2. In case there is a hill or other obstruction between the gun 
position and the target, determine whether it is possible for the cone 
of fire to clear the obstruction and hit the target. 

3. If there are friendly troops between the guns and the target, 
determine whether it is safe to fire over the friendly troops with the 
elevation required to hit the target. 

4. If it is desired to fire upon enemy troops upon a reverse slope, 
determine whether it is possible to search the slope effectively from 
the locations of his machine guns or select a position from which the 
slope can be searched effectively. 

The first three of these operations can be performed most expedi- 
tiously by use of the trajectory chart and the fourth by use of the 
chart for searching reverse slopes. 

Use of Trajectory Chart 

Example : 

Range from gun to target 2,300 meters. 

Height of target above gun 100 meters. 

Obstruction 160 meters high at a range of 1,800 meters. 

Friendly troops 130 meters above gun at a range of 1,200 meters. 

To find the quadrant elevation: 

Follow up the 2,300-meter vertical line until it cuts the horizontal 
line marked 100 meters. Take the trajectory through this point 
shown in black. Its quadrant elevation is 170 mils. If the point 
should fall between two trajectories, an interpolation should be made. 

219 



220 Employment of Machine Guns 

If equivalent range is desired, follow the trajectory down until it 
crosses the line for zero elevation which gives an equivalent range 
of 2,540 meters. 

To find the clearance of the obstruction: 

Follow the 170-mil black trajectory back to the 1,800-meter verti- 
cal range line. It intersects this vertical line at a height of 187 
meters. Since the obstruction is only 160 meters high at this point, 
the trajectory clears it by 27 meters. Looking above the 1,800-meter 
range line it is seen that the lowest shot of the cone is 19.3 meters 
below the center shot of the cone. Therefore the complete cone of 
fire will clear the obstruction. 

To determine whether it is safe to fire over friendly troops: 

Take the red trajectory marked 170 mils (to correspond to the 
quadrant elevation of 170 mils determined above) and follow it to the 
1,200-meter vertical range line. It intersects this line at a height of 
137 meters showing that it is safe to fire over friendly troops at a 
range of 1,200 meters at any height not greater than 137 meters. The 
height of the friendly troops is only 130 meters, so that it is safe to 
fire over them. 

Chart for Searching Reverse Slopes 

In order to search a reverse slope effectively, the gun must be 
placed at such a distance from the crest that the fall of the bullet will 
be slightly steeper than the slope of the ground. If the reverse slope 
had no inequalities or shell holes, the maximum result would be ob- 
tained when the fall of the bullet was exactly the same as the slope 
of the ground, as in that case perfectly grazing fire would be possible. 
Since there are inequalities, however, the best results will be obtained 
when the fall of the bullet is greater than the slope of the ground. 
The best angle of impact is one that is approximately 45 mils. Any 
angle between 30 and 60 mils gives excellent results, and good results 
can be obtained with any angle between 15 and 75 mils. 

There are two problems that may arise in connection with search- 
ing reverse slopes : 

1. To determine the searching powers of a gun in position. 

2. To find the best position from which to search a reverse slope. 
The chart for searching reverse slopes enables one to meet both 

of the problems. 



Rang* "> Meters 



Out C*IWm&l /tip 




Trajectory and Other Charts 221 

This graph comprises a series of curves representing various re- 
verse slopes from 10 to 150 mils. Ranges are represented by verti- 
cal lines. The points at which the slope curves cut the thick hori- 
zontal line indicate ranges at which the angle of impact of 45 mils 
is obtained on various slopes with the gun and the target on the same 
level. The diagonal lines represent the angle of impact when firing 
at any range, at any vertical interval, on any slope. 

When reading the graph it should be borne in mind that the slope 
curves represent an angle of impact of 45 mils throughout their 
length, reading along the curves. Also the diagonal lines, represent- 
ing the angles of impact, give the angle when reading along the verti- 
cal lines. 

To determine the searching powers of a gun in position: 

1. Find the point at which the slope curve crosses the vertical 
range line. 

2. Then if the gun is below the crest of the target, move down the 
range line from this point through the required vertical interval. If 
the gun is above the crest, move up the range line. 

3. The angle of impact obtained by firing at that range with that 
vertical interval on that particular slope can be read off along the 
diagonal lines. 

Example: A reverse slope of 60 mils is at a range of 1,600 
meters and is 20 meters above the gun. 

1. The 60-mil slope curve cuts the 1,600 range line at a point cor- 
responding to 22 meters above the gun. 

[Note: This means that the angle of impact on a slope of 60 
mils at 1,600 meters and 22 meters above the gun is 45 mils. Also 
interpolating between the diagonal lines, the angle of impact on a 
slope of 60 mils at 1,600 meters and on a level with the gun is 59 
mils.] 

2. Since the target is 20 meters above the gun, move 20 meters 
down the vertical line, and the new point thus established is on the 
1,600-meter range line with the target 20 meters above the gun. 

3. Interpolating between diagonal lines, the angle of impact is 
found to be 47 mils. The target, therefore, can be engaged success- 
fully. 



222 Employment of Machine Guns 

To find the best position front which to search a reverse slope: 

1. Find the point at which the particular slope curve cuts the 
central horizontal line. This gives the best range from which to 
engage the slope if gun and crest are on the same level. 

2. From the map find the vertical interval between the crest and 
the gun. 

3. If the crest is above the gun, move up the curve to the re- 
quired vertical interval and read off the range along the vertical line. 
If the crest is below the gun, move down to the required vertical 
interval. 

Example: It is desired to search a slope of 50 mils. 

1. The 50-mil slope curve cuts the central horizontal line at a 
range of 1,460. 

2. Assume that measuring back from the target 1,460 meters, the 
target is 20 meters below the position thus found. 

3. Move down the 50-mil slope curve to the 20-meter line, and the 
range at which the gun should be located is found to be 1,380 meters. 

[Note: If the contour reading at 1,380 is materially different 
from that at 1,460, again move up or down the slope curve to the 
new vertical interval and continue until the proper position is found.} 



4.8 5 6-1 8.9 9.7 10.7 12.0 13.6 15.9 18.8 22 
5.2 6.7-1 14.2 16.5 19.3 22.7 27.1 33.3 41.3 52 / 
*00 120000 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 23( 




200 1300 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 



P5.4 



3(5.9 42.2 49.3 57.2 66.0 75.7 86.4 98.2 111.3 



23C 
126 



2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 

.2 .5 .7 .9 

100 200 300 400 



2.1 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.8 5.6 6.4 7 2 8 1 8.9 9.7 
1.9 2.5 3.2 4.1 5.2 6.7 8.3 io'l 12.1 14.2 16.5 
700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 



10.7 12.0 13.6 15.9 18.8 22.7 28.3 36.5 49.3 \ below eon- 
19.3 22.7 27.1 33.3 41.3 52.2 67.S 91.1 128.1 / terofconc 
1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400 2500 2600 2700 2800 



TRAJECTORY CHART 

FOR THE 

BROWNING MACHINE GUN 



150 GRAIN BULLET 

PREPARED AT 

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL 

FORT BENNING, GA. 



r es are trajectory curves for Q. E. in 
REB CURVES SHOW 5AFETV LIMITS 



In order to fire safely ovs 
any Q. E., their position 
sponding red curve. 




* 'A 



200 300 400 500 600 700 
1.6 2.7 4.0 5.5 7.2 9.2 



.5 14.2 17.4 2 



100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400 2500 2600 2700 2800 
Range in meters 
25.4 30.3 35.9 42.2 49.3 57.2 66.0 75.7 86.4 98.2 111.3 126.0 142.8 162.5 186.3 215.9 253.7 



Employment of 
Machine Guns 

By 

Major WALTER C. SHORT, Infantry 

A comprehensive study of American 
Machine Gun tactics as developed 
in the World War. 

The only textbook on machine guns 
based on the present tables of 
organization. 



Price $3.50 postpaid 



United States Infantry Association 

Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C. 



MAP READING 



The most complete treatment of the subject of Map Read- 
ing that has been produced 

Price 60c, postpaid 



Here's what you get with Map Reading: 

1. Complete explanatory text covering (a) The computation, 
construction, and practical application of scales; (b) the determi- 
nation of direction — intersection and resection; (c) the conven- 
tional signs, fully illustrated; (d) contours, with complete expla- 
nation of the information they are intended to convey; (e) dozens 
and dozens of practical problems that bring out in a thoroughly 
practical way every phase of the subject of Map Reading. 

2. Outline maps — road and position — for practice in filling in 
contours. 

3. A complete explanation and practical illustration of the 
methods of determining map location by coordinates. 

4. All the equipment required for a complete course in Map 
Reading: (a) A six-inch protractor for solution of the direction 
problems; (b) a scale of horizontal equivalents; (c) a scale for 
reading map coordinates direct; (d) sheets of cross-section paper 
for the solution of visibility problems. 

5. The following maps are furnished with each copy of the 
book: 

(A) The P-ll sheet of the 12-inch Emmitsburg quadrangle specially 
prepared. 

(B) The Complete 3-inch Emmitsburg quadrangle, with grid lines 
printed in Red. 

If you will take the complete course of study contained 
in this book it is assured that you will be able to read 
any Military Map. 



UNITED STATES INFANTRY ASSOCIATION 

Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C. 



American 

Campaigns 

By Major M. F. Steele 

Prepared originally for students of the 
Army Service Schools in conjunction with 
their course in military history. 

Much has been written on the individual 
campaigns and battles that make up our mili- 
tary history, but this is the only single work 
that contains a comprehensive narrative of 
the whole down to and including the Spanish 
American War. 

The present edition is a reprint 
from new type and plates of the work 
which originally appeared in 1909, 
and which has been unobtainable ex- 
cept in second-hand book shops for 
many years. 

Two volumes in case 

Price, $10.00 per set 



U. S. Infantry Association 

Union Trust Building Washington, D. C. 



Reserve Officers 
Examiner — 



Based on the 
requirements of 
Special Regula- 
tions No. 43, War 
Department. 



Administration A book that places in the 

Military Law hands of Reserve Officers a 

Military Courtesy, Cus- complete set of questions and 

answers covering the five sub- 



toms of the Service 
I Service Regulat 
Military Hygiene 



jects included in the Basic 
Field Service Regulations Examination for promotion. 



Reserve Officers Examiner has been examined by myself 
and other officers on duty here. (Hd. 77th Div.) It is a 
good book and presents in very acceptable form the partic- 
ular information required by Reserve Officers in preparing 
for examination for promotion and keeping themselves 
posted on the subject matter therein. 

The book is so good that I am recommending its imme- 
diate purchase by all Reserve Officers assigned or attached 
to this Division. It enables them, with the least expen- 
diture of time, to get the material they need on the five 
basic subjects treated. 

J. J. BRADLEY, 
Colonel of Infantry, 
Chief of Staff 77th Division. 



Get your copy now. Devote some of 
your spare time to the study of its con- 
tents, and when the time comes you will 
be ready for your EXAMINATION FOR 
PROMOTION. 

Price $2.00 the Copy 



UNITED STATES INFANTRY ASSOCIATION 

Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C. 



Scouting and Patrolling 

By Lt. Col. W. H. WALDRON, U. S. Army 

Every Machine Gunner must be a 
Trained Scout. This little book will tell 
him in language that he can understand, 
just what to do and how to do it. 

CONTENTS 



Chapter I. — Importance of Infor- 
mation. 

Chapter II.— The Scout. Quali- 
fications of a scout. 

Chapter III.— Notes on scouting. 
Nervousness. Finding way. Cap- 
ture. Methods of scouting. 

Chapter IV. — Concealment. Use 
of common sense. Use of crest 
lines. Exercise of caution when 
moving. Remaining motionless 

when halted. Selection of observa- 
tion posts. Darkness. 

Chapter V. — Seeing and hearing. 
Sight training. Distinguishing ob- 
jects. 

Chapter VI.— Signs of the enemy. 
Troops on march. Tracks. Esti- 
mating strength. System of pro- 
tection. 

Chapter VII. — Patrols. Duties. 
Strength. Composition. Com- 

mander. Equipment. Instructions. 
Preparations. Starting. Formation. 
Communication. Conduct of patrol. 
Encountering the enemy. Night 
operations. Returning. 

Chapter VHI. — Reconnaissance of 
ground. Roads. Railroads. Rivers. 
Bridges. Towns and villages. Build- 
ings. Woods. Hills. Defiles. Re- 
connaissance of enemy. Bivouac. 
Defensive position on the march. 



Chapter DC. — Messages. Instruc- 
tion in the preparation. 

Chapter X.— Signals and signaling. 
Arm signals. Visual signaling. 
General service code. Semaphore 
code. Conventional Signals. 

Chapter XL — Map reading. Scales. 
Conventional signs. Direction. 

Contours. 

Chapter XDI. — Advance guards. 
Strength and composition. Forma- 
tion. Distance between elements. 
Company of infantry as advance 
guard. The point. The advance 
party. The support. Communica- 
tion. Halts. Flankers. Method of 
instruction. 

Chapter Xin.— Outposts. Posi- 
tion. Strength and composition. 
Formation. Outpost orders. The 
support. The outpost at night. 

Chapter XIV.— First aid. Wounds. 
First aid packet. Stopping bleed- 
ing. Broken bones. Drowning. 
Method of resuscitation. Snake 
bites. Freezing and frost bite. 
Sunstroke. 



Endorsed by Leading Officers of the Army 
Cloth bound • . Fits the pocket 

Price 75 cents. Postage Paid 



United States Infantry Association 

Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C. 



Just plain everyday talks in 
language you can understand 

Will save the instructor's time by furnishing him 
with a guide which he may rearrange or elaborate 
as he chooses. 



Thirty-Minute 
Talks— 



Colonel M. B. Stewart 
and 

Lt. Colonel W. H. Waldron 



Subjects of 

the Talks 

Organization. 

Training. 

Instructing. 

Physical Development. 

Close Order Drill. 

Extended Order Drill. 

Military Courtesy. 

Military Discipline. 

Care of Arms and Equip- 
ment. 

Advance Guards. 

Outposts. 

Scouting and Patrolling. 

Combat. 

Approach March and 
Deployment. 

Musketry. 

Orders and Messages. 

Field Fortifications. 

Map Reading. 

Military Sketching. 

Contouring. 



Explaining is half the 
work of instructing. Talk 
saves work — when it is 
the right kind of talk. 
For the instructor, ex- 
plaining, talking, is the 
hardest part because it 
means constant brushing 
up, reading, study, thought 
and planning — all of which 
takes time, and time counts 
heavily in the game of in- 
tensive training. 



Price $2.50 Postpaid 



United States Infantry Association 

Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



021 899 189 







